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Stiofan UsersWP

Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting') vulnerability in Stiofan UsersWP userswp allows Reflected XSS.This issue affects UsersWP: from n/a through 1.2.73.

stiofansisland UsersWP – Front-end login form, User Registration, User Profile & Members Directory plugin for WP

The UsersWP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.2.70 via the upload_file_remove() AJAX handler. The plugin stores the value of an account 'file' form field taken directly from $_POST when no real $_FILES upload is provided (process_account() calls uwp_validate_fields() and array_merges the result with the empty output of UsersWP_Files::validate_uploads()). At storage time the value is only checked with validate_file(), which passes any string that does not contain a literal '../'. When the value is later processed by upload_file_remove(), it is again gated with validate_file() and then normalized through uwp_get_file_relative_url(); that helper performs a global str_replace() of the uploads base URL against the stored URL, allowing a crafted URL containing embedded '..<uploads-baseurl>' tokens to collapse into '../../' traversal sequences after the last validation. The transformed value is then appended to the uploads base directory and passed to wp_delete_file() without any canonical containment check. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server (including wp-config.

stiofansisland UsersWP – Front-end login form, User Registration, User Profile & Members Directory plugin for WP

The UsersWP plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Arbitrary File Deletion in versions up to, and including, 1.2.65. This is due to insufficient validation of file-field values in the UsersWP_Validation::validate_fields() function (which falls through to sanitize_text_field() for fields of type 'file', leaving directory-traversal sequences intact) combined with the UsersWP_Forms::upload_file_remove() AJAX handler building the deletion target from the uploads basedir concatenated with the attacker-controlled metadata value without any realpath canonicalization or uploads-directory boundary check before calling unlink(). This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to delete arbitrary files on the affected site's server, including wp-config.