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anthropics claude-code

Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. Prior to 2.1.179, the Claude Code and Claude Desktop plugin installation flow runs git checkout for a marketplace-pinned commit without verifying that the resulting HEAD equals the pinned 40-character SHA. An attacker who controls a plugin repository on a Git host that permits SHA-shaped branch names can create a branch named after the reviewed commit, causing checkout to select the branch tip and install attacker-controlled plugin code. Exploitation requires a user to install the malicious plugin and pin it to the ostensibly safe hash. This issue is fixed in version 2.1.179.

Anthropic @anthropic-ai/claude-code

Claude Code validated that a target file path resided within the project working directory at permission-check time, but re-resolved the path at write time without repeating that validation. This time-of-check to time-of-use (TOCTOU) gap allowed an attacker who could write to the workspace to atomically replace a project file with a symlink, causing Claude Code to follow the symlink and write its output to an arbitrary file outside the project sandbox. Exploitation required the ability to win a race condition against the write operation and write access to the shared workspace, enabling a lower-privileged attacker to redirect benign edits to sensitive files (e.g., shell configuration) in a higher-privileged session. Users on standard Claude Code auto-update have received this fix already. Users performing manual updates are advised to update to the latest version. Thank you to hackerone.com/c_h4ck_0 for reporting this issue.

anthropics claude-code · Anthropic claude code

Claude Code is an agentic coding tool. From 2.1.38 until 2.1.163, Claude Code's worktree handling allowed creation of worktrees named ".git" and navigation to worktrees outside the sandbox context, enabling git directory confusion attacks. By exploiting symlink manipulation and git fsmonitor execution during worktree operations, an attacker could overwrite files in the user's home directory (such as .zshenv), leading to code execution outside of seatbelt sandbox restrictions. Reliably exploiting this required the user to clone a malicious repository containing prompt injection content and run Claude Code against it. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.1.163.

Anthropic Claude Desktop Cowork

Anthropic Claude Desktop Cowork VM image handling (confirmed across v1.1348.0 through v1.2278.0, including v1.1348.0, v1.1617.0, and v1.2278.0) validates only file presence and a version marker string before booting rootfs.img, but does not verify image content integrity at time-of-use. A local attacker with unprivileged code execution as the victim macOS user can modify the VM root filesystem image and have it trusted on subsequent Cowork VM boots, enabling persistent arbitrary code execution in the VM and access to host-mounted directories. The estimated CWE mapping is CWE-353 (Missing Support for Integrity Check).

anthropics claude-code · Anthropic claude desktop

The Claude Desktop app gives you Claude Code with a graphical interface built for running multiple sessions side by side. Prior to 1.3834.0, the CoworkVMService component in Claude Desktop for Windows ran as SYSTEM and did not validate whether the VM bundle directory was a real directory or an NTFS directory junction before creating files within it. A local non-elevated user could replace the user-writable VM bundle directory with a directory junction pointing to an attacker-chosen location, causing the service to create a SYSTEM-owned file in an arbitrary directory. This could be leveraged for local privilege escalation. This vulnerability is fixed in 1.3834.0.

MIC-DKFZ nnUNet · Dkfz nnu-net

nnU-Net is a semantic segmentation framework that automatically adapts its pipeline to a dataset. Prior to 2.4.1, the nnU-Net Issue Triage workflow in .github/workflows/issue-triage.yml is vulnerable to Agentic Workflow Injection. The workflow sets allowed_non_write_users: ${{ github.event.issue.user.login }}, which means any logged-in GitHub user who opens an issue can reach this agentic workflow with attacker-controlled content. Untrusted issue title and body content are embedded directly into the prompt of anthropics/claude-code-action, and the workflow then runs a command-capable Claude agent with permission to comment on and relabel the current issue via gh. Because this workflow is triggered automatically on issues.opened, an external attacker can submit a crafted issue that steers the agent beyond its intended issue-triage purpose and influences authenticated issue actions. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.4.1.

anthropics claude-code · Anthropic claude code

In versions 2.1.63 through 2.1.83 of Claude Code, the folder trust determination logic used the git worktree commondir file without validating its contents. An attacker could craft a malicious repository with a commondir file pointing to a path the victim had previously trusted, causing Claude Code to bypass its trust confirmation dialog and immediately execute hooks defined in `.claude/settings.json`. Exploitation requires the victim to clone the malicious repository and run Claude Code within it, and the attacker must know or guess a path the victim had already trusted. This issue has been fixed in version 2.1.84.