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IBM ContextForge MCP Gateway

IBM ContextForge MCP Gateway 0.1.0 through 1.0.5 is vulnerable to a server-side request Forgery (SSRF) that allows authenticated users with gateway creation privileges to perform arbitrary HTTP POST requests to internal network resources and cloud metadata endpoints. The vulnerability occurs during OAuth-enabled gateway registration when the system fails to validate the oauth_config.token_url parameter. When registering a gateway with OAuth client credentials authentication, an attacker can supply a malicious token_url pointing to internal services, cloud metadata endpoints (AWS IMDSv1, GCP, Azure), or localhost-bound services. The application immediately performs an HTTP POST request to the attacker-controlled URL with form-encoded credentials in the body. If the response cannot be parsed as a valid OAuth token response, up to 256 characters of the response body are reflected back to the attacker in the HTTP 502 error message. This vulnerability bypasses existing SSRF protections that are applied to the gateway.url field but not to OAuth configuration parameters.

IBM ContextForge MCP Gateway · Ibm contextforge

IBM ContextForge MCP Gateway 1.0.0 through 1.0.8 was vulnerable to path traversal in its Admin API log-download endpoint (`GET /v1/admin/logs/file`). The path confinement check uses `str.startswith()` rather than proper boundary validation, allowing an authenticated admin to read `.log`, `.jsonl`, and `.json` files outside the configured `LOG_FOLDER` by supplying a filename that resolves into a sibling directory whose absolute path shares the log directory's string prefix.

IBM ContextForge MCP Gateway

IBM ContextForge MCP Gateway <= v1.0.4 IBM mcp-context-forge could allow an authenticated user to bypass protection mechanisms due to incomplete recursive inspection of nested payload content.

IBM mcp-context-forge · IBM mcp-contextforge-gateway

ContextForge is an AI gateway, registry, and proxy that provides centralized discovery, guardrails, and management for MCP, A2A, and REST or gRPC APIs. Prior to 1.0.3, the /admin/gateways/test call site in mcpgateway/admin.py calls validate_gateway_test_url() in mcpgateway/common/validators.py to resolve and reject private, loopback, link-local, and cloud-metadata addresses, but ResilientHttpClient later resolves the original hostname again without binding the validated address. When MCPGATEWAY_ADMIN_API_ENABLED is enabled, an attacker with a database-backed role containing explicit gateways.read permission can use DNS rebinding to return a public address during validation and a private or metadata address during connection, bypassing ssrf_blocked_networks and ssrf_dns_fail_closed because those controls apply only to the validation-time result. The endpoint's allow_admin_bypass=False setting means a bootstrap-only virtual platform-admin identity without a database role is not sufficient. Successful exploitation can reach internal services and cloud metadata, expose cloud credentials, access internal APIs, or probe internal network ports. This issue is fixed in version 1.0.3.