Semaine du 19 octobre au 25 octobre 2026
2 CVE
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CVE-2026-61916 – Non évaluée
Apache Software Foundation Apache bRPC
Out-of-bounds reads in URL parsing and case-insensitive header lookup in Apache bRPC before version 1.18.0 on platforms where plain char is unsigned, such as ARM64, allow remote attackers to cause a process crash and denial of service by sending crafted input containing bytes with the high bit set. Root Cause: Two 256-entry lookup tables are accessed through pointers biased by 128 so that valid indices are in the range -128 to 127. Input bytes are promoted from plain char to int without first normalizing them to the signed-char range. On affected platforms, bytes in the range 0x80 to 0xFF therefore become indices 128 to 255 and read up to 127 bytes beyond the end of the underlying tables. Affected Scenarios: A remotely accessible bRPC HTTP server on an affected platform can reach the vulnerable URL lookup through an unauthenticated request URI containing a high-bit byte. The case-insensitive lookup is also reachable when untrusted header names are processed through APIs such as the HTTP/2 HPACK path. HTTP/1 header names containing high-bit bytes are rejected by the HTTP/1 parser before reaching the vulnerable lookup. Builds where plain char is signed, which commonly include x86_64 builds, are not affected by this issue. How to Fix: Choose one of the following options: 1. Upgrade Apache bRPC to version 1.18.0 or later. 2. Apply the patch from https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3376 . The fix normalizes lookup-table indices to the signed-char range before accessing the biased tables.
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CVE-2026-105299 8.7 Élevée
Cloudflare https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora
Summary Before version 0.9.0, the HTTP/1 upstream path in pingora-proxy passed the downstream request through upstream_request_filter and wrote it to the upstream without removing the client's Connection header, other hop-by-hop headers, or the headers Connection nominated, although RFC 9110 Section 7.6.1 requires intermediaries to remove them. The HTTP/2 upstream path already removed Connection and related HTTP/1-specific headers. A client could therefore nominate a header that the application adds in upstream_request_filter (for example, Connection: keep-alive, X-Forwarded-For). A downstream HTTP/1 intermediary that honors Connection would then strip the Pingora-added header before it reached the origin. Impact Specifically affects chained deployments where an HTTP/1 intermediary between Pingora and the origin processes Connection nominations (for example, Go's net/http/httputil.ReverseProxy) and the origin trusts headers added by that intermediary (for example, X-Forwarded-For for IP-based authorization). A remote, unauthenticated attacker can have those headers removed, potentially bypassing authorization. The reporter demonstrated access to an IP-restricted endpoint using X-Forwarded-For for IP validation on the origin. This is the same class of issue as CVE-2022-31813 in Apache HTTP Server. Note that Cloudflare CDN customers were unaffected, as no such chained deployment as described above exists with internal Pingora services, and Connection headers are sanitized before arriving at Pingora gateways. Mitigation: * Upgrade to pingora 0.9.0 or later. By default, Pingora now removes hop-by-hop and Connection-nominated headers from upstream requests, and rejects requests whose Connection header nominates Host, X-Forwarded-For, X-Forwarded-Host, X-Forwarded-Proto, or a pseudo-header. This is controlled by PeerOptions::http_upstream_request_policy (HttpUpstreamRequestPolicy). Fix commits: https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/28c18e6b6b04dd0bd937234e5950049e6d74cded , https://github.com/cloudflare/pingora/commit/ca23f1668eca8e78be7ba62ef0edbd458b40eeee * Do not use HttpUpstreamRequestPolicy::preserve() if the origin relies on headers added by Pingora; it restores the old passthrough behavior. * If you cannot upgrade: in upstream_request_filter, remove the Connection header and every header it nominates before adding trusted headers.