Mardi 6 octobre 2026

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() advances to the fragment containing @offset with an unbounded loop: while (offset >= walk->past + walk->frags[walk->fragi].len) walk->past += walk->frags[walk->fragi++].len; walk->fragi is advanced and walk->frags[walk->fragi] is dereferenced without ever checking fragi against walk->nr_frags. When the requested offset is at or beyond the total length spanned by the walk's fragments, fragi runs past nr_frags and off the end of the fixed-size on-stack frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1] array, reading out-of-bounds stack memory. The two callers behave differently: iptfs_skb_add_frags() already guards against this with if (!walk->nr_frags || offset >= walk->total + walk->initial_offset) return len; but iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() has no such guard and calls iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() unconditionally, so it performs the out-of-range walk. Its own "fragi < walk->nr_frags" bound check runs only afterwards, too late to prevent the read. This is reachable from the receive path: a crafted IP-TFS (AGGFRAG) payload delivered to an IPTFS SA drives iptfs_reassem_cont() -> iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() with an offset past the fragment total, e.g.: BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888008ad7210 by task repro/345 iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:392 iptfs_skb_can_add_frags+0x155/0x310 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:420 iptfs_reassem_cont+0xcf8/0x1140 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:902 iptfs_input_ordered+0x552/0x670 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1280 iptfs_input+0x3d6/0xde0 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1741 xfrm_input+0x282f/0x6140 net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:700 xfrm4_esp_rcv+0x93/0x120 net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c:104 ip_rcv+0x278/0x2d0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612 Give iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() the same up-front guard that iptfs_skb_add_frags() already has, so the walk is never entered with an out-of-range offset. When it triggers, the caller falls back to the existing linearize-and-copy path, which is safe.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: iptfs: fix runt reassembly panic from short inner tot_len When the start of an inner packet is split across two outer packets such that fewer than 4 bytes land at the end of the first one, __input_process_payload() saves those bytes as a runt and skips the iplen/iphlen validation performed for in-place packets. When the continuation packet arrives, iptfs_reassem_cont() only requires the declared inner length to be >= sizeof(ra_runt) (6) before allocating the reassembly skb with that attacker-controlled length. However, __iptfs_iphlen() always returns the fixed minimum IP header size (20 for IPv4, 40 for IPv6), so for an inner IPv4 tot_len in [6, 19] the header-completion copy writes past the declared packet length, and the subsequent "ipremain -= copylen" underflows to ~4GB, leaving the payload copy length bounded only by blkoff (up to 64KB). At runtime the skb_put() tailroom check turns this into skb_over_panic(), i.e. an unprivileged kernel panic (DoS), reachable locally via userns+netns IPTFS SAs and remotely against IPTFS VPN gateways when the decrypted outer skb is linear (e.g. AF_PACKET taps, tun/tap delivery). Align the runt path with the normal path by requiring the declared inner length to cover at least the IP header size. This also subsumes the previous >= sizeof(ra_runt) check, since the minimum IP header is always larger than the runt buffer. This issue was found by the autokbug dynamic kernel fuzzer at Tencent Yunding Lab.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: fix compat ALLOCSPI request use-after-free xfrm_state_netlink() builds the ALLOCSPI response with dump_one_state(), which already calls alloc_compat() with the response skb and header. xfrm_alloc_userspi() then calls alloc_compat() again, but passes the original request skb and its header. For a compat request, the translator therefore interprets the 228-byte compat xfrm_userspi_info as the 232-byte native layout and reads four bytes past the declared payload. It also publishes the translated child through the request's frag_list. A multicast clone of the request shares skb_shared_info and can observe that child. xfrm_user_rcv_msg() frees it after the request handler returns, racing a compat receiver which may still be copying from it and resulting in a use-after-free. Remove the redundant conversion. The response keeps its correct compat translation from dump_one_state(), and no child is attached to the inbound request.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_scpi: reject DVFS OPP count above MAX_DVFS_OPPS scpi_dvfs_get_info() already rejected a zero opp_count, but still trusted any larger value from the SCP firmware. The shared-memory reply only holds MAX_DVFS_OPPS entries in buf.opps[]; a bigger count over-reads that array and then sizes the allocated OPP table incorrectly (garbage OPPs / OOB). The missing upper bound dates back to the original SCPI DVFS support. Reject zero and out-of-range counts in one check and return -EINVAL.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: scpi: bound-check DVFS index in scpi_dvfs_recalc_rate dvfs_get_idx() may return an out-of-range index if the SCP firmware is buggy or returns a stale value. Only negative indexes were rejected, so a large index walked past info->opps and could treat garbage as a clock rate (KASAN OOB / wrong frequency to consumers). The missing upper bound dates back to the original SCPI clock driver. Treat indexes >= opp count as invalid and return 0, same as idx < 0.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/iser: reject a remote invalidation of an unregistered direction A write command whose data is sent entirely as immediate data is not registered. iser_reg_mem_fastreg() takes the DMA key path and leaves rdma_reg[ISER_DIR_OUT].desc at NULL, while iser_dma_map_task_data() has already set dir[ISER_DIR_OUT]. iser_check_remote_inv() looks at dir[] alone and hands the descriptor to iser_inv_desc(), which reads desc->sig_protected. A target that answers such a command with IB_WR_SEND_WITH_INV faults the initiator. Leaving those commands unregistered is deliberate. The same function already terminates the connection when a target sends a remote invalidation the initiator did not ask for. A target that invalidates a direction that was never registered is in the same class, so give it the same answer. Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000004: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000020-0x0000000000000027] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 40 Comm: kworker/u8:2 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc5-ISERHOST-gf5098b6bae76-dirty #3 PREEMPT(lazy) Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC v2 (i440FX + PIIX, arch_caps fix, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: rxe_wq do_work RIP: 0010:iser_task_rsp+0x6d6/0xec0 Code: 48 c1 ea 03 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 ba 06 00 00 48 8b 9b 78 01 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 48 8d 7b 20 48 89 fa 48 c1 ea 03 <0f> b6 04 02 84 c0 74 06 0f 8e 76 06 00 00 80 7b 20 00 0f 84 3d 04 RSP: 0018:ffff88811b008db8 EFLAGS: 00010202 RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000001848 RDX: 0000000000000004 RSI: 1ffff11021587b12 RDI: 0000000000000020 RBP: ffff88810adc1ae4 R08: ffff888109b7f860 R09: ffffffff90a922c0 R10: ffff88810adc1a1c R11: 000000000000003c R12: ffff888109b7f800 R13: ffff88810adc1acc R14: ffff888109b7f820 R15: 0000000000000000 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88818a676000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00000000005afe2b CR3: 000000010af23005 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 PKRU: 55555554 Call Trace: <IRQ> __ib_process_cq+0xe1/0x390 ib_poll_handler+0x6e/0x200 irq_poll_softirq+0x1df/0x480 ? clockevents_program_event+0x2ba/0x860 ? __pfx_irq_poll_softirq+0x10/0x10 handle_softirqs+0x18e/0x590 ? __pfx_handle_softirqs+0x10/0x10 ? __hrtimer_rearm_deferred+0x156/0x450 do_softirq+0x3b/0x60 </IRQ> <TASK> __local_bh_enable_ip+0x61/0x70 __alloc_skb+0x732/0x890 ? _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x85/0xe0 ? __pfx___alloc_skb+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_read_unlock_irqrestore+0x16/0x50 rxe_init_packet+0x16b/0x4f0 prepare_ack_packet+0xb8/0x830 rxe_receiver+0x499/0x9980 ? __pfx_rxe_receiver+0x10/0x10 ? rxe_completer+0x29e5/0x38c0 ? hrtimer_start_range_ns_common+0x75f/0x1730 ? hrtimer_start_range_ns+0xa6/0x2c0 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_rxe_receiver+0x10/0x10 do_work+0x144/0x470 process_one_work+0x633/0x1030 ? assign_work+0x11d/0x370 worker_thread+0x45b/0xd10 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x2c6/0x3b0 ? recalc_sigpending+0x15c/0x1e0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 ? __switch_to+0x572/0xdd0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> Modules linked in: ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/bnxt_re: check create_singlethread_workqueue() in DCB setup bnxt_re_init_dcb_wq() ignores a failed allocation. The async DCB handler later calls queue_work() on the NULL pointer.