Mardi 20 octobre 2026

Eclipse Foundation Eclipse ThreadX

One logical thread of a user-mode ThreadX module costs the Module Manager's shared object pool two allocations, not one. The module asks for a `TX_THREAD` control block through `txm_module_object_allocate`; `_txm_module_manager_thread_create` then takes a second allocation of `TXM_MODULE_KERNEL_STACK_SIZE` bytes for the privileged kernel stack that thread's system calls run on, and records it in the control block. Both come from `_txm_module_manager_object_pool` and both are linked onto the module's allocation list. The Module Manager's thread-delete dispatcher released only the first. The kernel stack stayed allocated until the whole module was stopped, so a module that creates, terminates and deletes threads in a loop — every state transition valid, every service returning `TX_SUCCESS` — removed a fixed block from a finite pool shared by the manager and by every other loaded module, on every cycle, for as long as it stayed loaded. Once the pool is exhausted, no memory-protected module can create any kernel object and no user-mode module thread can be created anywhere in the system. Vulnerable function: `_txm_module_manager_tx_thread_delete_dispatch`, in `common_modules/module_manager/inc/txm_module_manager_dispatch.h`.

Eclipse Foundation Eclipse ThreadX

The Module Manager's block-pool create dispatcher proved that two `ALIGN_TYPE` words of the extra-parameter array a memory-protected module supplies lay inside the module's data, and then used indices 0 through 3 of that array. One of the two unproved words is read by the dispatcher's own buffer check, which takes index 1 as the pool start and index 2 as the length to range-check it over. So the out-of-bounds read is performed by the validation code itself, before the kernel service is reached, and the size the caller's pool start is then validated against is a word the manager has not proved the module owns. The other unproved word is read when the service's argument list is built. Vulnerable function: `_txm_module_manager_tx_block_pool_create_dispatch`, in `common_modules/module_manager/inc/txm_module_manager_dispatch.h`.

Eclipse Foundation Eclipse ThreadX

The Module Manager's object lookup validated one byte of a memory-protected module's search name and then walked as much of it as the module declared, in privileged mode, with the kernel's preemption count raised. Both lookup dispatchers are affected: the recommended `txm_module_object_pointer_get_extended` is handed a length and does not use it to bound the buffer, and the deprecated `txm_module_object_pointer_get` supplies the largest value a `UINT` can hold, so it removes the bound rather than lacking one. A module can make the walk unbounded without knowing anything about the memory it reaches, and where the walk reaches memory a privileged read cannot take, the resulting fault leaves the kernel unable to preempt for the rest of the system's life. Vulnerable functions: `_txm_module_manager_txm_module_object_pointer_get_dispatch`, `_txm_module_manager_txm_module_object_pointer_get_extended_dispatch` (both in `common_modules/module_manager/inc/txm_module_manager_dispatch.h`) and `_txm_module_manager_object_name_compare` (`common_modules/module_manager/src/txm_module_manager_util.c`).

Eclipse Foundation Eclipse ThreadX

A ThreadX module reaches a kernel object's delete service through the Module Manager's dispatch layer, which asked one question about the pointer: does the object lie outside the module's own code and data. That is the policy for *using* an object, and using an object a module does not own is supported and intended — `txm_module_object_pointer_get_extended` searches the system's created objects by name and hands back objects the application created and objects other modules created, so that a module can send to a shared queue, take a shared semaphore or get a shared mutex. Destroying one of those is not sharing it. A module could name any object it had a pointer to and have the privileged dispatcher delete it.

WSO2 Enterprise Integrator · WSO2 Identity Server · WSO2 API Manager · WSO2 Open Banking AM

The RemoteUserStoreManagerService does not sufficiently validate password change attempts when the password history validation feature is enabled. This oversight allows an attacker to repeatedly attempt password guesses for a user account without being adequately restricted. Exploiting this vulnerability enables an attacker to discover a user's password through brute force, leading to account impersonation. The success rate of such an attack is influenced by the complexity of the targeted user's password, with simpler passwords increasing the likelihood of compromise.

