Octobre 2026

Gitea

Seven Gitea API routes under `/api/v1/users/{username}` (followers, following, following/{target}, starred, subscriptions, keys and gpg_keys) were registered without the `individualPermsChecker` middleware that enforces the visibility of the target user. An authenticated user could therefore read the followers, following list, starred and watched repositories and public SSH and GPG keys of a user with limited or private visibility, whom they could not otherwise see. The issue was fixed in 1.27.3 and 28.0.0 and disclosed with 28.2.0.

Gitea

Adding attachments to a release checked the repository and release of an attachment but not whether it was already linked to an issue or comment. A user with write access to the releases of a repository, who knew the UUID of an attachment in that repository, could link it to a release. This exposed the file name, size and download count of the attachment through the release and allowed the user to rename or delete it.

Gitea

The visibility check of Gitea user profiles was applied to GET requests only, while `POST /{username}` (follow and unfollow) required only a signed-in user. Any authenticated user could therefore obtain the full name, location, website and description of a user with a private profile from the response. The issue was fixed in 28.1.0 and disclosed with 28.2.0.

Gitea

Creating a draft release through the API returned an `assets` list that was built from a release without an ID, which matched every attachment that was not linked to a release. A user who could create a draft release in a repository therefore received the metadata (file name, UUID, upload time, size and download count) of issue and comment attachments of repositories they could not read, and of abandoned uploads.

Gitea

`GET /api/v1/user/subscriptions` returned the metadata of every repository a user was watching without checking that the user still had access to it. A user who watched a private repository while having access, and later lost it, for example through a team permission downgrade, could still read its name, description, clone URLs, owner and counters. The issue was fixed in 1.27.0 and 28.0.0 and disclosed with 28.2.0.

Gitea

The Gitea web handlers for adding and removing reactions on issues and comments did not refuse locked issues for users without write access, although the API did. A signed-in user who could read an issue could therefore add or remove reactions on a locked issue and its comments, bypassing the interaction restriction of the lock. Only reactions were affected; no content could be changed.

Gitea

The Gitea Actions artifact v4 (Twirp) handlers read the whole request body into memory without a size limit. A user who can run a workflow and obtains the runner token of that run could send an oversized request to the artifact service and exhaust the memory of the server, which terminates the Gitea process. The request body is now limited to 1 MiB.

Gitea

Requesting `/{username}/-/repositories` for an individual user instead of an organization made the organization home handler dereference a nil organization and panic. The request needs no authentication and no special configuration. The server answered with an HTTP 500 error and logged a panic for each request; the fix returns 404 for individual users.

Gitea

The Gitea OpenID association callback in the security settings accepted a positive OpenID 2.0 assertion without checking that the signed-in user had started the linking. Because OpenID 2.0 allows unsolicited assertions, an attacker-controlled OpenID provider could attach the attacker's identity to the account of a signed-in victim who opened a crafted link, and the attacker could then sign in as the victim through OpenID login, which does not apply the local TOTP or WebAuthn checks. The callback now requires a time-limited `state` value bound to the user.

Gitea

Gitea's web attachment handler skips its cross-repository ownership check for attachments created before 16 January 2026 and checks permissions against the repository named in the request URL instead. An unauthenticated attacker who knows a private attachment's UUID can request it through a public repository's attachment path and retrieve its contents. This can expose issue and pull request attachments or release assets; the random attachment UUID must already be known to the attacker.

Gitea

When OpenID sign-in is enabled, Gitea processes unauthenticated assertion parameters and sends an HTTP POST request to the caller-supplied OpenID provider endpoint during verification. An attacker controls the destination and much of the form body, allowing interaction with internal HTTP services reachable from the Gitea server. The response is not returned to the attacker, so the issue is blind SSRF; its impact depends on the services and network addresses the server can reach.

Gitea

Gitea's collaboration access-mode endpoint accepts the Owner access mode from an authenticated repository collaborator with Admin access. The collaborator can promote their effective permissions from Admin to Owner and then perform owner-only operations, including transferring the repository to their own account. This bypasses the intended boundary between repository administration and ownership.

Gitea

Gitea's Maven upload handler reads checksum uploads entirely into memory and returns before enforcing package-size quotas. An authenticated user with package-publish permission can submit an oversized body to a checksum endpoint despite legitimate checksum values being at most 128 bytes. This bypasses the upload quota on that path and can exhaust server memory.

Gitea

Gitea uses inconsistent repository visibility predicates, and the condition used by some repository-listing endpoints admits repositories whose owners are hidden from the viewer. Those listings disclose repository metadata even though direct routes correctly deny access with a 404 response. The issue exposes repository existence and listing information across the intended owner-visibility boundary.

Gitea

Gitea does not limit the length of the gitignores field accepted by repository-creation forms and the API. Repository initialization splits the field into template names, repeatedly reads the referenced templates, and buffers their contents in memory. An attacker who can create repositories can submit an oversized value to amplify template reads and memory use, impairing availability.

Gitea

Gitea's Actions workflow status badge endpoint does not enforce repository-read scope or the public-only restriction on the token authenticating the request. A token lacking read:repository, or restricted to public repositories, can retrieve the latest workflow status of a private repository accessible to its owner. This discloses private workflow status beyond the token's intended delegated permissions.

Gitea

Gitea's repository markup endpoint resolves same-repository pull request references without enforcing the viewer's Pull Requests permission. A member with only Wiki access to a private repository can submit a markup preview request and retrieve a private pull request's title and state icon despite lacking Issues and Pull Requests access. This exposes pull request metadata across repository unit permissions.

Gitea

Gitea's organization-list API does not enforce the read:organization token scope. A token limited to another category, such as read:misc, can retrieve organization metadata visible to its owner. For a site administrator's token, the response can include Limited and private organizations, bypassing the intended restriction on the token's delegated access.