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rtrs: guard against null kobj name In the client, if `init_path()` errors, the callee tries to clean up with `rtrs_clt_close_conns()`. However, this can lead to calling the event tracing code with `clt_path->kobj->name` being `NULL` and thus causing a null pointer dereference when trying to copy from it. This just adds a guard to check that the name is not `NULL` before copying from it. The server appears to have a similar pattern.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mad: Fix receive buffer leak when PKey enforcement fails ib_mad_complete_recv() initializes mad_recv_wc->rmpp_list and then runs ib_mad_enforce_security() before linking recv_buf onto that list. On failure it calls ib_free_recv_mad(), which only walks rmpp_list and frees the ib_mad_private of every buffer found there. As the list is still empty at that point, nothing is freed at all. The caller cannot clean up either: ib_mad_recv_done() sets recv to NULL right after ib_mad_complete_recv() returns, assuming the MAD layer took ownership of the buffer. Every MAD that fails the PKey check therefore leaks one ib_mad_private (about 300 bytes per IB port MAD, ~2K for OPA), and a remote node can trigger this repeatedly by sending MADs with a wrong PKey. Link recv_buf onto rmpp_list right after the list is initialized, so the error path has something to free.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/erdma: Use IRQ-safe XArray helpers for QP and CQ tables Locked QP and CQ lookups from EQ interrupts can deadlock with create-path XArray updates. If an interrupt arrives while the create path holds the plain xa_lock, the lookup spins forever trying to acquire the same lock. Use IRQ-safe XArray helpers for all QP and CQ create-path updates, including the GSI QP store and error paths. Initialize both arrays with XA_FLAGS_LOCK_IRQ so sleeping allocations preserve interrupt state.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rtrs-clt: Fix CQ pool leak when connect is interrupted The client borrows shared CQ credits in the ADDR_RESOLVED handler via ib_cq_pool_get(), before the peer is connected. create_cm() can return -ERESTARTSYS from wait_event_interruptible_timeout() without destroying the CM ID. The init_conns() and stop-and-destroy paths then call destroy_con_cq_qp() while cq is still NULL (no PUT) and only afterwards rdma_destroy_id(). CMA serializes the handler against rdma_destroy_id() with handler_mutex, but that does not order the GET against destroy_con_cq_qp(). If ADDR_RESOLVED has already passed the DESTROYING check, it can take con_mutex, GET credits, and then lose the con to kfree. Device unregister later hits WARN_ON(cq->cqe_used) in ib_cq_pool_cleanup(). Set a per-connection flag under con_mutex before CQ/QP teardown so a racing ADDR_RESOLVED cannot borrow credits after teardown has begun.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: virt_wifi: free skb when disconnected When the simulated link is disconnected, virt_wifi_start_xmit() returns NET_XMIT_DROP without freeing the skb. dev_hard_start_xmit() treats this return value as consumed, so every packet sent while disconnected leaks its skb. Free the skb before returning the drop status.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmfmac: cyw: pass PMKID to firmware if present Zero out auth_status on initialization. Otherwise, garbage will leak from the stack to the firmware (when ssid is less than 32 bytes and/or when params->pmkid is set). Then, pass the params->pmkid to the firmware (without it, the firmware caches a garbage PMKID on successful authentication and denies a subsequent association request that includes the PMKID).

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/IPoIB: Avoid restoring OPER_UP after multicast flush ipoib_ib_dev_flush_light() temporarily clears IPOIB_FLAG_OPER_UP to prevent multicast joins while ipoib_mcast_dev_flush() is running, and restores the flag afterwards if it was previously set. This restore races with ipoib_ib_dev_down(). If the interface is brought down while the flush is in progress, ipoib_ib_dev_down() clears IPOIB_FLAG_OPER_UP, but the flush path may set it again after the device has already gone down. Since commit 894021a75291 ("IB/ipoib: Make the carrier_on_task race aware"), ipoib_mcast_carrier_on_task() relies on IPOIB_FLAG_OPER_UP being cleared to terminate its rtnl_trylock() retry loop. If the flag is left set after shutdown, the workqueue retries forever, causing teardown to deadlock when ipoib_ndo_uninit() waits in destroy_workqueue() while holding RTNL. Instead of overloading IPOIB_FLAG_OPER_UP to block multicast joins during a light flush, introduce a dedicated IPOIB_FLAG_MCAST_FLUSH flag. Use it together with IPOIB_FLAG_OPER_UP to determine whether multicast joins are allowed, avoiding the race with device shutdown.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: don't get the radio mask for netdev-less wdevs cfg80211_calculate_bi_data() calls rdev_get_radio_mask() with wdev->netdev, which can be NULL and then crashes in mac80211. To avoid that, invert the order of checks since wdev->netdev is always valid for beaconing interfaces.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: check IP header size in cfg80211_classify8021d() A frame that looks like IP can be transmitted, but be too short, so the DS field is read incorrectly: BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in cfg80211_classify8021d+0x99d/0x12b0 net/wireless/util.c:1027 cfg80211_classify8021d+0x99d/0x12b0 net/wireless/util.c:1027 ieee80211_select_queue+0x37a/0x9e0 net/mac80211/wme.c:180 __ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0x60f/0x1d90 net/mac80211/tx.c:4304 ieee80211_subif_start_xmit+0xa8/0x6d0 net/mac80211/tx.c:4538 ... packet_sendmsg+0x9173/0xa2a0 net/packet/af_packet.c:3108 Use skb_header_pointer() like the MPLS case.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: Fix device kref underflow in dma_chan_put() dma_chan_get() takes chan->device->ref only on the slow path: /* no kref on fast path */ if (chan->client_count) { __module_get(owner); chan->client_count++; return 0; } if (!try_module_get(owner)) return -ENODEV; if (!dma_device_get(chan->device)) { // calls kref_get_unless_zero() dma_chan_put() drops the ref unconditionally, so every fast-path get/put pair drops one extra device reference. The bug fires when two conditions hold together: a non-private provider has a persistent client holding chan->client_count > 0 and another client cycles dmaengine_get()/dmaengine_put(). When the kref hits zero, the subsequent dma_find_channel() returns NULL even though the provider module is still loaded. Fix this by dropping device->ref only on the last put, matching the single slow-path get.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: fix use-after-free in dma_chan_put() and dma_release_channel() When dma_device_put() drops the last reference on chan->device->ref, dma_device_release() runs and may free the dma_device along with its channels. dma_chan_put() then still reads chan->device->owner via dma_chan_to_owner() for the trailing module_put(). KASAN catches it: slab-use-after-free in dma_chan_put+0x3e6/0x4c0 Read of size 8 by task insmod/6319 Freed by task 6319: kfree+0x225/0x470 dma_chan_put+0x395/0x4c0 dmaengine_put+0xf8/0x160 Cache the module owner in dma_chan_put() before the put so the trailing module_put() does not need chan->device.