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4 CVE

Critique 0 Élevée 1 Moyenne 2 Faible 1 Non évaluée 0 Exploitées (KEV) Tri : plus récentes « VeraCrypt » ✕
  1. CVE-2026-77572 3.3 Faible

    VeraCrypt

    VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. In 1.26.29 and earlier, selected metadata IOCTL handlers in the VeraCrypt Windows veracrypt.sys driver accept caller-supplied object-manager and device paths broader than supported VeraCrypt workflows require. A local user who can open the intentionally user-accessible \.\VeraCrypt device can use TC_IOCTL_GET_RESOLVED_SYMLINK, TC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_PARTITION_INFO, VC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY_EX, or the legacy TC_IOCTL_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY handler to make src/Driver/Ntdriver.c perform kernel-context symbolic-link or disk-device lookups outside the intended path scope. This can disclose low-sensitivity drive-letter targets, partition information, disk geometry, GPT or MBR state, and limited object-manager path metadata.

  2. CVE-2026-108982 7.2 Élevée

    IDRIX VeraCrypt

    VeraCrypt 1.26.29 (FUSE-T build) on macOS sometimes allows unintended access to decrypted data. It does not terminate the FUSE-T auxiliary service (go-nfsv4) and its associated VeraCrypt core-service helper processes when a volume is dismounted. After VeraCrypt reports the volume as dismounted, the auxiliary mount continues to serve the decrypted volume image (volume.dmg) over a loopback SMB session, and the leaked processes retain an open handle to the underlying raw device. A local user or process can therefore remount and access the decrypted volume without the passphrase, e.g., by reopening a previously accessed path (such as through a macOS Open Recent menu) or by attaching volume.dmg from the stale auxiliary mount. (The macFUSE build of VeraCrypt is not affected.)

  3. CVE-2026-54073 4.6 Moyenne

    VeraCrypt

    VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. From 1.26.6 until 1.26.29, file-hosted hidden volume creation forces quick format and the FormatNoFs function in src/Common/Format.c and FormatFat function in src/Common/Fat.c use WriteFile to place raw zeroed sectors at predictable 128 MiB intervals. These writes bypass the normal EncryptDataUnits formatting path, leaving deterministic plaintext markers in an area expected to resemble random ciphertext. The markers can weaken plausible deniability during forensic inspection, although they do not disclose hidden-volume content or reduce the strength of VeraCrypt encryption. This issue is fixed in version 1.26.29.

  4. CVE-2026-53762 6.2 Moyenne

    VeraCrypt

    VeraCrypt provides disk encryption with strong security based on TrueCrypt. Prior to 1.26.29, non-default builds created with WOLFCRYPT=1 and WOLFCRYPT_BACKEND route SHA-256 and SHA-512 volume-header key derivation through derive_key_sha256 and derive_key_sha512 in src/Crypto/wolfCrypt.c, where the configured iterations value is discarded and wc_HKDF is used instead of PBKDF2-HMAC. Changing the PIM or iteration count therefore does not increase derivation cost, allowing an attacker with an affected container, disk image, or volume header to perform substantially cheaper offline password guesses. Official precompiled VeraCrypt binaries and normal distribution packages use the standard PBKDF2 backend and are not affected. Volumes created by an affected WOLFCRYPT=1 build require backup and recreation because corrected builds derive different keys. This issue is fixed in version 1.26.29.