Apple macOS

This issue was addressed by removing the vulnerable code. This issue is fixed in macOS Golden Gate 27. An app may be able to disclose kernel memory.

zephyrproject zephyr

The Bluetooth Classic Hands-Free Profile HF role in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/hfp_hf.c does not release the AT command buffers that are still queued on hf->tx_pending when the RFCOMM DLC goes down. hfp_hf_disconnected() only cancelled the work items and cleared hf->acl, and no other code path ever dequeues those buffers, so each one is permanently lost from the fixed hf_pool (CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN + 1 buffers, i.e. two in the default configuration). The same function also left BT_HFP_HF_FLAG_CONNECTED set, and hfp_hf_create() wiped the object with memset() as soon as hf->acl was NULL, without checking whether hf->work, hf->slc_work or hf->deferred_work was still pending or running. The remote Audio Gateway peer controls the trigger end to end and needs no application involvement: an unsolicited +BCS: 1 response makes bcs_handle() call bt_hfp_hf_select_codec() and queue an AT+BCS buffer, which cannot be transmitted while BT_HFP_HF_FLAG_RX_ONGOING is set, and an immediately following RFCOMM DISC strands that buffer. Repeating the connect / +BCS / disconnect cycle a couple of times empties hf_pool for good. With the pool exhausted, HFP command sending fails permanently, and because hfp_hf_send_cmd() allocates with K_FOREVER (bt_rfcomm_create_pdu() → bt_conn_create_pdu()) from the Bluetooth RX context — where that timeout is not downgraded to K_NO_WAIT — one further +BCS from the peer parks the Bluetooth RX thread inside net_buf_alloc() with no possible waker, halting all HCI event processing until the device is rebooted. Separately, reusing the HF slot while a work handler was still queued or running allowed memset() to wipe live k_work items out from under the system workqueue, corrupting shared kernel workqueue state. Exploitation requires an established HFP session (for SSP devices L2CAP enforces authentication before the RFCOMM channel is reachable) and a build with CONFIG_BT_HFP_HF enabled.

zephyrproject zephyr

The user-mode syscall verifier z_vrfy_rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer() in subsys/rtio/rtio_syscalls.c validated its two output parameters, buff and buff_len, with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_READ() rather than K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE(). Both are pure out-parameters: z_impl_rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer() stores the mempool buffer address and its length through them. The distinction is enforced by every architecture validator — arch_buffer_validate() on RISC-V PMP explicitly accepts the global __rom_region/__rodata_region for reads only, and the ARM MPU validators accept P_RO_U_RO and P_RW_U_RO regions for reads only — so a read-validated pointer is not necessarily writable by the calling thread. An unprivileged user-mode thread that has been granted access to an RTIO context (rtio_access_grant()) can invoke the rtio_cqe_get_mempool_buffer() syscall with buff/buff_len pointing at memory it may read but not write, and with a completion-queue entry whose flags field it fully controls (only RTIO_CQE_FLAG_MEMPOOL_BUFFER in flags[7:0] is required; flags[19:8] and flags[31:20] supply the block index and count). The kernel then performs a pointer-sized and a 4-byte store through those addresses while running in supervisor mode. Reaching the store requires CONFIG_USERSPACE together with CONFIG_RTIO_SYS_MEM_BLOCKS, the configuration behind RTIO_DEFINE_WITH_MEMPOOL; without the latter the implementation returns -ENOTSUP and writes nothing. Two outcomes follow. If the target lies in a memory-domain partition declared K_MEM_PARTITION_P_RW_U_RO (privileged read-write, user read-only), the kernel-mode store succeeds and deposits partly attacker-chosen values into memory the memory domain had marked read-only for that thread, bypassing the partition's write protection. If the target lies in globally readable but unwritable memory such as .text/.rodata in flash, the store faults in kernel mode; the fault is delivered to z_fatal_error() and the default k_sys_fatal_error_handler() halts or reboots the device, giving an unprivileged thread a reliable full denial of service. The read-permission check does bound the damage: the address must still be readable by the calling thread, so kernel-private memory cannot be targeted and no confidential data is disclosed. The fix replaces both checks with K_SYSCALL_MEMORY_WRITE(), so a thread lacking write permission is terminated by K_OOPS before the implementation runs; the cqe argument correctly remains read-validated.