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: wait for RCU readers before releasing dma_device dma_issue_pending_all() walks the dma_device_list with list_for_each_entry_rcu() under rcu_read_lock(). dma_device_release() unlinks the device with list_del_rcu() and then calls device->device_release() (which in many drivers, such as plx_dma.c, directly calls kfree()). Because there is no grace period between unlinking the device and freeing it, concurrent RCU readers in dma_issue_pending_all() can access the device after it has been freed. The lockless walk originally relied on clients holding a dmaengine reference to pin the provider module, and therefore the device, for as long as they might traverse the list. Commit 8ad342a86359 ("dmaengine: Add reference counting to dma_device struct") decoupled the dma_device lifetime from the module reference, so the device can now be released while a reader is still walking the list. Add synchronize_rcu() before the device is freed, so RCU readers are guaranteed to have finished. Keep it unconditional: providers that do not implement device_release() free the device themselves once dma_async_device_unregister() returns. This call will delay for a grace period with dma_list_mutex held, which is safe and only teardown path is delayed.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: only group hidden BSSes with beacon entries When a probe response for an unknown BSS comes in, __cfg80211_bss_update() looks for an existing entry with the same BSSID and a hidden (zero-length or NUL-filled) SSID, and if it finds one it groups them, using the beacon IEs from the existing entry. But that could find another entry without a beacon, if it was also from a probe response (with SSID), so there's a group without beacon elements. If a beacon with a hidden SSID for that BSSID arrives later, cfg80211_combine_bsses() goes looking for the probe response entries that belong to it - i.e. entries with the same BSSID and channel that have no beacon IEs - and finds those two. They are already grouped with each other, so it hits its WARN_ON_ONCE(bss->pub.hidden_beacon_bss) WARN_ON_ONCE(!list_empty(&bss->hidden_list)) which are there because an entry without beacon elements is not supposed to be part of a group yet. Only combine entries when a beacon was already received, ones that are kept separate will be combined when a beacon arrives.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: cfg80211: ibss: ref BSS entry for joined event When the IBSS is joined, we only record the BSSID/channel in the event and look up the BSS entry when processing it. However, that's racy, e.g. a new scan with NL80211_SCAN_FLAG_FLUSH can remove it, causing a warning in the event work: !bss WARNING: net/wireless/ibss.c:37 at __cfg80211_ibss_joined+0x3d3/0x440 Workqueue: cfg80211 cfg80211_event_work cfg80211_process_wdev_events+0x39f/0x5b0 net/wireless/util.c:1144 cfg80211_process_rdev_events+0xa1/0x110 net/wireless/util.c:1179 cfg80211_event_work+0x2f/0x40 net/wireless/core.c:393 Do the lookup early (the driver is expected to only join an IBSS that has a BSS entry) and keep a reference to it.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: don't start a ROC while scanning The ROC work can be pending when a scan starts (which requires ROC list to be empty, but that's possible), and then a new ROC can be added to the list and the work will pick it up. Avoid starting that ROC if a scan made it between things, as otherwise we'll hit a warning later: WARNING: net/mac80211/offchannel.c:404 at ieee80211_start_next_roc+0x256/0x2d0 Workqueue: events_unbound cfg80211_wiphy_work Call Trace: __ieee80211_scan_completed+0x4fd/0xe40 net/mac80211/scan.c:537 ieee80211_scan_work+0x472/0x1ff0 net/mac80211/scan.c:1193 cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x410/0x570 net/wireless/core.c:513

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: don't offload TC setup on AP_VLAN interfaces AP_VLAN interfaces are purely virtual, so don't try to offload TC setup to drivers. We can't really use the AP interface either since we may not know it all the time, and it could technically even change. Just reject the TC offload so things get done in software.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: abort chanswitch when leaving a mesh The code in ieee80211_stop_mesh() leaves CSA active, but leaving the mesh released the channel context, so the CSA finalize work crashes: Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000003 KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000018-0x000000000000001f] RIP: 0010:ieee80211_put_srates_elem+0x42/0x640 net/mac80211/util.c:3272 Call Trace: ieee80211_mesh_build_beacon+0xa83/0x1b50 net/mac80211/mesh.c:1093 ieee80211_mesh_rebuild_beacon+0xc7/0x170 net/mac80211/mesh.c:1147 ieee80211_mesh_finish_csa+0x131/0x210 net/mac80211/mesh.c:1542 ieee80211_set_after_csa_beacon net/mac80211/cfg.c:4085 [inline] __ieee80211_csa_finalize net/mac80211/cfg.c:4133 [inline] ieee80211_csa_finalize+0x633/0x1150 net/mac80211/cfg.c:4155 cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x2ab/0x450 net/wireless/core.c:438 Abort the channel switch properly.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: reset state when starting AP fails ieee80211_start_ap() can set enable_beacon (and beacon_int) and fail later, leaving it set forever. Scanning can then attempt to restore beaconing on such an interface, leading to: Oops: divide error: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI RIP: 0010:mac80211_hwsim_link_info_changed+0xca7/0xf00 Call Trace: drv_link_info_changed+0x413/0x860 net/mac80211/driver-ops.c:495 ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0x24b/0x3c0 net/mac80211/main.c:427 ieee80211_offchannel_return+0x381/0x580 net/mac80211/offchannel.c:160 __ieee80211_scan_completed+0x993/0xe30 net/mac80211/scan.c:519 ieee80211_scan_work+0x472/0x2010 net/mac80211/scan.c:1193 cfg80211_wiphy_work+0x2b7/0x550 net/wireless/core.c:538 in hwsim. Also, cfg80211 then allows changing the interface type, and the off-channel path getgs confused about beaconing as well, leading to another warning: WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.c:468 at drv_link_info_changed+0x583/0x880 ieee80211_link_info_change_notify+0x24b/0x3c0 net/mac80211/main.c:427 ieee80211_offchannel_stop_vifs+0x328/0x5c0 net/mac80211/offchannel.c:122 ieee80211_start_sw_scan net/mac80211/scan.c:583 [inline] __ieee80211_start_scan+0xfb6/0x1af0 net/mac80211/scan.c:882 Reset the state on failures to always have it correct.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: reset the LED state when ifup fails When the first interface comes up, the radio LED is turned on. This can start the TPT trigger timer, which continues running. But if bringing up the interface fails then the timer keeps running and won't be stopped by anything, eventually it can be freed: ODEBUG: free active (active state 0) object: ffff888127e12130 object type: timer_list hint: tpt_trig_timer+0x0/0x300 net/mac80211/led.c:145 WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 5923 at lib/debugobjects.c:612 debug_print_object+0x1a2/0x2b0 debug_check_no_obj_freed+0x4b7/0x600 lib/debugobjects.c:1129 kfree+0x436/0x670 mm/slub.c:6818 ieee80211_led_exit+0x162/0x1c0 net/mac80211/led.c:210 ieee80211_unregister_hw+0x27e/0x3a0 net/mac80211/main.c:1706 rt2x00lib_remove_dev+0x55b/0x670 Undo the LED state in the error path.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: only operate on TDLS peers in the TDLS code ieee80211_tdls_oper() can operate on the AP station, which then yields various warnings when the AP station is removed then or at a later point in time after being confused for a TDLS peer. Always check that the station is a TDLS peer.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: don't allow injecting frames wider than the chanctx Frames injected on a monitor interface can carry a radiotap field requesting a bandwidth, which mac80211 passes down to the driver regardless of the the actual operational bandwidth. If the bandwidth requested is too wide, that triggers a warning in hwsim: WARN_ON(hwsim_get_chanwidth(bw) > hwsim_get_chanwidth(confbw)) Drop such frames entirely instead since they cannot be sent.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: add HE 6 GHz capability in the scan elems len The HE 6 GHz Band Capability element is in the probe request for every band if 6 GHz is supported, so add the size to scan_ies_len. Otherwise, building probe request elements can fail, triggering the WARN_ON in __ieee80211_start_scan().

