Vendredi 9 octobre 2026
14 CVE
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CVE-2026-104112 6.8 Moyenne
illumos-gate · OmniOS
A missing release of resources in the illumos name service cache daemon (nscd) allows a local user to exhaust kernel memory. The nscd door server procedure, switcher() in usr/src/cmd/nscd/nscd_frontend.c, does not close file descriptors that are passed with a door call but not used by the request, and the main nscd door at /var/run/name_service_door accepts passed descriptors from any user in its zone. Because nscd also runs with an unlimited file descriptor limit, an unprivileged local user, including one in a non-global zone, can repeatedly pass a descriptor to its zone's nscd in a door_call() loop, causing the file descriptor table of nscd to grow without bound in kernel memory. This causes a denial of service of nscd and can render processes in all zones on the host unresponsive. The flaw has existed since 2006 (illumos-gate commit cb5caa98), and affects any illumos distribution prior to illumos-gate commit af810a72.
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CVE-2026-102916 6.8 Moyenne
illumos-gate · OmniOS
A reachable assertion in the illumos bhyve instruction emulator allows a guest to panic the host. When emulating a REP-prefixed MOVS or STOS instruction that accesses guest MMIO, vie_emulate_movs() and vie_emulate_stos() in usr/src/uts/intel/io/vmm/vmm_instruction_emul.c do not clear the VIES_REPEAT status flag on the final iteration. For MMIO regions emulated in the kernel (the local APIC, I/O APIC and HPET), the stale flag causes a VERIFY assertion in vie_advance_pc() to fail, and the host panics. A privileged user within a guest VM can issue a REP MOVS or REP STOS instruction against the local APIC page to cause a denial of service of the host and every other guest running on it. The flaw has existed since 2020 (illumos-gate commit e0c0d44e), and affects any illumos distribution prior to illumos-gate commit 696ecf8d.
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CVE-2026-98384 – Non évaluée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of sk_protocol in bpf_sock_destroy() sk_protocol lives in struct sock, not in struct sock_common. A timewait or request sock handed to bpf_sock_destroy() by the tcp iterator is neither, so reading sk->sk_protocol runs past the object: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in bpf_sock_destroy+0xc7/0xe0 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881047d11b4 by task test_progs/428 Tainted: [W]=WARN Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0 print_report+0xd1/0x630 kasan_report+0xf3/0x130 __asan_report_load2_noabort+0x14/0x30 bpf_sock_destroy+0xc7/0xe0 bpf_prog_c3dd61f9d9cd9f37_iter_tcp6_timewait+0x9f/0xb7 bpf_iter_run_prog+0x538/0xde0 bpf_iter_tcp_seq_show+0x26b/0x4b0 bpf_seq_read+0x424/0x1210 vfs_read+0x197/0xe40 ksys_read+0x119/0x240 __x64_sys_read+0x72/0xc0 x64_sys_call+0x647/0x27e0 do_syscall_64+0xe5/0x610 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e Only check sk_protocol on full socks. tcp_abort() already knows how to deal with TIME_WAIT and NEW_SYN_RECV socks. Also fix the comment, it never matched the code.
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CVE-2026-98383 – Non évaluée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Disallow bpf_skb_pull_data() for LWT_SEG6LOCAL An LWT_SEG6LOCAL program can invalidate its cached SRH with bpf_lwt_seg6_adjust_srh() and then call bpf_skb_pull_data(). The latter may reallocate skb->head, leaving the per-CPU SRH pointer dangling. Post-program SRH validation then writes through that pointer. Disallow bpf_skb_pull_data() for LWT_SEG6LOCAL programs so the verifier rejects this unsafe helper combination. Other LWT program types continue to expose the helper through lwt_out_func_proto().
