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triggerdotdev trigger.dev

Trigger.dev before 4.5.6 self-hosted Docker Compose deployments using the default secrets from hosting/docker/.env.example allow authentication bypass because the hardcoded MAGIC_LINK_SECRET lets anyone forge valid magic link tokens. Unauthenticated attackers can log in as any email address, then reach Postgres, Redis, and ClickHouse with default credentials from runner containers on infrastructure networks, compromising all tenant data.

Eclipse Ditto Ditto Explorer UI

In Eclipse Ditto versions 3.6.0 to 3.8.13 and 3.9.0 to 3.9.7, the Ditto Explorer UI loads its complete environment configuration, including the Ditto API URI and the OpenID Connect (OIDC) provider settings, from an arbitrary cross-origin URL supplied in the environmentsURL query parameter. It adopts this configuration without user confirmation and persists it in the browser's localStorage. A crafted link can therefore set an attacker-controlled OIDC authority with autoSso enabled. The UI then automatically starts a login at the genuine identity provider but exchanges the returned authorization code together with its PKCE code_verifier at an attacker-controlled token endpoint. This lets the attacker redeem the code for the victim's access and refresh tokens. Alternatively, an attacker-controlled api_uri causes the UI to send the victim's bearer token or Basic credentials to the attacker. Because the configuration is persisted, later visits to the UI without the crafted link repeat the token theft. In versions 3.9.0 to 3.9.7, the Swagger UI OIDC integration of the Helm chart and the Docker Compose deployment is affected in the same way, but requires the user to start the login. The issue is fixed in 3.8.14 and 3.9.8.

langbot-app LangBot

LangBot's plugin runtime (pip package langbot_plugin) through 0.4.17 starts a debug WebSocket server on 0.0.0.0:5401 (/plugin/ws) whose authentication is gated on plugin_debug_key, which defaults to an empty string and is never set by the upstream repository, Docker image, or docker-compose (which additionally publishes port 5401 to the host); the key check is therefore skipped entirely. Any remote attacker able to reach the port can register an arbitrary "debug plugin" without credentials. Because events are broadcast to all initialized plugins without filtering, the attacker's plugin receives the full context of every IM message event (including private chats, message chains, and user/sender IDs in plaintext) and can inject forged replies, send messages as any configured bot, enumerate bot UUIDs, invoke configured LLM models, read knowledge-base contents, and register malicious tools that feed every user's LLM pipeline. Registering with "prod_mode": true causes later legitimate installations of a plugin with the same author/name to be rejected, resulting in persistent denial of service. No patched version was available at the time of publication.

Eclipse Foundation Eclipse aeriOS

In the current development version of Eclipse aeriOS, for which no official release has yet been published, the Federator component disables TLS certificate validation for outbound HTTPS connections by default. When the TLS_CERTIFICATE_VALIDATION environment variable is unset or set to false, the component configures its HTTP transport to skip TLS certificate verification. As a result, an attacker able to intercept network communications between the Federator and external services could impersonate those services and intercept sensitive information transmitted over HTTPS, including OAuth client credentials and bearer tokens. The issue has been addressed by enabling TLS certificate validation by default. The TLS_CERTIFICATE_VALIDATION environment variable is now set to true in the default configuration provided by the Helm chart and Docker Compose deployment.

Headroom Labs Headroom

Headroom's LLM proxy lets a client choose the upstream destination with the x-headroom-base-url request header. _resolve_openai_upstream_base in headroom/proxy/handlers/openai.py accepts the header value, requires only that it parse with an http or https scheme and a hostname, and returns it for use as the upstream base; _select_passthrough_base_url in headroom/providers/proxy_routes.py reads the same header for the passthrough routes. No check rejects loopback, link-local, or RFC 1918 destinations, and because the component is a proxy the upstream response is returned to the caller, so the request reaches internal services and cloud metadata addresses and their responses are disclosed. The Authorization header accompanying the request is forwarded unchanged to the caller-designated host. The pip console script binds 127.0.0.1 by default, but the reference docker-compose.yml ships --host 0.0.0.0 with published ports and no required HEADROOM_PROXY_TOKEN, which the server itself warns about at startup, so a deployment following the shipped compose exposes the affected data-plane routes to the network without authentication.