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: mesh: reset the CSA state when leaving ifmsh->csa is allocated in ieee80211_mesh_csa_beacon() and only freed in ieee80211_mesh_finish_csa(), i.e. when the channel switch completes. Leaving the mesh while a switch is still pending therefore leaks it. Additionally, ifmsh->csa_role and ifmsh->chsw_ttl have their state leak in this case, so things can get mixed up in addition to the memory leak. Refactor the reset and call it in ieee80211_stop_mesh() to fix it all.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: mesh: release the channel if start fails ieee80211_join_mesh() acquires a channel context and then calls ieee80211_start_mesh(), which can fail. In that case, the chanctx isn't released then interface removal will attempt to unassign it after it's removed from the driver, hitting: wlan0: Failed check-sdata-in-driver check, flags: 0x0 WARNING: net/mac80211/driver-ops.c:366 at drv_unassign_vif_chanctx ieee80211_assign_link_chanctx __ieee80211_link_release_channel ieee80211_link_release_channel ieee80211_teardown_sdata unregister_netdevice_many_notify _cfg80211_unregister_wdev ieee80211_remove_interfaces ieee80211_unregister_hw mac80211_hwsim_del_radio hwsim_exit_net Correctly release the channel on start failures.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: set up the TX info early to fix failure paths The previous commit 2c51457d930f ("wifi: mac80211: free ack status frame on TX header build failure") cleaned up the leak, but still left the code a bit messy and the failed SKB didn't get reported to userspace. Fix this up by initialising skb->cb[] earlier, which allows using ieee80211_free_txskb() and therefore reports it for the failure in ieee80211_build_hdr(), and unifies the ieee80211_skb_resize() failure path with it.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nft_nat: fully initialise new_addr in netmap setup nft_nat_setup_netmap() builds the mapped address in an on-stack union nf_inet_addr. For an IPv4 mapping it writes only the 4-byte .ip member and the loop runs a single 32-bit iteration, but it then copies the whole 16-byte union into range->min_addr and range->max_addr, so the upper 12 bytes reach nf_nat_setup_info() uninitialised. KMSAN reports an uninit-value in nf_nat_setup_info() reached from nft_nat_eval(). The IPv6 path fills all 16 bytes and is not affected. Zero-initialise new_addr.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: nf_nat: unregister and release hooks on error If nf_hook_entries_insert_raw() fails, the NAT hooks get never released, resulting in a memleak. Postpone setting nat_proto_net->nat_hook_ops when the hooks are registered to simplify the error path to decide whether the nat hooks need unwinding.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm: Fix drm_pending_vblank_event leak in error path for out_fence_ptr When an out_fence_ptr is provided but DRM_MODE_PAGE_FLIP_EVENT is not set, a drm_pending_vblank_event will be allocated. If later, there is an allocation failure or another failure at setup_out_fence(), that event will not have base.fence set and it will not be released at complete_signaling(). Release the event and set crtc_state->event to NULL just like in the DRM_MODE_PAGE_FLIP_EVENT case when there is a failure at drm_event_reserve_init(). That is, prepare_signaling() releases the event and there is nothing to be done at complete_signaling(). Use drm_event_cancel_free() as that will also undo drm_event_reserve_init() in case it has been called.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: neighbour: Enforce min/max to NDTPA_INTERVAL_PROBE_TIME_MS. NDTPA_INTERVAL_PROBE_TIME_MS sets .type and .min but misses .validation_type, so no validation is applied: # ynl --family rt-neigh --do setneightbl \ --json '{"name": "arp_cache", "parms": {"interval-probe-time-ms": 0}}' # ynl --family rt-neigh --dump getneightbl --output-json | \ jq '.[] | select(.name == "arp_cache" and has("config")) | .parms["interval-probe-time-ms"]' 0 Moreover, nla_get_msecs() uses msecs_to_jiffies(), and u64 is silently cast to u32, so a larger value can bypass the min check: e.g. 4294967296 == 0x100000000 # ynl --family rt-neigh --do setneightbl \ --json '{"name": "arp_cache", "parms": {"interval-probe-time-ms": 4294967296}}' # ynl --family rt-neigh --dump getneightbl --output-json | \ jq '.[] | select(.name == "arp_cache" and has("config")) | .parms["interval-probe-time-ms"]' 0 msecs_to_jiffies() returns MAX_JIFFY_OFFSET if the value is larger than INT_MAX. Also, INT_MAX ms overflows int NEIGH_VAR() when HZ > 1000 (Alpha, MIPS), and passing a negative integer to queue_delayed_work(unsigned long delay) causes sign extension, which wraps around the expiry time to the past, resulting in it being handled as 0 delay in the timer wheel. Let's use NLA_POLICY_FULL_RANGE() and limit the max to 1 day. The same max check is applied to sysctl as well. Note that this controls the probe interval for NTF_MANAGED entries, so the max of 1 day is unlikely to break any deployments.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: bcd2000: Fix race between rawmidi and disconnect Although we tried to fix the potential UAF issues at USB disconnect on bcd2000 driver, there is still an overlooked case -- namely, when a rawmidi trigger callback has been already running at USB disconnect handling, the in-flight function (e.g. bcd2000_midi_send()) could still access the URB, because the previous URB NULL-check & clearance was considered only for the URB complete callbacks, but not about the parallel rawmidi operations. For addressing the race, this patch introduced a new spinlock that covers each rawmidi operation as well as the rawmidi handling in the complete callback. The URB is cleared with the lock, so it guarantees that the pending rawmidi task already finished or a NULL check is effective.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: pcm: set timer->private_data before registering the PCM timer snd_pcm_timer_init() calls snd_device_register() to link the new struct snd_timer into the global timer list while it still carries hw.c_resolution = snd_pcm_timer_resolution (and hw.start/hw.stop), and only afterwards sets timer->private_data = substream. Once the timer is on the list under register_mutex, a concurrent reader can already reach it through the same mutex and invoke these callbacks. /proc/asound/timers does this via c_resolution(), and snd_timer_open()+snd_timer_start() reach start()/stop() the same way. All three dereference timer->private_data, which for this brief window is NULL, giving a NULL-pointer dereference: substream = timer->private_data; return substream->runtime ? ... // substream is NULL Move the private_data/private_free assignment before snd_device_register() so the timer is never visible on the list without its private_data set. On the snd_device_register() failure path, private_free() (snd_pcm_timer_free()) can now run, but it only does substream->timer = NULL, which is already NULL at that point since substream->timer is set to the new timer just once, after a successful registration -- so the failure path stays safe.