Mercredi 14 octobre 2026
4 CVE sur 11
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CVE-2026-109527 7.5 Élevée
modelcontextprotocol python-sdk
The Model Context Protocol Python SDK is the official Python SDK for Model Context Protocol servers and clients. In mcp versions before 1.29.1 and from 2.0.0a1 through 2.0.1, the Streamable HTTP session manager, SSE message endpoint, and OAuth authorization-server routes buffer complete HTTP request bodies without enforcing a maximum size. An unauthenticated remote client able to reach an affected endpoint can send a large declared or streamed request body that consumes multiple times the body size in process memory and can repeatedly exhaust memory or terminate the server. Stdio-only servers and deployments with an effective upstream request-size limit are not affected, and applications that use StreamableHTTPServerTransport directly remain responsible for enforcing their own limit. The standard SDK server applications and session managers are fixed in versions 1.29.1 and 2.1.0.
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CVE-2026-104103 8.1 Élevée
ludwig-ai ludwig
Ludwig is a low-code framework for building custom LLMs, neural networks, and other AI models. Prior to 0.17.8, ludwig.datasets.archives.extract_archive() validated tar member names before calling TarFile.extractall() but did not validate symlink members or hard-link members. A crafted archive could create a link that escaped the extraction directory and then write a later member through that link, placing attacker-controlled content at an arbitrary filesystem path with the extracting process's privileges. The same containment check used os.path.commonprefix, so a sibling path sharing the destination's character prefix could also pass. The dataset-loading path can download and extract configured archive URLs, but exploitation requires a user to process an archive from a source controlled or compromised by the attacker on supported Python 3.12 and 3.13 runtimes. Python 3.14 is not affected because its default tar data filter rejects escaping links. This issue is fixed in version 0.17.8.
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CVE-2026-103929 7.8 Élevée
jdx mise
mise manages dev tools like node, python, cmake, and terraform. Prior to 2026.7.14, in the default non-safe mode, mise loads .mise.toml [settings] from an untrusted local project before trust approval and strip_local_only_settings removes only fields marked global_only. The unix_default_file_shell_args, unix_default_inline_shell_args, windows_default_file_shell_args, and windows_default_inline_shell_args settings were not marked global_only, allowing a repository to replace the default interpreter arguments used by trusted tasks that have no explicit shell, postinstall directives, template exec operations, or hooks that fall back to the default shell. When mise appends the trusted command after the attacker-controlled interpreter arguments, the attacker-selected command can execute first with the developer account's privileges even though the local configuration was never trusted. The separate path-sanitization hardening note in the advisory is outside this vulnerability. This issue is fixed in version 2026.7.14.
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CVE-2026-104795 8.8 Élevée
Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.21
The insights-runtime-extractor runs as a privileged DaemonSet (`hostPID: true`) that scans container processes for runtime fingerprinting. When scanning a container, the coordinator: 1. **fork()s** a child process 2. **setns()** into the target container's PID and mount namespaces 3. **fchdir()** back to an orphaned FD pointing at the extractor's own root filesystem (where `/crio.sock` is hostPath-mounted) 4. Calls **only `seteuid(target_uid)`** — changing the effective UID but leaving the **real UID and saved-set-UID at 0** and **retaining the permitted capability set** 5. The `check_no_privileged_perms()` guard inspects only the Effective capability set (so it passes), and is **skipped entirely when the target runs as uid 0** 6. The `VersionExecutable` fingerprint invokes `fpr_kind_executable` with `process.command_line[0]` — the target's argv[0], read from `/proc/<pid>/cmdline` and **fully controlled by the workload** 7. `fpr_kind_executable` calls `exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output()` — executing the **workload's own binary** inside the workload's mount namespace while **ruid=0 in the host user namespace** The executed process can call `setuid(0)` to restore full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN`, and inherits the orphaned cwd which resolves into the extractor container's filesystem containing the host CRI-O socket. ## Affected Code ### 1. Insufficient privilege drop (Rust — extractor coordinator) **File:** `extractor/src/insights_runtime_extractor.rs` ```rust // Lines 139-146 — seteuid-only drop, guard skipped for root containers join_process_namespaces(process.pid)?; change_dir(current_dir); switch_user(*process.uid)?; if *process.uid != 0 { perms::check_no_privileged_perms() .expect("Must not have privileged permissions to run fingerprints"); } fingerprint::run_fingerprints(&config, out_dir, &process); ``` ```rust // Lines 182-185 — only effective UID changed; ruid/suid stay 0 fn switch_user(uid: u32) -> Result<(), ScannerError> { debug!("... Becoming user: {uid}"); seteuid(uid.into()).map_err(|e| ScannerError::Errno(e)) } ``` ### 2. Execution of untrusted binary (Go — fingerprint) **File:** `fingerprints/pkg/utils/file.go` ```go // Lines 75-80 — executes a path taken verbatim from workload's argv[0] func GetExecutableVersionOutput(executable string) (string, error) { out, err := exec.Command(executable, "--version").Output() if err != nil { return "", err } return string(out), nil } ``` ### 3. Workload-controlled path forwarded (Rust — version_executable) **File:** `version_executable.rs` ```rust // Lines 29-34 — workload-controlled command_line[0] forwarded to fingerprint return Some(vec![ fpr_kind_executable, out_dir.to_string(), String::from(&process.command_line[0]), String::from(&version_executable.runtime_kind_name), ]); ``` ## Attack Pattern **Attacker:** Any tenant able to schedule a pod (unprivileged, any namespace) **Victim:** The node running the insights-runtime-extractor DaemonSet **Trigger:** Automatic — the DaemonSet scans all container processes on the node **Attack sequence:** 1. Attacker creates a pod whose process name matches a configured versioned-executable pattern (`node`, `python`, `python3`, `MainThread`, or contains `java`) 2. The pod's main binary (at the path matching argv[0]) is a malicious executable that calls `setuid(0)` to restore root 3. When the insights operator triggers a scan, the DaemonSet forks, enters the attacker's mount namespace, and executes the attacker's binary with ruid=0 4. The attacker's code regains full root with `CAP_SYS_ADMIN` in the host user namespace 5. The inherited cwd contains the host CRI-O socket → full node compromise