louislam dockge

Dockge validates a stack name only on the write path. In backend/stack.ts the allow-list check in validate(), which requires the name to match ^[a-z0-9_-]+$, is reached from save() alone, while the path getter returns path.join(this.server.stacksDir, this.name) and Stack.getStack builds path.join(server.stacksDir, stackName) with no check. The socket handlers in backend/agent-socket-handlers/docker-socket-handler.ts confirm the caller is logged in and that the name is a string, then pass it straight to Stack.getStack, so a name containing traversal sequences resolves outside the managed stacks directory. An authenticated user can therefore read the composeENV and composeYAML values of any directory the server process can reach, which discloses the secrets in that directory's .env or Compose file, and can invoke delete(), which runs docker compose down and then fsAsync.rm on the traversed path with recursive and force set, removing that directory. Disclosure is limited to files named .env or an accepted Compose filename, and deletion requires the target directory to hold a valid Compose file so that docker compose down exits successfully. Dockge commonly runs as root with access to the Docker socket, so the reachable set includes unrelated applications on the host. Instances configured with disableAuth, a supported option that logs the caller in as admin automatically, expose both operations without authentication.

moby go-archive · Docker Sandboxes · Docker Desktop · Docker Engine

The tar extraction routines in moby/go-archive (Unpack, UnpackLayer, Untar/UntarUncompressed, and the ApplyLayer helpers) do not confine filesystem operations to the destination directory. The extractor decides where each archive entry lands using lexical string checks and then performs the filesystem operation on a path that is resolved by the OS, so links introduced by the archive can be followed out of the destination directory. An attacker who controls the contents of an archive can create or overwrite files at arbitrary paths writable by the extracting process.

dokploy

Dokploy is a free, self-hostable Platform as a Service (PaaS). Prior to 0.29.13, sanitizeCommand in packages/server/src/utils/builders/compose.ts only trims whitespace and strips surrounding quotes from compose.command before exportEnvCommand and docker command interpolation, allowing an authenticated user who can update a Compose service to inject shell metacharacters and execute arbitrary commands on the Dokploy host. This issue is fixed in version 0.29.13.

open-reception appointment-booking-software

OpenReception's appointment booking software provides an end-to-end encrypted appointment booking platform. Prior to version 1.0.2, the `GET /api/tenants/{id}` endpoint returns the full tenant record to any authenticated `TENANT_ADMIN` of that tenant, including the `databaseUrl` field. This field contains the live PostgreSQL connection string the application uses to connect to that tenant's database. In the tested official `docker-compose.prod.yml` deployment, the connection string contained the user `postgres` with `rolsuper=true` and the plaintext password from `secrets/postgres_password.txt`. Operators who configure a non-superuser PostgreSQL user via `secrets/postgres_user.txt` would expose a less privileged credential, but the disclosure of the connection string itself is independent of that choice. The same credential applies to every database managed by that PostgreSQL instance: the central `appointment_booking` database, every per-tenant database (one per tenant), and the postgres administrative database. A `TENANT_ADMIN` of one tenant who can reach `postgres:5432` (directly via internal network, indirectly via any SSRF, RCE, or file-read in the application) can read every other tenant's appointment ciphertexts, key shares, and metadata; read the central user table, including all `GLOBAL_ADMIN` accounts, password hashes, and session records; modify or delete any data in any tenant database; and/or i a superuser-scoped deployment: use PostgreSQL's `pg_read_server_files`, `COPY ... FROM PROGRAM`, and `CREATE EXTENSION` for further escalation inside the database container. This breaks the per-tenant database isolation that is otherwise the primary cross-tenant control in the application. The application code carefully scopes most queries to the calling tenant's database, but those scopings are irrelevant once the attacker holds the credentials that bypass the application entirely. Version 1.0.2 fixes the issue.