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/msm/dp: skip PUSH_IDLE when the link was never enabled msm_dp_display_atomic_enable() returns early when link training fails, leaving ->power_on false and the main link down. msm_dp_display_atomic_disable() nevertheless writes DP_STATE_CTRL_PUSH_IDLE and waits for an idle-pattern completion that cannot arrive, so every failed enable is followed by "PUSH_IDLE pattern timedout". Every other step of the teardown is already gated on that flag: msm_dp_display_disable(), called from .atomic_post_disable(), returns early on !power_on. The PUSH_IDLE write is the only one that is not, so the controller's runtime-PM reference is then dropped without the link having been taken down. On glymur (Snapdragon X2 Elite) the consequence is not a warning. The SoC does not survive it: TrustZone force-stops the SOCCP and ADSP remote processors and the machine resets silently about 50 ms later, with no oops and no panic. On an ASUS Zenbook A16 (UX3607OA), whose eDP panel does not currently train, this reproduces without any compositor or GPU involvement: # eDP enable has already failed with "Failed link training (rc=-104)" echo 1 > /sys/class/graphics/fb0/blank [535.645455] === marker === [535.694833] qcom_q6v5_pas d00000.remoteproc: fatal error received: \ sys_m_smsm.c:512:TZ force stop [535.694875] remoteproc remoteproc0: crash detected in soccp: type fatal error [535.728857] qcom_q6v5_pas 6800000.remoteproc: fatal error received: \ sys_m_smsm.c:783:err fatal notification received from TZ <SoC reset> Gate the PUSH_IDLE write on ->power_on so the disable path is consistent with the rest of the teardown. With this applied the same sequence is harmless and the machine stays up; without it, it resets every time. The unconditional write dates back to the original DP driver (c943b4948b58 ("drm/msm/dp: add displayPort driver support")), but the surrounding code has been restructured several times since, so no Fixes: tag is offered. Note that the eDP link-training failure that exposes this on the A16 is a separate problem in the glymur eDP PHY and is reported separately; this change is about not damaging the machine when training fails, for whatever reason. Tested on ASUS Zenbook A16 (UX3607OA), Snapdragon X2 Elite Extreme, on linux-next next-20260803 and next-20260807. The machine has since been running next-20260807 with this patch as its daily driver. Patchwork: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/745167/

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: 6fire: fix OOB write from device-reported iso length usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler() sizes each outgoing isochronous packet as (actual_length - 4) / (in_n_analog << 2) * (out_n_analog << 2) + 4, where actual_length is the unsigned length the device reported for the matching IN packet. A packet completed with status 0 and actual_length < 4 wraps the subtraction to 0x7fffffec; a zero-length isochronous packet is legal on the bus, and the preceding loop rejects only non-zero status. The sum reaches memset() on out_urb->buffer, a 4832-byte object from kcalloc(PCM_MAX_PACKET_SIZE, PCM_N_PACKETS_PER_URB). Even without the wrap the result is out of bounds: at 88.2/96 kHz the 4-in/6-out scaling turns a full 420-byte IN packet into 628, so eight packets span 5024 bytes of that buffer. usb_submit_urb() rejects an over-long descriptor only after the memset() and the usb6fire_pcm_playback() copy of user PCM data have run. Guard the subtraction as the sibling usb6fire_pcm_capture() already does, and limit the frame count to what fits in rt->out_packet_size, the OUT endpoint's wMaxPacketSize. This bounds total_length by the buffer size while keeping each packet length aligned to a whole output frame. BUG: KASAN: out-of-bounds in usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:338) Write of size 18446744073709551456 at addr ffff88802a3d0000 by task vhci_rx/5018 Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120) print_report (mm/kasan/report.c:378 mm/kasan/report.c:482) kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) kasan_check_range (mm/kasan/generic.c:186 mm/kasan/generic.c:200) __asan_memset (mm/kasan/shadow.c:84) usb6fire_pcm_in_urb_handler (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:338) __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657) usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1741) vhci_rx_loop (drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:107 drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:242) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) Allocated by task 10: __kmalloc_cache_noprof (mm/slub.c:5563) usb6fire_pcm_init (sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:560 sound/usb/6fire/pcm.c:595) usb6fire_chip_probe (sound/usb/6fire/chip.c:133) usb_probe_interface (drivers/usb/core/driver.c:399) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88802a3d0000 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-8k of size 8192 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of 4832-byte region [ffff88802a3d0000, ffff88802a3d12e0) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/shrinker: Take a runtime PM ref before shrinking non-system memory __xe_shrinker_walk() walks the SYSTEM and TT LRUs without a runtime PM reference. Shrinking a bo outside system memory invalidates its GPU mappings, which needs the device resumed, so while it is runtime suspended the page table zap trips an assert and the TLB invalidation returns -ENODEV: WARNING: drivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_bo.c:770 at xe_bo_move_notify+0x1fc/0x450 [xe] xe_bo_shrink+0x20f/0x2b0 [xe] __xe_shrinker_walk+0x174/0x410 [xe] xe_shrinker_scan+0x10c/0x1e0 [xe] do_shrink_slab+0x176/0x7e0 drop_caches_sysctl_handler+0x9c/0xf0 Take a reference before walking a memory type other than XE_PL_SYSTEM and stop there if it cannot be acquired. Reuse the shrinker's existing acquire path, which resumes the device directly where reclaim allows that and otherwise queues the PM worker for a later scan. Stop the walk once the scan target is met, so a satisfied scan does not wake the device. System memory is still reclaimed while the device is suspended. Gate this on xe_device_is_l2_flush_optimized(), the same condition under which xe_bo_trigger_rebind() issues the invalidation for a non-fault-mode vm, so reclaim is unaffected elsewhere. The System CCS copy already has its own reference in xe_bo_shrink(). Only a non-fault-mode vm can reach this, since a fault-mode vm requires LR mode and that holds a runtime PM reference for the vm's lifetime. Reproduced with igt@xe_madvise@dontneed-before-exec while the GPU is runtime suspended. v2: simplify needs_rpm check. (Matt) retarget Fixes tag since the issue occurs with the non-fault-mode path added by 4e7ebff69aed. v3: handle this in xe_shrinker.c instead of xe_bo.c (Thomas) v4: stop the walk once the scan target is met. (Sashiko) v5: rebase on the freed page accounting fix. (Sashiko) v6: reuse the shrinker acquire path so runtime pm can be resumed directly instead of always queueing a worker. (Thomas) v7: replace xe_pm_runtime_put() with xe_shrinker_runtime_pm_put(). (Thomas) (cherry picked from commit 628f92b28bf4c371c10207daf6fc4caee0c0db2e)