Gitea

Gitea's shared comparison helper omits the token repository-access check used when updating pull requests. A public-only token with read:repository scope can route a comparison or pull request creation through a public base repository and retrieve commit history and diffs from a private head repository accessible to the token owner. This bypasses the token's public-only restriction; it does not remove the account's underlying repository permission checks.

Gitea

Gitea creates server-side Git hook directories and scripts with mode 0777 and relies on the process umask to restrict access. With a permissive umask such as 0000 or 0002, another local user who can reach the repository storage may modify a hook or add an executable to a writable hook directory. A later Git operation can execute that file as the Gitea service account.

Gitea

Gitea's repository migration API accepts a public-only token when the request specifies creation of a private repository. A delegated token intended to operate only on public resources can create a private repository and migration task under the authorizing account or an organization where that user has the necessary permissions. The ordinary private repository-creation route rejects the same token, but the migration path omits that restriction.

Gitea

Gitea's organization repository-creation API requires write:organization but omits the write:repository token scope enforced by other repository-creation routes. A personal access token or OAuth application token without repository-write scope can therefore create organization-owned repositories if the authorizing user has permission to do so. This bypasses the token's delegated scope boundary while remaining subject to the user's organization permissions.

Gitea

Gitea's user SSH and GPG key-list API endpoints omit the profile visibility check applied by their web equivalents. A restricted account can retrieve public keys, key titles, fingerprints, and GPG-embedded email addresses belonging to Limited-visibility users. The disclosure concerns public key material and associated metadata, not private cryptographic keys.

Gitea

Gitea's API and web issue-search paths do not treat restricted accounts as anonymous viewers when evaluating Limited-visibility repository owners. A restricted user can search and retrieve issue titles and bodies that should be hidden by the owner's visibility policy. Keyword matching can also reveal that hidden issue content or comments contain a supplied term.

Gitea

Gitea's activity-feed and contribution-heatmap API handlers do not apply the profile visibility check for restricted accounts viewing Limited-visibility users. A restricted user can retrieve activity records and contribution timestamps that the corresponding profile routes deny. Exposed activity can include repository names, commit messages, and issue or pull request events associated with qualifying public-repository activity.

Gitea

For pull request events, Gitea reads workflow definitions from the pull request head and posts a synthetic skipped status when workflow branch or path filters exclude execution. A fork pull request author can supply a workflow matching a required status context but deliberately prevent it from running. Because skipped statuses count as success, branch protection or organization-required workflow checks can appear satisfied without the mandated workflow executing; no runner or maintainer approval is required for this path.

Gitea

Gitea's user organization-list API includes Limited-visibility organizations for authenticated restricted accounts without applying the visibility restriction enforced by the single-organization endpoint. A restricted user can list a known user's public organization memberships and retrieve limited organizations' names, descriptions, and avatars. This exposes organization metadata that should be hidden from the requesting account.

Gitea

Gitea's package registry grants authenticated users read access to packages owned by Limited-visibility users without excluding restricted accounts. A restricted user can enumerate and download those packages despite the visibility policy that should prevent this access. The issue affects user-owned package registries and exposes package contents across the intended authorization boundary.

Gitea

Gitea's collaborative-owner authorization path for reading cross-repository reusable workflows does not exclude fork pull request runs. An approved fork workflow targeting a private repository can read workflow files from another private repository that trusts the base repository's owner through collaborative-owner configuration. The issue exposes private reusable workflow contents at caller-selected Git refs; it does not itself grant write access or code execution in the other repository.

Gitea

Gitea's Swift package parser limits each manifest to 128 KiB but does not limit the number of manifests or their aggregate size before reading them into memory. An authenticated user with package-publish permission can upload a highly compressed archive containing many manifests, causing allocations far larger than the uploaded archive. This can exhaust memory, terminate the process, or cause request failures.

Gitea

Gitea parses Alpine package uploads before enforcing package-size quotas and does not bound the decompressed .PKGINFO data or its dependency and provides entry counts. An authenticated user with package-publish permission can upload a small, highly compressed archive that causes disproportionately large memory allocations during parsing and metadata generation. On memory-constrained deployments, this can terminate the process or otherwise disrupt availability.

Gitea

Gitea's initial GitLab migration version probe uses an HTTP client without a timeout and does not attach the migration task's cancellation context. An authenticated user who can start migrations can target an attacker-controlled server that keeps the response open indefinitely. The request continues after task cancellation and can exhaust the migration worker pool, preventing other migrations from progressing.

Gitea

Gitea's OneDev migration downloader reads the entire remote version response into memory without a size limit and uses a client without a timeout. An authenticated user who can start a repository migration can direct it to an attacker-controlled OneDev-compatible server returning an oversized or never-ending response. This can consume memory and hold migration workers, impairing service availability.

Gitea

Gitea's repository-side team-link API allows a repository administrator who is not an organization owner to attach organization teams to a repository despite RepoAdminChangeTeamAccess being disabled. The endpoint does not enforce the organization's restriction on repository administrators changing team access. This allows unauthorized changes to which organization teams receive repository access.

Gitea

Gitea's starred-repository and tracked-time API endpoints do not re-check current repository permissions before returning data associated with the requesting user. A user whose access to a private repository has been revoked can still retrieve repository metadata through /api/v1/user/starred and private issue titles through /api/v1/user/times. The disclosure depends on relationships or tracked-time entries created before access was revoked.

Gitea

When OpenID sign-in is enabled, Gitea accepts a user-supplied OpenID URL and performs discovery requests without validating the destination against internal network addresses. An unauthenticated remote attacker can cause the server to contact loopback or private-network HTTP services. This can expose internal service behavior and enable interaction with resources that are not directly reachable by the attacker.