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Cap-go capgo.app

Capgo (capgo.app) blocks direct user inserts into the public.manifest table with a RESTRICTIVE row-level security policy, but that restriction can be bypassed indirectly. A principal holding an app-scoped upload/write/all API key (upload+ rights) or an authenticated user with write+ rights on an app can update public.app_versions.manifest on a version whose storage_provider is 'r2-direct', which is not covered by the bundle content-lock check. The on_version_update async worker trusts record.manifest and, using the service-role Supabase client, inserts the attacker-controlled file_name, file_hash, and s3_path into public.manifest before clearing app_versions.manifest. When a channel points to the crafted version, the /updates endpoint returns the service-role-created manifest entry as a client-facing download_url, enabling OTA manifest poisoning through a trusted async worker path. All versions are affected; no patch was available at the time of publication.

Cap-go capgo.app

Capgo (capgo.app) through version 12.261.0 contains an incomplete access-control fix for the public.sso_providers table. Migration 20260826100000_sso_providers_block_direct_active_insert.sql installs a BEFORE UPDATE guard (enforce_sso_provider_client_update_guard()) that freezes only the dns_verified_at, domain, status and enforce_sso columns; provider_id (as well as metadata_url and attribute_mapping) is left writable. Because the table is granted ALL to the anon and authenticated roles with no column-level restriction, and PostgreSQL row-level security policies such as allow_org_admins_update_sso_providers constrain only which row may be updated and not which columns, a user holding the org_admin tier permission org.update_settings can PATCH provider_id over PostgREST to an identity provider under their control. Since provider_id is the trust anchor binding an email domain to an authorized IdP, the attacker can then authenticate through their own IdP while asserting the org owner's email; the server-side provider match succeeds and the merge routine attaches the attacker's SSO identity to the existing owner account, nulls its password, and deletes its other identities and sessions. This results in vertical privilege escalation from org_admin to org owner/super_admin, account takeover, and lockout of the legitimate owner. Exploitation requires that the target organization has an active SSO provider configured and that the attacker already holds org_admin in that organization. No patched version is available.

Capgo

Capgo before 12.128.2 contains a broken object level authorization vulnerability in middlewareKey() that accepts the client-controlled x-limited-key-id header without validating ownership, allowing authenticated users to adopt cross-tenant limited keys. Attackers can supply another tenant's limited key ID to bypass authorization checks and access unauthorized cross-tenant resources across multiple API endpoints.

Cap-go capgo

Cap-go before 12.128.2 contains a privilege inversion vulnerability in GET /build/logs/:jobId that allows read-only API key holders to cancel running native builds. The endpoint registers an abort listener on the SSE stream that unconditionally invokes cancelBuildOnDisconnect() using the privileged server-side BUILDER_API_KEY when clients disconnect, bypassing the app.build_native permission check required by the explicit POST /build/cancel/:jobId endpoint. Attackers with read-only API keys can repeatedly disrupt native build operations and CI/CD workflows by opening the log stream and dropping the connection.