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5 CVE

Critique 0 Élevée 2 Moyenne 2 Faible 1 Non évaluée 0 Exploitées (KEV) Tri : plus récentes « universal-tool-calling-protocol python-utcp » ✕
  1. CVE-2026-101061 4.7 Moyenne

    universal-tool-calling-protocol python-utcp

    utcp-gql before 1.1.1 and utcp-websocket before 1.1.1 contain server-side request forgery vulnerabilities due to incomplete application of CVE-2026-44661 fixes. The GraphQL plugin uses a vulnerable prefix check allowing bypass URLs like http://127.0.0.1.attacker.example, while the WebSocket plugin performs no URL validation despite documented security requirements. Attackers can force connections to internal services and cloud metadata endpoints by supplying malicious tool URLs in call templates, and receive configured API keys and OAuth tokens sent to attacker-controlled hosts.

  2. CVE-2026-101060 8.2 Élevée

    universal-tool-calling-protocol python-utcp

    python-utcp versions before 1.1.4 contain a server-side request forgery vulnerability in HttpCommunicationProtocol.call_tool that validates the initial tool URL but follows HTTP redirects without re-validating the target. Attackers controlling a tool endpoint can return a 302 redirect to internal services, allowing the UTCP client to reach cloud metadata endpoints or internal HTTP services and return their response bodies to the caller.

  3. CVE-2026-101059 7.1 Élevée

    universal-tool-calling-protocol python-utcp

    utcp-http before 1.1.4 fails to validate the OAuth2 tokenUrl field from remote OpenAPI specifications, allowing attackers to redirect credential submission to arbitrary endpoints. When a victim registers an attacker-controlled OpenAPI spec and invokes a generated OAuth2-protected tool, the library POSTs the victim's client_id and client_secret to the attacker-supplied token endpoint without URL validation.

  4. CVE-2026-101058 6.9 Moyenne

    universal-tool-calling-protocol python-utcp

    python-utcp (pip package utcp-http) before 1.1.12 does not verify whether tool URLs declared in a hand-written UTCP manual point at the agent's own loopback interface when that manual is discovered from a remote, non-loopback origin. Because ensure_secure_url intentionally permits loopback HTTP for local development and native manuals bypassed the loopback check performed by the OpenAPI converter, an attacker who can serve a UTCP manual that a victim registers can cause the client to issue requests to services bound only to 127.0.0.1 on the victim host and have the response bodies returned to the caller (server-side request forgery). The http, sse and streamable_http protocols are all affected. Reach is limited to loopback, and exploitation further requires a loopback service that answers unauthenticated requests with useful data. Fixed in utcp-http 1.1.12, which rejects manuals fetched from a non-loopback origin that declare loopback tool URLs, keyed off the final post-redirect discovery URL.

  5. CVE-2026-101057 3.1 Faible

    universal-tool-calling-protocol python-utcp

    utcp-mcp (the MCP plugin of python-utcp) through 1.1.2 connects to the HTTP and WebSocket MCP server URLs given in a call template's mcpServers configuration without the ensure_secure_url validation that the HTTP-family plugins apply, so the HTTPS/WSS-or-loopback rule is not enforced. A call template naming a plain-HTTP, non-loopback MCP server URL is dialed as configured, exposing the MCP handshake to network interception and permitting cleartext connections to internal hosts. The mcpServers configuration is operator-authored rather than remote data, and the connection is an MCP handshake rather than an arbitrary request returning a body, which limits practical exploitation; the OAuth2 token_url credential path described in the original report was not reachable in the affected versions, because the OAuth2 handler was never invoked and the call template's auth field was not read. Fixed in utcp-mcp 1.1.3, which validates server URLs before any connection is made.