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CVE-2026-98382 – Non évaluée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Reject dev-bound-only programs on other devices __bpf_offload_dev_match() falls back to comparing offdev pointers after an exact netdev mismatch. Bound-only programs normally have NULL offdevs, so unrelated netdevs compare equal. A bound-only program on an offload-registered netdev can instead inherit a real offdev and match a sibling port. With CAP_BPF and CAP_NET_ADMIN, a caller can use bpf(BPF_LINK_CREATE) with a different target ifindex to run metadata kfuncs specialized for the bound driver on the target driver's xdp_buff. Running a veth-bound program on tun reads beyond tun's bare stack xdp_buff as a veth_xdp_buff. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000010-0x0000000000000017] RIP: 0010:veth_xdp_rx_timestamp (drivers/net/veth.c:1673) Call Trace: ... tun_build_skb (drivers/net/tun.c:1739) tun_get_user (drivers/net/tun.c:1856) tun_chr_write_iter (drivers/net/tun.c:2091) vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:595 fs/read_write.c:687) ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:739) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Restrict non-offloaded programs to exact netdev matches and retain the shared-offdev fallback only for genuinely offloaded multi-port programs.
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CVE-2026-98381 – Non évaluée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: veth: manage XDP program pointers during channel resize veth_set_channels() tears down XDP resources for removed RX queues without clearing rq->xdp_prog. If the program is then detached or replaced, those queues keep the old pointer after bpf_prog_put(). A later channel increase can re-enable NAPI and run the freed program. BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffc90000256048 Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: veth_xdp_rcv_skb (include/linux/filter.h:779 include/net/xdp.h:696 drivers/net/veth.c:820) Call Trace: veth_xdp_rcv (drivers/net/veth.c:941) veth_poll (drivers/net/veth.c:986) __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:7787) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7850 net/core/dev.c:8007) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:645) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt
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CVE-2026-98380 – Non évaluée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: reject IDR error pointers when deleting actions tcf_action_delete() drops the reference held by its lookup before calling tcf_idr_delete_index() with the saved action index. An unlocked classifier can remove that action and reserve the same IDR slot with ERR_PTR(-EBUSY) in between. tcf_idr_delete_index() only checks the lookup result for NULL. It therefore treats the reservation as a tc_action and dereferences tcfa_bindcnt. A hardware execution breakpoint was used to schedule the interleaving without changing the kernel source. KASAN reported this decoded trace: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in tca_action_gd+0x5b9/0x1010 Read of size 4 at addr 0000000000000010 by task poc/150 Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000002 RIP: tca_action_gd+0x5c0/0x1010: arch_atomic_read at arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:23 raw_atomic_read at include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:457 atomic_read at include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:33 tcf_idr_delete_index at net/sched/act_api.c:766 tcf_action_delete at net/sched/act_api.c:1859 tcf_del_notify at net/sched/act_api.c:2014 tca_action_gd at net/sched/act_api.c:2064 R13: 0000000000000010 R15: fffffffffffffff0 Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception R15 contains ERR_PTR(-EBUSY), and adding the tcfa_bindcnt offset produces the address in R13. With the guard applied, the same reproducer returned -ENOENT without a KASAN report or panic. Treat error pointers as absent and return -ENOENT.
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CVE-2026-98379 – Non évaluée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ip6t_rpfilter: reject routes without inet6_dev ip6_route_lookup() can return an error-free route whose rt6i_idev is NULL. Lowering an external nexthop device's MTU below IPV6_MIN_MTU tears down its inet6_dev while fib6_ifdown() leaves routes using nexthop objects in the FIB. An unprivileged user can construct this state with rtnetlink in a private user and network namespace, then trigger a NULL dereference through an IPv6 rpfilter lookup: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000000 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000000-0x0000000000000007] RIP: rpfilter_mt (net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6t_rpfilter.c:75) Call Trace: ip6t_do_table (net/ipv6/netfilter/ip6_tables.c:316) nf_hook_slow (net/netfilter/core.c:619) ipv6_rcv (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:351) __netif_receive_skb_one_core (net/core/dev.c:6216) process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6680) __napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:7739) net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7959) handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:622) do_softirq.part.0 (kernel/softirq.c:523) __local_bh_enable_ip (kernel/softirq.c:450) __dev_queue_xmit (net/core/dev.c:4913) packet_sendmsg (net/packet/af_packet.c:3139) __sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2252) __x64_sys_sendto (net/socket.c:2259) do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt Reject routes without an inet6_dev immediately after lookup. Such routes are not eligible for reverse-path filtering, and the check protects all later rt6i_idev dereferences.
