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Mem0 mem0

The mem0 1.0.0 server lacks authentication and authorization controls for its memory creation API endpoint (POST /memories). The endpoint allows unauthenticated users to submit arbitrary memory records without verifying their identity or permissions. A remote attacker can exploit this by sending unauthenticated POST requests to create malicious or spoofed memory entries in the database, leading to unauthorized data injection and potential data pollution.

Mem0 mem0

The mem0 1.0.0 server lacks authentication and authorization controls for its memory deletion API endpoint (DELETE /memories/{memory_id}). The endpoint allows unauthenticated users to delete arbitrary memory records without verifying their identity or permissions. A remote attacker can exploit this by sending unauthenticated DELETE requests to remove any memory entry from the database, leading to unauthorized data loss and potential denial of service.

Mem0 mem0

The mem0 1.0.0 server lacks authentication and authorization controls for its memory reset and table re-creation functionality accessible via the DELETE /memories endpoint. An unauthenticated attacker can send a DELETE request that triggers a reset operation, leading to the execution of a CREATE TABLE SQL statement. This can cause unexpected table re-creation, schema disruption, potential data loss, and denial of service for the memory management service.

Mem0 mem0

The mem0 1.0.0 server lacks authentication and authorization controls for its memory deletion API endpoint (DELETE /memories). The endpoint allows unauthenticated users to delete memory records by specifying arbitrary user identifiers (e.g., user_id, run_id, agent_id) in the request query parameters. A remote attacker can exploit this by sending unauthenticated DELETE requests to erase memory data for any user, leading to unauthorized data loss and denial of service.

mem0ai mem0

A vulnerability was found in mem0ai mem0 up to 1.0.11. This affects the function pickle.load/pickle.dump of the file mem0/vector_stores/faiss.py. Performing a manipulation results in deserialization. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The exploit has been made public and could be used. The patch is named 62dca096f9236010ca15fea9ba369ba740b86b7a. Applying a patch is the recommended action to fix this issue.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: close crash window in attr dabtree inactivation When inactivating an inode with node-format extended attributes, xfs_attr3_node_inactive() invalidates all child leaf/node blocks via xfs_trans_binval(), but intentionally does not remove the corresponding entries from their parent node blocks. The implicit assumption is that xfs_attr_inactive() will truncate the entire attr fork to zero extents afterwards, so log recovery will never reach the root node and follow those stale pointers. However, if a log shutdown occurs after the leaf/node block cancellations commit but before the attr bmap truncation commits, this assumption breaks. Recovery replays the attr bmap intact (the inode still has attr fork extents), but suppresses replay of all cancelled leaf/node blocks, maybe leaving them as stale data on disk. On the next mount, xlog_recover_process_iunlinks() retries inactivation and attempts to read the root node via the attr bmap. If the root node was not replayed, reading the unreplayed root block triggers a metadata verification failure immediately; if it was replayed, following its child pointers to unreplayed child blocks triggers the same failure: XFS (pmem0): Metadata corruption detected at xfs_da3_node_read_verify+0x53/0x220, xfs_da3_node block 0x78 XFS (pmem0): Unmount and run xfs_repair XFS (pmem0): First 128 bytes of corrupted metadata buffer: 00000000: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000010: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000020: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000030: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000040: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000050: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000060: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00000070: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ XFS (pmem0): metadata I/O error in "xfs_da_read_buf+0x104/0x190" at daddr 0x78 len 8 error 117 Fix this in two places: In xfs_attr3_node_inactive(), after calling xfs_trans_binval() on a child block, immediately remove the entry that references it from the parent node in the same transaction. This eliminates the window where the parent holds a pointer to a cancelled block. Once all children are removed, the now-empty root node is converted to a leaf block within the same transaction. This node-to-leaf conversion is necessary for crash safety. If the system shutdown after the empty node is written to the log but before the second-phase bmap truncation commits, log recovery will attempt to verify the root block on disk. xfs_da3_node_verify() does not permit a node block with count == 0; such a block will fail verification and trigger a metadata corruption shutdown. on the other hand, leaf blocks are allowed to have this transient state. In xfs_attr_inactive(), split the attr fork truncation into two explicit phases. First, truncate all extents beyond the root block (the child extents whose parent references have already been removed above). Second, invalidate the root block and truncate the attr bmap to zero in a single transaction. The two operations in the second phase must be atomic: as long as the attr bmap has any non-zero length, recovery can follow it to the root block, so the root block invalidation must commit together with the bmap-to-zero truncation.