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pi-hole · Pi-hole pi-hole

Pi-hole is a DNS sinkhole that protects devices from unwanted content without installing any client-side software. From 6.0 to 6.4.2, a user with code execution as the unprivileged pihole user can escalate to root by replacing /etc/pihole/logrotate. The replacement is laundered to root:root ownership by pihole-FTL-prestart.sh and then parsed as root by the daily pihole flush cron, executing firstaction shell as uid 0. This issue is fixed in version 6.4.3.

pi-hole FTL

Pi-hole FTL is the core engine of the Pi-hole network-level advertisement and tracker blocker. Prior to version 6.6.1, Pi-hole FTL contains a race condition vulnerability in the HTTP session management subsystem, introduced with the v6.0 rewrite of the embedded CivetWeb-based web server. This issue has been patched in version 6.6.1.

pi-hole

Pi-hole is a DNS sinkhole that protects devices from unwanted content without installing any client-side software. From 6.0 to before Core 6.4.2 and FTL 6.6.1, two shell scripts executed as root by systemd (pihole-FTL-prestart.sh and pihole-FTL-poststop.sh) read the files.pid path from this config without validation and use it in privileged file operations (install and rm -f). By writing an arbitrary path into files.pid, an attacker with pihole privilege can cause root to delete and then recreate any file on the system outside the ProtectSystem=full-restricted directories, gaining write access to it. On a default Pi-hole installation this yields local privilege escalation to root via SSH authorized keys manipulation. If /root/.ssh/authorized_keys does not exist (default on fresh installs), only ExecStartPre is required. If the file exists, ExecStopPost deletes it first, and the same restart triggers both hooks in sequence. This vulnerability is fixed in Core 6.4.2 and FTL 6.6.1.

pi-hole FTL · Pi-hole ftldns

Pi-hole FTL is the core engine of the Pi-hole network-level advertisement and tracker blocker. In versions before 6.6.1, the `dns.interface` configuration field in Pi-hole FTL accepted newline characters without validation, allowing an attacker to inject arbitrary directives into the generated dnsmasq configuration file. On installations with no admin password set (the default for many deployments), the configuration API is fully accessible without credentials, allowing a network-adjacent attacker to inject the payload, enable the built-in DHCP server, and achieve arbitrary command execution on the host the next time any device on the network requests a DHCP lease. The injected value is persisted to /etc/pihole/pihole.toml and survives restarts. The strncpy in the code path limits the total interface field to 31 bytes, but payloads such as wlan0\ndhcp-script=/tmp/p fit within this constraint. The dnsmasq config validation introduced in FTL 6.6 only checks syntactic validity, so valid directives injected via newline pass validation successfully. This issue has been fixed in version 6.6.1.