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CVE-2026-98378 – Non évaluée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Skip unsettled links in link iterator bpf_link_prime() inserts a link into link_idr before anon_inode_getfile() succeeds and before bpf_link_settle() publishes the ID in link->id. bpf_link_by_id() treats such an ID-zero link as unsettled, but the link iterator takes a reference without this check. If anon_inode_getfile() then fails, the creator removes the ID and frees its still-private link directly. The iterator is left with a dangling reference and its next bpf_link_put() accesses freed memory. Treat ID-zero entries as transient in bpf_link_get_curr_or_next(), just as bpf_link_by_id() does. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in bpf_link_put Write of size 8 by task exp/384 Call Trace: bpf_link_put kernel/bpf/syscall.c:3372 bpf_link_seq_next kernel/bpf/link_iter.c:33 bpf_seq_read kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c:158 vfs_read fs/read_write.c:572 ksys_read fs/read_write.c:716 do_syscall_64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:84 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121 Kernel panic - not syncing: KASAN: panic_on_warn set ...
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CVE-2026-98377 – Non évaluée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vlan: require the MAC header to be present in __vlan_insert_inner_tag() __vlan_insert_inner_tag() only guarantees head room via skb_cow_head(), never that mac_len bytes of MAC header are present. Its ETH_HLEN wrappers - __vlan_insert_tag() under skb_vlan_push(), and vlan_insert_tag() under validate_xmit_vlan() on the generic transmit path - therefore rewrite the first 16 bytes at skb->data: a 12-byte memmove plus two 2-byte stores at +12 and +14. No caller supplies the bound, while the pop helpers use skb_ensure_writable()/pskb_may_pull(). An IFF_TUN device has hard_header_len == 0, so packet_snd() accepts a one-byte AF_PACKET/SOCK_RAW frame. The first vlan push only sets a hwaccel tag; the next - clsact "action vlan push" or bpf_skb_vlan_push() - enters the helper with skb->len still 1. The head comes from skbuff_small_head without __GFP_ZERO, so each push drags bytes from beyond skb->tail into the frame. After three the one-byte send leaves as 13 bytes carrying 11 bytes of uninitialised slab: 0000: 5a b3 62 12 80 88 ff ff 00 b3 62 12 81 `------------------------------' only 0x5a was sent; the rest is slab, here the top 56 bits of a linear-map address Require the MAC header the helper rewrites to be present, so such a frame is dropped rather than transmitted.
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CVE-2026-98376 – Non évaluée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Use array_map_meta_equal for percpu array inner map replacement percpu_array_map_ops.map_meta_equal points to the generic bpf_map_meta_equal(), which does not compare max_entries. When a percpu array serves as an inner map, replacing it with one that has fewer max_entries bypasses the check. Since percpu_array_map_gen_lookup() inlines the original template's index_mask as a JIT immediate, a lookup on the replacement map can access pptrs[] out of bounds. Point percpu_array_map_ops.map_meta_equal to array_map_meta_equal(), which already enforces the max_entries equality check. Add a selftest to verify that replacing a percpu array inner map with a differently-sized one is rejected.
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CVE-2026-98375 – Non évaluée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xen/netfront: drop RX packets with a short Ethernet header handle_incoming_queue() pulls pull_to bytes into the head before calling eth_type_trans(). pull_to is the length of the first RX slot, capped at RX_COPY_THRESHOLD, and that length comes from the backend. Nothing checks it against ETH_HLEN. If the first slot is shorter than ETH_HLEN and more slots follow, the head ends up shorter than an Ethernet header while skb->len is longer, and eth_type_trans() BUG()s in __skb_pull(). If the whole packet is shorter than ETH_HLEN, eth_type_trans() reads the header past the end of the data instead. Pull at least ETH_HLEN, and drop the packet if that fails, which also drops packets too short to hold an Ethernet header. This also checks the return value of the pull, which was ignored.
