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10 CVE

Critique 1 Élevée 6 Moyenne 3 Faible 0 Non évaluée 0 Exploitées (KEV) Tri : plus récentes « Getarcane arcane » ✕
  1. CVE-2026-96628 4.3 Moyenne

    getarcaneapp arcane

    Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 2.11.0, AuthMiddleware.managerAuth accepts X-Arcane-Agent-Token credentials and the environment-token branch calls next before the AdminRequired option is evaluated. An attacker with a valid X-Arcane-Agent-Token can request /api/debug/pprof/* through a route protected by WithAdminRequired because EnvironmentPermissionSet is installed and the request continues without checking IsGlobalAdmin. This exposes administrator-restricted Go pprof runtime and diagnostic information and may impose profiling overhead. This issue is fixed in version 2.11.0.

  2. CVE-2026-96627 8.8 Élevée

    getarcaneapp arcane

    Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 2.6.0, UpdateUser in backend/api/handlers/users.go sets PasswordHash for any target without comparing caller and target privilege. A holder of delegated users:update permission can submit a password change for the global administrator, replace the administrator password, and authenticate as that account, resulting in complete global administrator account takeover. This issue is fixed in version 2.6.0.

  3. CVE-2026-96626 8.5 Élevée

    getarcaneapp arcane

    Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 2.5.0, UpdateRegistry and TestRegistry in backend/api/services/container_registry_service.go allow the registry URL to change while preserving the stored encrypted token. When a holder of registries:update and registries:test repoints a generic registry URL without supplying a replacement token, TestRegistry decrypts the preserved token and RegistryLogin sends it to the attacker-controlled host because normalizeRegistryServerAddressInternal does not restrict the destination. This exposes the stored container-registry PAT or password and can enable image access or tampering. This issue is fixed in version 2.5.0.

  4. CVE-2026-86114 6.5 Moyenne

    getarcaneapp arcane

    Arcane versions before 2.0.0 fail to properly restrict template operations, allowing default user role accounts to create, modify, and delete compose templates including instance-wide defaults. Attackers can inject malicious container configurations with privileged settings or host path mounts that execute with administrative privileges when deployed by administrators.

  5. CVE-2026-47179 7.7 Élevée

    getarcaneapp arcane

    Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.4, ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent returns the contents of any Docker Compose include directive declared in a project's compose file before any path-traversal validation runs. Because ProjectService.CreateProject writes attacker-supplied compose content to disk without validating include paths, an authenticated user can create a project whose compose file declares include: ['../../../../etc/passwd'], then read the include via the project file API. The result is arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process, including /app/data/arcane.db (the SQLite database containing every user's password hash and API key), enabling escalation to admin and, via Arcane's Docker control plane, RCE on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.4.

  6. CVE-2026-47125 8.8 Élevée

    getarcaneapp arcane

    Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.2, the PUT /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables endpoint, which writes the system-wide .env.global file used for variable substitution in every project's compose file, is missing an admin authorization check. Any authenticated non-admin user can call this endpoint with their bearer token or API key and overwrite the global environment variables that are merged into every project deployment. By overriding values like REGISTRY, IMAGE, DATABASE_URL, or SECRET_KEY that other users reference via ${VAR} in compose files, an attacker can redirect image pulls to attacker-controlled registries (supply-chain RCE on the Docker host), exfiltrate database credentials, or disrupt all projects. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.2.

  7. CVE-2026-45627 8.2 Élevée

    getarcaneapp arcane

    Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.0, the unauthenticated GET /api/app-images/logo endpoint reflects a user-supplied color query parameter into the body of an SVG document via strings.ReplaceAll with no escaping. The substitution lands inside a <style> element of the embedded logo.svg, allowing an attacker to close the style block and inject executable <script> content. Because the response is served as image/svg+xml and Arcane sets no Content-Security-Policy or X-Content-Type-Options headers, navigating a logged-in admin victim to a crafted URL executes attacker-controlled JavaScript in Arcane's origin and rides the victim's HttpOnly JWT cookie to fully compromise the admin account. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.0.

  8. CVE-2026-45626 6.3 Moyenne

    getarcaneapp arcane

    Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. In 1.18.1 and earlier, GET /environments/{id}/volumes/{volumeName}/browse accepts a path query parameter that is passed to a shell command (sh -c "find … | while …") inside an Arcane helper container. The path sanitiser blocks ../ traversal but does not strip Bourne-shell metacharacters such as $() or backticks, and strconv.Quote only escapes Go string metacharacters, not shell substitution sequences. Any authenticated user with access to a browseable volume can execute arbitrary commands inside the helper container; command output is reflected back in the 500 error body.

  9. CVE-2026-45625 9.9 Critique

    getarcaneapp arcane

    Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.0, Arcane's huma-based REST API exposes nine endpoints under /api/customize/git-repositories and /api/git-repositories/sync for managing GitOps source repositories and their stored credentials. Eight of those endpoints (list, create, get, update, delete, test, listBranches, browseFiles) never call the checkAdmin(ctx) helper that every other admin-managed resource (container registries, environments, users, API keys, swarm, settings, system, notifications, events) uses, and the huma authentication middleware deliberately enforces only authentication, not the admin role. As a result, any logged-in user with the default user role can list, create, modify, delete, and test git repository configurations. By repointing an existing repository's URL to an attacker-controlled host while omitting the token/sshKey fields (which UpdateRepository only rewrites when explicitly supplied), the attacker causes Arcane to decrypt the legitimate PAT/SSH key on its next /test, /branches, or /files call and present it as HTTP Basic auth (or SSH key auth) to the attacker's host — producing a one-step exfiltration of plaintext Git credentials. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.0.

  10. CVE-2026-42461 7.5 Élevée

    getarcaneapp arcane · Getarcane arcane

    Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to version 1.18.0, four GET endpoints under /api/templates* in Arcane's Huma backend are registered without any Security requirement, allowing any unauthenticated network client to list and read the full Compose YAML and .env content of every custom template stored in the instance. Because Arcane's UI exposes a "Save as Template" flow on the project / swarm-stack creation pages that persists the operator's real env content (database passwords, API keys, etc.) verbatim, this missing authorization is an unauthenticated read of operator secrets in practice — not a theoretical info-disclosure. The frontend explicitly treats /customize/templates/* as an authenticated area (PROTECTED_PREFIXES in frontend/src/lib/utils/redirect.util.ts), and every CRUD operation (POST/PUT/DELETE) on the same paths requires a Bearer/API key, so this is a clear backend authorization gap, not intended public access. This issue has been patched in version 1.18.0.