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envoyproxy envoy · Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 2.6 · Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 3.0 · Red Hat OpenShift Service Mesh 3.1

Envoy is an open source edge and service proxy designed for cloud-native applications. Prior to versions 1.35.11, 1.36.7, 1.37.3, and 1.38.1, a vulnerability in Envoy's HTTP/2 downstream request processing allows an unauthenticated remote client to trigger excessive memory consumption, potentially resulting in OOM termination of the Envoy process and denial of service. The issue arises from the combination of two behaviors. First, cookie header bytes are not fully accounted for during request header size validation in Envoy. Second, HPACK header block limits in oghttp2/quiche are enforced on encoded bytes without a corresponding limit on total decoded header size. Together, these behaviors allow a malicious client to cause large decoded header allocations while bypassing the intended request header size protections. Versions 1.35.11, 1.36.7, 1.37.3, and 1.38.1 contain a fix. No complete workaround is known short of applying a fix. Possible temporary mitigations include disabling downstream HTTP/2 where operationally feasible; enforcing stricter request header and cookie limits before traffic reaches Envoy; and monitoring Envoy memory usage for abnormal growth under HTTP/2 traffic.

js-cookie · Red Hat Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9 · Red Hat Advanced Cluster Security for Kubernetes 4.10 · Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.1

JavaScript Cookie is a JavaScript API for handling cookies, client-side. Prior to version 3.0.7, js-cookie's internal assign() helper copies properties with for...in + plain assignment. When the source object is produced by JSON.parse, the JSON object's "__proto__" member is an own enumerable property, so the for…in enumerates it and the target[key] = source[key] write triggers the Object.prototype.__proto__ setter on the fresh target ({}). The result is a per-instance prototype hijack: Object.prototype itself is untouched, but the merged attributes object now inherits attacker-controlled keys. Because the consuming set() function then enumerates the merged object with another for...in, every key the attacker placed on the polluted prototype lands in the resulting Set-Cookie string as an attribute pair. The attacker can set domain=, secure=, samesite=, expires=, and path= on cookies whose attributes the developer thought were locked down. This issue has been patched in version 3.0.7.