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: Use managed KMS polling to fix UAF on unbind vc4_kms_load() calls drm_kms_helper_poll_init() but the driver provides no matching drm_kms_helper_poll_fini(). The output poll work stays scheduled after unbind and runs on the freed drm_device: # modprobe vc4; rmmod vc4; sleep 10 BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in delayed_work_timer_fn BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in drm_client_dev_hotplug [drm] Workqueue: events output_poll_execute [drm_kms_helper] Allocated by task 171: __devm_drm_dev_alloc Freed by task 262 (rmmod): drm_dev_put / component_del Use drmm_kms_helper_poll_init() so polling is finalized with the device, as other drivers do.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: hda: trace PCM open only after assigning a stream Stream assignment can fail when hardware streams are exhausted. Move the tracepoint after the NULL check because its payload accesses the assigned stream tag. Detected by static analysis and reviewed with AI-assisted source auditing.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: ath11k: cleanup arsta in ath11k_mac_peer_cleanup_all() When mac80211 removes a sta, it calls .sta_state() which in turn calls ath11k_mac_station_remove(). In that function we clean up both peers & arsta related resources. But when the firmware crashes, ath11k calls ieee80211_restart_hw(), which assumes that all driver related resources are cleaned up beforehand. This cleanup is supposedly done by ath11k_mac_peer_cleanup_all() but does not in fact free arsta->rx_stats / tx_stats. Extract the arsta cleanup from ath11k_mac_station_remove() into a new ath11k_mac_station_cleanup() and call it from both there and ath11k_mac_peer_cleanup_all(). This should handle kmemleaks reports like: unreferenced object 0xffffff801ae66400 (size 1024): comm "hostapd", pid 1306, jiffies 4295011565 hex dump (first 32 bytes): 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ backtrace (crc d61c08ec): kmemleak_alloc+0x3c/0x50 __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x2b0/0x3e0 ath11k_mac_op_sta_state+0x1dc/0xb10 drv_sta_state+0xac/0x6f8 sta_info_insert_rcu+0x314/0x5e0 sta_info_insert+0x14/0x38 ieee80211_add_station+0x10c/0x1a0 nl80211_new_station+0x3e8/0x680 genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xc0/0x120 genl_rcv_msg+0x1b4/0x258 netlink_rcv_skb+0x4c/0x108 genl_rcv+0x38/0x60 netlink_unicast+0x190/0x278 netlink_sendmsg+0x15c/0x370 ____sys_sendmsg+0x120/0x290 ___sys_sendmsg+0x70/0xa0 Tested-on: QCN9074 hw1.0 PCI WLAN.HK.2.9.0.1-01977-QCAHKSWPL_SILICONZ-1

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: seg6: set IPSKB_L3SLAVE from IP6SKB_L3SLAVE on IPIP decapsulation When an SRv6 packet arrives on an interface enslaved to a VRF, vrf_ip6_rcv() sets IP6SKB_L3SLAVE in IP6CB, but decap_and_validate() has never set IPSKB_L3SLAVE in IPCB. The bit stayed clear in the common case, and with CONFIG_IPV6_MIP6 the leftover frag_max_size of a reassembled outer packet could even set it, with no VRF involved. Commit 44930446dde4 ("ipv6: seg6: clear IPv4 control block on IPIP decapsulation") then made the unreliable bit reliably clear. The effect of the missing flag is visible with End.DX4 when a delivery to a local address of the node reaches the socket lookup. For example, a UDP socket bound to the enslaved ingress interface does not receive any of the decapsulated packets, while an unbound socket outside the VRF does. This contradicts Documentation/networking/vrf.rst: by default the scope of an unbound UDP or TCP socket is limited to the default VRF. Set IPSKB_L3SLAVE for IPv4 in decap_and_validate(), which already does the same for IPv6. The socket lookup then matches the decapsulated packet like any other packet received on that enslaved interface. Such a packet matches an unbound UDP or TCP socket only when udp_l3mdev_accept or tcp_l3mdev_accept is set.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bcmgenet: restore the hardware filters on open bcmgenet_hfb_init() runs INIT_LIST_HEAD() on priv->rxnfc_list, which drops every rule off the list, and bcmgenet_open() calls it on each ifup. Every rule the user configured is silently lost: # ethtool -N eth0 flow-type ether dst $MAC action 0 Added rule with ID 0 # ethtool -n eth0 | grep -c Filter: 1 # ip link set eth0 down && ip link set eth0 up # ethtool -n eth0 | grep -c Filter: 0 Initialise the lists once at probe and restore the rules on open, as bcmgenet_resume() already does.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: icmp: reject RTN_UNREACHABLE input routes in icmp_route_lookup When the forward output route cannot be used in icmp_route_lookup(), it enters the "reverse path" and calls ip_route_input() on fl4_dec.daddr, the original packet's source address. ip_route_input() only returns an error for truly invalid packets. For unreachable addresses it will succeed and return an input route whose dst.output is set to ip_rt_bug(). The existing check only rejects RTN_LOCAL routes, so the RTN_UNREACHABLE route types can still be returned and later used for output, syzkaller triggering a WARN_ON_ONCE() in ip_rt_bug() as bellow: ------------[ cut here ]------------ WARNING: net/ipv4/route.c:1273 at ip_rt_bug+0x14/0x20 RIP: 0010:ip_rt_bug+0x14/0x20 Call Trace: ip_push_pending_frames+0xfa/0x100 __icmp_send+0x905/0xf10 ip_options_compile+0xc0/0xd0 ip_rcv_finish_core+0x321/0xae0 ip_rcv+0x1de/0x260 __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0x11a/0x130 netif_receive_skb+0x7b/0x260 tun_get_user+0x11bf/0x1c10 ------------[ cut here ]------------ Reject input route that is RTN_UNREACHABLE to fix it. The net warning is only printed for RTN_LOCAL, as RTN_UNREACHABLE is not the result of a race condition.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: fddi: skfp: fix NULL deref when setting the MAC address while down skfp_ctl_set_mac_address() calls ResetAdapter() unconditionally, without checking netif_running(). ResetAdapter() first calls card_stop(), which sets smc->hw.hw_state to STOPPED, and then mac_drv_clear_tx_queue(), which walks the two transmit queues: for (i = QUEUE_S; i <= QUEUE_A0; i++) { queue = smc->hw.fp.tx[i] ; ... t = queue->tx_curr_get ; smc->hw.fp.tx[] is only populated by init_tx(), which is reached from skfp_open() through init_smt() -> init_fddi_driver() -> init_fplus() -> init_mac() -> init_tx(). The private area is allocated and zeroed by alloc_fddidev(), so on an interface that has never been brought up both queue pointers are still NULL. The hw_state test at the top of mac_drv_clear_tx_queue() does not catch this, because card_stop() has just set STOPPED; the function proceeds into the loop and dereferences NULL. ResetAdapter() does call init_smt() itself, but only after the queues have been cleared. Setting the MAC address on a down interface therefore oopses: ip link set dev fddi0 address 02:00:00:00:00:01 BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mac_drv_clear_tx_queue+0x68/0x2c0 [skfp] Read of size 8 at addr 0000000000000010 by task ip/302 Call Trace: <TASK> mac_drv_clear_tx_queue+0x68/0x2c0 [skfp 6c01d4bab63c36978bd0a7d7e90837adb44cc37b] ResetAdapter+0x29/0x100 [skfp 6c01d4bab63c36978bd0a7d7e90837adb44cc37b] skfp_ctl_set_mac_address+0x57/0x80 [skfp 6c01d4bab63c36978bd0a7d7e90837adb44cc37b] netif_set_mac_address+0x1e4/0x2c0 do_setlink+0x684/0x2680 </TASK> Address 0x10 is the offset of tx_curr_get, the third pointer in struct s_smt_tx_queue, on 64-bit. mac_drv_clear_rx_queue(), which ResetAdapter() calls immediately afterwards, dereferences smc->hw.fp.rx[QUEUE_R1] in the same way behind the same ineffective hw_state test; the transmit queue merely crashes first. Both are covered by the guard below. Skip the adapter reset when the interface is down. dev_addr_set() is left unconditional, so the new address is still recorded in dev->dev_addr. Nothing is lost by not resetting the adapter here: skfp_open() deliberately re-reads the factory address on every open, read_address(smc, NULL); eth_hw_addr_set(dev, smc->hw.fddi_canon_addr.a); and the comment above it states this is done to discard exactly such an address override across a close/open cycle. An address set while the interface is down could not have survived the following open even before this change, so the guard removes no working behaviour. Guarding the hardware side of ndo_set_mac_address() with netif_running() is established practice; skge_set_mac_address() has done so since commit 2eb3e621c4e0 ("skge: set mac address bonding fix"). Guarding the reset as a whole, rather than NULL-checking the queues, is also what the rest of the driver expects. After a previous open/close the queue pointers are stale but non-NULL, so there is no crash, yet ResetAdapter() goes on to call smt_online() and STI_FBI() ("Enable Board Interrupts") while skfp_close() has already called free_irq() - the adapter would be brought back online with no handler installed. The only other ResetAdapter() caller is skfp_interrupt(), which by construction runs only while the device is open. Found by automated driver testing against an emulated SysKonnect FDDI adapter under a KASAN-enabled 7.0.0 kernel. Triggering it requires CAP_NET_ADMIN.