Recherche « supsystic Popup by Supsystic »
6 CVE
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CVE-2026-104023 4.9 Moyenne
supsysticcom Smart Popup by Supsystic
The Smart Popup by Supsystic plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to generic SQL Injection via the 'sidx' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 1.13.2 due to insufficient escaping on the user supplied parameter and lack of sufficient preparation on the existing SQL query. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with administrator-level access and above, to append additional SQL queries into already existing queries that can be used to extract sensitive information from the database.
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CVE-2026-102398 7.1 Élevée
supsystic Popup by Supsystic
Unauthenticated Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in Popup by Supsystic <= 1.13.1 versions.
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CVE-2026-73381 9.1 Critique
supsystic Popup by Supsystic
Unauthenticated Broken Authentication in Popup by Supsystic <= 1.13.0 versions.
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CVE-2026-73380 9.8 Critique
supsystic Popup by Supsystic
Unauthenticated PHP Object Injection in Popup by Supsystic <= 1.13.0 versions.
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CVE-2026-27537 6.5 Moyenne
supsystic Popup by Supsystic
Unauthenticated Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in Popup by Supsystic <= 1.11.2 versions.
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CVE-2026-18322 8.8 Élevée
supsysticcom Smart Popup by Supsystic
The Smart Popup by Supsystic plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 1.12.0. This is due to a permission map collision in the `havePermissions()` function in `classes/frame.php`, where `array_merge()` overwrites the popup module's administrator-restricted method list with the base controller's value, silently removing `save` from protected actions; this is compounded by the subscription confirmation email embedding the same generic `pps_nonce` that the unauthenticated `wp_ajax_nopriv_save` endpoint accepts, and by the complete absence of any server-side role allowlist in `createWpSubscriber()`. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to submit a crafted POST request to `admin-ajax.php` using a nonce obtained from a public subscription confirmation email, setting `params[tpl][sub_wp_create_user_role]` to `administrator` via the exposed `popupControllerPps::save()` action, and then triggering the stored confirmation flow to create a persistent WordPress Administrator account with attacker-chosen credentials.