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Recherche « Huawei openUBMC »

3 CVE

Critique 0 Élevée 1 Moyenne 1 Faible 1 Non évaluée 0 Exploitées (KEV) Tri : plus récentes « Huawei openUBMC » ✕
  1. CVE-2026-65200 3.5 Faible

    Huawei openBMC

    The openUBMC device-management process parses PLDM-over-MCTP and NCSI-over-MCTP responses from on-bus devices, and three response parsers in the shared transport libraries subtract a fixed header or reserved-field size from a device-supplied response length without a lower-bound check. An undersized response wraps the unsigned length difference to a very large value, and the parser then reads far past the response buffer. The affected code sits in the base (non-vendor) PLDM control class and the Huawei NCSI driver, so it is reachable for any PLDM endpoint or Huawei NIC on the internal management bus, unlike the vendor-specific wangxun parser tracked separately.

  2. CVE-2026-65199 5.4 Moyenne

    Huawei openBMC

    openUBMC assigns the full privilege set to pseudo-identities representing SNMP callers. An authenticated, but low-privilege, SNMP user can therefore invoke mapped backend operations as an administrative identity. In `route_mapper/account.lua`, `get_user_privilege` returns the complete nine-privilege set for a `special_users` group that includes the `SNMPv1_v2c` pseudo-user.

  3. CVE-2026-65198 8.6 Élevée

    Huawei openUBMC

    Huawei's openUBMC ships a default SNMPv3 USM key that uses one value for both authentication and privacy. An attacker who holds the key (recoverable from the open-source build) can authenticate SNMPv3 to, and decrypt SNMPv3 traffic from, any unit that still carries the shipped key. The build customization `manifest/build/customization/default_password.lua` sets `AuthenticationKey == EncryptionKey == 7df2f29369e3ac3245b2c9d46b67a0ecd055197e41808a34ef325db2f6422581` for the iBMC product build, and the community seed `account/manufacture/default_password.lua` sets both to `7a2f5b86f20233ec7b7bef49643fbf34d86d0cbf6f1f8f5c52d4f30d4536938b`. These are shipped constants, not per-unit values, and they are not rotated by the Administrator password reset, so they survive account provisioning. This is especially dangerous considering that SNMP access is mapped to full device administration privileges, including system reset and firmware upgrades.