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: mst: move switchdev call outside rcu This is a follow-up of one of sashiko's pre-existing bug reports. br_mst_set_state() calls switchdev_port_attr_set() for nonzero MSTIs while holding rcu_read_lock() which invokes the blocking switchdev notifier chain and may sleep. Nonzero MSTI changes come from netlink with rtnl held. Move the switchdev call before entering the rcu section and assert that rtnl is held. The call cannot be deferred because netlink needs its error and extack. Also DSA reads the old bridge MST state during the callback and checks it. A deferred callback will be late and will see the updated state.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: Don't call skb_clone_and_charge_r() for close()d listener in tcp_v6_do_rcv(). tcp_v6_do_rcv() no longer calls skb_clone_and_charge_r() for TCP_LISTEN since commit 073d89808c06 ("net: fix data-races around sk->sk_forward_alloc"). However, there is still a small race window between tcp_v6_rcv() and tcp_v6_do_rcv(), where concurrent close() changes TCP_LISTEN to TCP_CLOSE, causing skb_clone_and_charge_r() to be called locklessly and resulting in the splat below. [0] Let's avoid calling skb_clone_and_charge_r() for TCP_CLOSE as well. This is fine for non-listeners because tcp_rcv_state_process() drops skb for TCP_CLOSE and opt_skb was freed immediately anyway. [0]: sk->sk_forward_alloc WARNING: net/ipv4/af_inet.c:162 at inet_sock_destruct+0x64d/0x810 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:162, CPU#1: ksoftirqd/1/28 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 28 Comm: ksoftirqd/1 Not tainted 7.2.0 #17 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:inet_sock_destruct+0x64d/0x810 net/ipv4/af_inet.c:162 Code: 3d 49 ff e9 06 fd ff ff e8 d0 5b 83 f8 90 0f 0b 90 e9 35 fe ff ff e8 c2 5b 83 f8 90 0f 0b 90 e9 c5 fe ff ff e8 b4 5b 83 f8 90 <0f> 0b 90 e9 04 ff ff ff e8 a6 5b 83 f8 90 0f 0b 90 e9 65 fe ff ff RSP: 0018:ffffc90000677bb8 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff8880117bde80 RCX: ffffffff8957eb41 RDX: ffff88801dad5d00 RSI: ffffffff8957ec3c RDI: 0000000000000005 RBP: 00000000fffff000 R08: ffffffff8957eb41 R09: 00000000fffff000 R10: 0000000000000005 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffff8880117bdf10 R14: ffffffff81c08eb7 R15: 0000000000000003 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8880d7ae5000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f93a1021138 CR3: 00000000207a9000 CR4: 0000000000350ef0 Call Trace: <TASK> __sk_destruct+0x82/0xae0 net/core/sock.c:2356 rcu_do_batch kernel/rcu/tree.c:2645 [inline] rcu_core+0x59c/0x1100 kernel/rcu/tree.c:2897 handle_softirqs+0x1e4/0x9b0 kernel/softirq.c:622 run_ksoftirqd kernel/softirq.c:1076 [inline] run_ksoftirqd+0x38/0x60 kernel/softirq.c:1068 smpboot_thread_fn+0x458/0xc80 kernel/smpboot.c:160 kthread+0x396/0x4a0 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x8e0/0xe40 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 </TASK>

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: do not let tcp_rmem be set below 4096 We can hit a division by zero crash in tcp_rcvbuf_grow() and tcp_rcv_space_adjust(): divide error: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP RIP: 0010:tcp_rcvbuf_grow+0x187/0x450 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:939 ... grow = div_u64(((u64)rcvwin << 1) * (newval - oldval), oldval); The division uses oldval = tp->rcvq_space.space as divisor. When tp->rcvq_space.space is zero, this leads to a divide-by-zero exception. tp->rcvq_space.space is initialized in tcp_init_buffer_space(): tp->rcvq_space.space = min3(tp->rcv_ssthresh, tp->rcv_wnd, (u32)TCP_INIT_CWND * tp->advmss); If tcp_rmem[1] is configured to very small values (such as 1), sk->sk_rcvbuf is initialized to 1. Then tcp_full_space(sk), which computes (sk->sk_rcvbuf * scaling_ratio) >> 8, truncates to 0. This sets tp->window_clamp = 0, tp->rcv_ssthresh = 0, and tp->rcvq_space.space = 0. Later, when data arrives and DRS is invoked, tcp_rcvbuf_grow() divides by oldval == 0. Back in 2015, commit b1cb59cf2efe ("net: sysctl_net_core: check SNDBUF and RCVBUF for min length") ensured that net.core.rmem_default and net.core.rmem_max cannot be set below SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF. Similarly, SO_RCVBUF setsockopt enforces max_t(int, val * 2, SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF). However, net.ipv4.tcp_rmem still had .extra1 = SYSCTL_ONE, allowing arbitrarily small values. Because SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF depends on sizeof(struct sk_buff) and cacheline alignment, its value varies across architectures and configuration options. Using a fixed constant of 4096 ensures a predictable, architecture- independent lower bound that is safely above SOCK_MIN_RCVBUF everywhere and matches the documented 4K default. Fix this by setting tcp_rmem.extra1 to 4096 and updating the documentation.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dmaengine: mmp_pdma: fix wrong sg length in mmp_pdma_prep_slave_sg() In mmp_pdma_prep_slave_sg(), for_each_sg() iterates the scatterlist putting each entry into 'sg', but the entry length is read from 'sgl' (the list head) instead of 'sg' (the current entry): for_each_sg(sgl, sg, sg_len, i) { addr = sg_dma_address(sg); avail = sg_dma_len(sgl); /* should be 'sg' */ Consequently 'avail' is always the length of the first entry. For multi-sg lists this causes out-of-bounds reads when a later entry is shorter than the first, and silent data loss when it is longer. Single-sg or uniformly-sized lists happen to mask the issue.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix queuing tx_work after workqueue is drained hci_send_acl(), hci_send_sco() and hci_send_iso() queue hdev->tx_work unconditionally. They can run from the L2CAP/SCO/ISO socket send path while hci_dev_close_sync() is draining hdev->workqueue (HCIDEVDOWN racing with a socket write). Since that queue_work() is not chained work from the tx_work worker itself, __queue_work() sees the queue marked __WQ_DRAINING, warns "cannot queue %ps on wq %s", and drops the work: WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 5985 at kernel/workqueue.c:2352 __queue_work Call Trace: queue_work_on l2cap_chan_send l2cap_sock_sendmsg ... hci_dev_close_sync() already sets HCI_CMD_DRAIN_WORKQUEUE before draining, but only hci_cmd_work() and handle_cmd_cnt_and_timer() check it before queuing. Route the tx_work producers through the same guard via a shared hci_sched_tx() helper.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: validate TX skb length in send_sync btintel_pcie_prepare_tx() copies skb->len bytes into a fixed BTINTEL_PCIE_BUFFER_SIZE (4096) DMA slot via an unchecked memcpy. Oversized packets are currently rejected only in btintel_pcie_send_frame(); any future caller of btintel_pcie_send_sync() would silently overflow the DMA buffer. Add the bounds check in btintel_pcie_send_sync() itself, right before skb_push() and the DMA copy.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: coredump: Quiesce dump work on unregister hci_devcd_handle_pkt_init() arms dump_timeout and coredump producers queue dump_rx without holding an hdev reference. Unregister leaves both works live, so disconnecting during an active dump lets them access hdev after hci_release_dev() frees it. Shut down coredump processing during unregister. Close the producer gate under dump_q.lock before disabling both works, then free the active buffer and queued packets under hci_dev_lock. Serializing the gate with enqueue prevents controller-specific workers from adding packets after the final purge.