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OpenStack Keystone

An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3. Tokens obtained via delegated authentication methods (EC2 credentials, application credentials, OAuth1 access tokens, and trusts) are not blocked from creating, modifying, or deleting credentials via the /v3/credentials API. EC2-derived tokens can additionally read credential blobs, exposing TOTP MFA seeds and other secrets. Also, PATCH /v3/credentials does not validate the requested post-update project_id, allowing any delegated token to move a credential to an unauthorized project. All Keystone deployments using delegated authentication are affected.

OpenStack Keystone

In OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3, any authenticated user holding role:reader on any project can list every project-scoped role assignment under any domain by passing a domain ID as scope.project.id with include_subtree to the GET /v3/role_assignments endpoint. The domain's project record has domain_id=null, causing the policy domain_id check to pass for any caller. With include_names, the response discloses the names and home-domain IDs of every user, group, project, and role involved. The literal "default" domain ID works against any deployment created with keystone-manage bootstrap. An attacker can harvest domain IDs from the response and repeat the query to map role assignments across the entire cloud. This is caused by misuse of "None" in  list_role_assignments_for_tree.

OpenStack Keystone

In OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3, tokens obtained via delegated authentication mechanisms (OAuth1 access tokens, application credentials, trusts) could be submitted to the token-method authentication path for reauthentication to escape their intended project scope. When an application credential token was presented with no explicit scope, Keystone would issue a new token scoped to the credential owner's default project rather than the project for which the credential was issued, bypassing the intended project boundary. All Keystone deployments that permit delegated authentication through OAuth1 access tokens, application credentials, or trusts are affected.

OpenStack Keystone

In OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.3, tokens obtained via OAuth1 access token, application credential, or trust-scoped authentication could create new long-lived credentials or authorize new delegations that persist independently of, and outlive, the credential used to obtain them. The delegation restrictions that block these operations did not consistently apply to all delegated token types, allowing an OAuth1-scoped token, for example, to create application credentials or authorize OAuth1 request tokens despite those operations being restricted for other delegated token types. All Keystone deployments that permit delegated authentication through OAuth1 access tokens, application credentials, or trusts are affected.

OpenStack Keystone

An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. The Keystone federated token rescoping mechanism does not propagate the original token's expiry to the newly issued token. When a federated user rescopes a token via POST /v3/auth/tokens, the handle_scoped_token() function in the mapped authentication plugin returns response data without an expires_at value. The token provider falls back to issuing a token with a fresh default TTL. By rescoping repeatedly before each token expires, a user can maintain access indefinitely, bypassing operator-configured token lifetime policies. This is a variant of CVE-2012-3426. Only deployments using federated identity (SAML2, OpenID Connect) are affected.

OpenStack Keystone · Red Hat OpenStack Platform 13 (Queens) · Red Hat OpenStack Platform 16.2 · Red Hat OpenStack Platform 17.1

An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. When combined with an application credential impersonation vulnerability, an attacker with the member role on a project can escalate to admin by chaining unrestricted application credentials with Keystone trusts. The impersonated token carries the victim's identity, which passes the trustor validation check. Keystone then validates the delegated roles against the victim's actual role assignments in the database, not the roles on the requesting token. This allows the attacker to create a trust delegating the victim's admin role to themselves. The trust persists independently, and additional trusts and application credentials can be created to maintain access. All actions are logged under the victim's identity.

OpenStack Keystone · Red Hat OpenStack Platform 13 (Queens) · Red Hat OpenStack Platform 16.2 · Red Hat OpenStack Platform 17.1

An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. The Keystone RBAC policy enforcer in enforce_call unconditionally merges the raw JSON request body into the policy enforcement dictionary via policy_dict.update(json_input.copy()), overwriting trusted target data that was previously set from database lookups. Because flask.request.get_json is called with force=True, this works regardless of Content-Type or HTTP method. Any authenticated user can inject arbitrary policy target attributes (e.g., user_id, project_id) into the request body to bypass RBAC checks and perform unauthorized operations on resources belonging to other users or projects. This was introduced in commit 5ea59f52 (Rocky/14.0.0).

OpenStack Keystone

An issue was discovered in OpenStack Keystone before 29.0.2. The Keystone application credential authentication plugin does not verify that the user supplied in the authentication request matches the owner of the application credential. An attacker can authenticate with their own application credential ID and secret while specifying a different user's name and domain in the request body. Keystone issues a token attributed to the victim user. The impersonated token is project-scoped and carries the intersection of the application credential's roles and the victim's actual roles on the project. This enables audit evasion, reading the victim's credentials, and acting as the victim within shared projects.