WWBN AVideo

WWBN AVideo is an open source video platform. Versions prior to 29.0 expose .env files to unauthenticated users through the official Docker compose configuration. The official docker-compose.yml mounts the entire project root directory as the Apache document root, causing the .env file — which contains database credentials, admin passwords, and infrastructure configuration — to be served as a static file at /.env. No .htaccess rule or Apache configuration blocks access to dotfiles. Exploitation enables direct database access, admin panel takeover, and further lateral movement within the Docker network. This issue has been resolved in version 29.0.

coollabsio coolify

Coolify is an open-source and self-hostable tool for managing servers, applications, and databases. Prior to 4.0.0-beta.469, the executeInDocker() helper wraps user-controlled commands in single quotes without escaping embedded single quotes. Attackers who can edit application settings can inject a single quote into docker_compose_custom_build_command or docker_compose_custom_start_command to break out of the quoted context and execute arbitrary commands on the managed server host during deployments, escaping the intended Docker container confinement. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0-beta.469.

coollabsio coolify

Coolify is an open-source and self-hostable tool for managing servers, applications, and databases. From 4.0.0-beta.471 through 4.0.0-beta.473, a regression in SHELL_SAFE_COMMAND_PATTERN allowed ampersands in custom Docker Compose build, start, and pre/post-deployment command fields, allowing an authenticated team member to inject shell commands that execute on the host. This issue is fixed in version 4.0.0-beta.474.

getarcaneapp arcane

Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.4, ProjectService.GetProjectFileContent returns the contents of any Docker Compose include directive declared in a project's compose file before any path-traversal validation runs. Because ProjectService.CreateProject writes attacker-supplied compose content to disk without validating include paths, an authenticated user can create a project whose compose file declares include: ['../../../../etc/passwd'], then read the include via the project file API. The result is arbitrary read of any file readable by the Arcane backend process, including /app/data/arcane.db (the SQLite database containing every user's password hash and API key), enabling escalation to admin and, via Arcane's Docker control plane, RCE on the host. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.4.

getarcaneapp arcane

Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to 1.19.2, the PUT /api/environments/{id}/templates/variables endpoint, which writes the system-wide .env.global file used for variable substitution in every project's compose file, is missing an admin authorization check. Any authenticated non-admin user can call this endpoint with their bearer token or API key and overwrite the global environment variables that are merged into every project deployment. By overriding values like REGISTRY, IMAGE, DATABASE_URL, or SECRET_KEY that other users reference via ${VAR} in compose files, an attacker can redirect image pulls to attacker-controlled registries (supply-chain RCE on the Docker host), exfiltrate database credentials, or disrupt all projects. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.19.2.

Advantech SaaS Composer · Advantech IoTSuite Growth Linux docker · Advantech IoTSuite Starter Linux docker · Advantech IoT Edge Linux docker

Successful exploitation of the SQL injection vulnerability could allow a remote authenticated attacker to execute arbitrary commands via a specific interface, potentially enabling the attacker to access, modify, or delete sensitive information within the database.

getarcaneapp arcane · Getarcane arcane

Arcane is an interface for managing Docker containers, images, networks, and volumes. Prior to version 1.18.0, four GET endpoints under /api/templates* in Arcane's Huma backend are registered without any Security requirement, allowing any unauthenticated network client to list and read the full Compose YAML and .env content of every custom template stored in the instance. Because Arcane's UI exposes a "Save as Template" flow on the project / swarm-stack creation pages that persists the operator's real env content (database passwords, API keys, etc.) verbatim, this missing authorization is an unauthenticated read of operator secrets in practice — not a theoretical info-disclosure. The frontend explicitly treats /customize/templates/* as an authenticated area (PROTECTED_PREFIXES in frontend/src/lib/utils/redirect.util.ts), and every CRUD operation (POST/PUT/DELETE) on the same paths requires a Bearer/API key, so this is a clear backend authorization gap, not intended public access. This issue has been patched in version 1.18.0.