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CVE-2026-19575 7.8 Élevée
zephyrproject zephyr
The user-mode verification handler for the device_deinit() system call, z_vrfy_device_deinit() in kernel/device.c, validated its dev argument with K_SYSCALL_OBJ_INIT(dev, K_OBJ_ANY). k_object_validate() short-circuits its type comparison when the requested type is K_OBJ_ANY, so the check reduced to "this pointer is the base address of some kernel object the calling thread has been granted" — the object's actual type was never compared, and K_SYSCALL_OBJ_INIT also skips the initialization-state check. The sibling handlers z_vrfy_device_init() and z_vrfy_device_is_ready() already used K_OBJ_DRIVER_ANY and were unaffected. A thread running in user mode can therefore pass any kernel object it holds permission on — most usefully a thread stack object obtained from the k_thread_stack_alloc() syscall or a statically defined K_THREAD_STACK it was granted in order to spawn a child user thread — whose backing memory is writable from user mode. z_impl_device_deinit() then interprets those attacker-written bytes as a struct device: it dereferences the state pointer read out of the object, calls the function pointer read out of ops.deinit, and on success writes through state again. The result is an indirect call to an arbitrary address executed in supervisor mode, plus an arbitrary kernel read and a single-byte kernel write. Exploitation gives a local unprivileged thread full kernel code execution, defeating the CONFIG_USERSPACE isolation boundary entirely; a less precise attempt yields a supervisor-mode fault and a system crash. The defect is only reachable in builds that enable both CONFIG_USERSPACE and CONFIG_DEVICE_DEINIT_SUPPORT — with de-initialization support disabled, z_impl_device_deinit() returns -ENOTSUP without ever dereferencing the pointer. In v4.2.x and v4.3.x, CONFIG_DEVICE_DEINIT_SUPPORT defaulted to y, so every CONFIG_USERSPACE build of those releases is exposed unless the option was explicitly turned off. From v4.4.0 the option is opt-in (no default, and not selected by any in-tree subsystem), so a v4.4.x build is exposed only if it enables the option explicitly. The v4.2 line is no longer maintained and receives no backport. The fix changes the object check to K_OBJ_DRIVER_ANY, which constrains the argument to the build-generated driver object type range (K_OBJ_DRIVER_FIRST..K_OBJ_DRIVER_LAST) — the real struct device instances placed by the linker — so the state and ops.deinit fields are once again kernel-controlled.
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CVE-2026-19569 8.8 Élevée
zephyrproject zephyr
dynamic_object_create() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c computed the backing allocation for a dynamically allocated kernel object as obj_size_get(otype) + size, and for thread stack elements as STACK_ELEMENT_DATA_SIZE(size) (a round-up plus fixed overhead), without checking either expression for unsigned wrap-around. A size close to SIZE_MAX makes the computed total wrap to a very small value, so the heap chunk handed out is a few bytes while the object descriptor is still tagged with the full requested type and registered in the kernel object table. The size argument reaches that arithmetic directly from user mode. k_object_alloc_size() is declared __syscall in include/zephyr/sys/kobject.h, its verifier z_vrfy_k_object_alloc_size() in kernel/userspace/userspace_handler.c is a bare pass-through, and z_object_alloc() only range-checks otype — nothing bounds size. The stack-element branch is additionally reachable through the k_thread_stack_alloc() syscall via kernel/dynamic.c. Because subsequent kernel-object validation checks only the object's type and initialization state, the undersized handle passes K_SYSCALL_OBJ_INIT()/K_SYSCALL_OBJ_NEVER_INIT(), and the matching init syscall (for example k_mutex_init(), k_sem_init(), or k_thread_create()) then writes a complete object over the truncated allocation. An unprivileged user-mode thread can therefore trigger a supervisor-mode out-of-bounds write into the kernel resource-pool heap, of a size and content it substantially controls, corrupting sys_heap chunk metadata and adjacent kernel objects. Under CONFIG_GEN_PRIV_STACKS the thread-stack branch additionally stores an attacker-influenced wild pointer as a user thread's privileged stack base. The practical result is escape from the CONFIG_USERSPACE sandbox — kernel-level code execution or at minimum kernel memory corruption and system compromise. Exploitation requires CONFIG_USERSPACE together with CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS (also selected by CONFIG_DYNAMIC_THREAD under userspace), and a calling thread with an assigned resource pool. The fix rejects both overflowing computations and frees the partially built descriptor.