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_qca: Do not write to the serial port after it is closed hci_uart_close() closes the serdev port if HCI_QUIRK_NON_PERSISTENT_SETUP is set (for example, for the WCN399x family). A failed hci_dev_open_sync() following a successful qca_setup() calls hdev->close() but not hdev->shutdown(), so the port is closed while power->vregs_on is left true. qca_serdev_remove() then passes its power->vregs_on test and calls qca_power_off(), which writes to the closed port unconditionally. Seen on a WCN3988 by unbinding the driver after a controller failure. The trace below is from a 7.0.0 based kernel, where qca_power_off() was still named qca_power_shutdown(): Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000038 Call trace: tty_set_termios+0x50/0x238 (P) ttyport_set_baudrate+0x84/0xc0 serdev_device_set_baudrate+0x24/0x40 qca_power_shutdown+0x158/0x1fc [hci_uart] qca_serdev_remove+0x54/0x68 [hci_uart] serdev_drv_remove+0x1c/0x2c device_remove+0x4c/0x80 device_release_driver_internal+0x1cc/0x224 device_driver_detach+0x18/0x24 unbind_store+0xb4/0xc0 Check HCI_UART_PROTO_READY, which hci_uart_close() clears in the same place it closes the port, before writing to it. The regulator disable is left unconditional so the controller is still powered down. The dangling serport->tty that turns this into a use-after-free is addressed in a separate patch.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: ISO: Fix parent socket leak in iso_conn_ready() iso_get_sock() returns the parent socket with a reference held, which is dropped by sock_put() once the child socket has been set up. The error path taken when iso_sock_alloc() fails only calls release_sock() and returns, leaking the reference and thus the parent socket itself. Drop the reference on that path as well.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btmtksdio, btmtkuart: validate WMT event length before struct access btmtksdio.c and btmtkuart.c cast a received WMT event straight to struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt and read its op/flag fields without checking the event is long enough to contain them, unlike btmtk.c. The FUNC_CTRL case then further casts to struct btmtk_hci_wmt_evt_funcc and reads its 2-byte status field, again without a length check. Firmware that sends a short or malformed WMT event makes both drivers read past the end of the received SKB. Mirror btmtk.c: validate the base WMT header with skb_pull_data() before touching any of its fields, and when a FUNC_CTRL event turns out to be the short, header-only form (a plain enable/disable ack with no status word), decode the result from the header's own flag byte instead (0 = success, otherwise failure). Verified setup on MT7920, MT7921, MT7922 and MT7925: no regression.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btintel_pcie: fix off-by-one bounds check in RX submit btintel_pcie_submit_rx() used frbd_index > rxq->count to guard the FRBD array access, allowing frbd_index == rxq->count to pass through and index one element past the end of the array. Change the check to >= rxq->count so every out-of-range index is rejected. This issue was reported by Claude Mythos.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: af_unix: Unify scc_index when finalising SCC in __unix_walk_scc(). Commit bfdb01283ee8 ("af_unix: Assign a unique index to SCC.") changed Tarjan's algorithm to update lowlink with lowlink, which is called lowpoint (unix_vertex.scc_index). unix_vertex_dead() assumes all vertices in an SCC share the same lowpoint, but this is not always true if an SCC has two or more back edges, depending on the order of DFS. For example, the graph below has two back edges from B to A and from C to B. A --> B --> C ^ | ^ | `----' `----' If DFS walks through A -> B -> C -> B (-> C -> B) -> A (-> B -> A), each index and scc_index will be updated as follows. A --> B --> C C = (3, 3) (index, scc_index) B = (2, 2) A = (1, 1) A ... B ... C C = (3, 2)<-. ^ | B = (2, 2) -' `----' A = (1, 1) A ... B ... C C = (3, 2) ^ | . . B = (2, 1)<-. `----' .... A = (1, 1) -' Then, unix_vertex_dead() thinks that B is passed to another SCC with scc_index 2, and the SCC is not garbage-collected. This does not happen if DFS walks in a different order below or starts from B. 1 3 A --> B --> C ^ | ^ | `----' `----' 2 4 Let's unify scc_index across the SCC when finalising it. Note that updating v->index was previously done in unix_scc_dead(), when called from __unix_walk_scc(), just to save one loop. Since __unix_walk_scc() now iterates over the SCC anyway, the update is moved back to __unix_walk_scc() and 'fast' argument is dropped.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: stmmac: fix TSO header length truncation stmmac_tso_xmit() stores the protocol header length returned by stmmac_tso_header_size() in a u8. stmmac_tso_valid_packet() admits headers up to 1023 bytes, so a header longer than 255 bytes wraps modulo 256 (486 becomes 230, 256 becomes 0). A TCP over IPv6 socket carrying a few hundred bytes of sticky destination/hop-by-hop options makes skb_tcp_all_headers() exceed 255 while staying below the 1023-byte limit, so such an skb reaches stmmac_tso_xmit(). Widen proto_hdr_len to unsigned int, which is sufficient since the value is bounded by the hardware limit, and adjust the debug print specifier accordingly.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pppoatm: ensure a writable skb header and linear data In pppoatm_send(), LLC encapsulation checks whether there is sufficient headroom for the 4-byte LLC header, but does not ensure that the skb header is writable. Normal transmit packets passing through ppp_start_xmit() have their header unshared via skb_cow_head(). However, packets can also reach pppoatm_send() via PPP channel bridging (PPPIOCBRIDGECHAN) without going through ppp_start_xmit(). Use skb_cow_head() to ensure both sufficient headroom and a writable header before pushing the LLC header. While at it: - Call pskb_may_pull(skb, 1) before inspecting skb->data[0] to prevent out-of-bounds reads on zero-length or non-linear frames (e.g. from bridging). - Defer SC_COMP_PROT protocol compression until after pppoatm_may_send() succeeds. This eliminates the temporary skb allocation on admission failure and completely removes the fragile "undo" heuristic at the nospace label, avoiding any risk of reading uninitialized headroom or performing an unbalanced skb_push().

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drop_monitor: use timer_shutdown_sync() to prevent timer rearming during teardown In drop_monitor teardown paths (net_dm_trace_off_set(), net_dm_hw_monitor_stop(), and error unwind paths in net_dm_trace_on_set() and net_dm_hw_monitor_start()), per-CPU timers are stopped using timer_delete_sync() followed by cancel_work_sync(). However, there is a circular dependency between send_timer and dm_alert_work: 1) sched_send_work() (timer callback) schedules dm_alert_work. 2) send_dm_alert() / net_dm_hw_summary_work() calls reset_per_cpu_data() or net_dm_hw_reset_per_cpu_data(). 3) If memory allocation fails under memory pressure in the reset function, it re-arms the timer via mod_timer(&data->send_timer, ...). If dm_alert_work is running concurrently while timer_delete_sync() executes on another CPU, an allocation failure in the worker will re-arm the timer after timer_delete_sync() has already returned. Once cancel_work_sync() completes and module_put() is called, the timer remains active in the timer wheel. If the module is then unloaded, the timer will fire and execute sched_send_work() in freed memory, triggering a kernel panic / use-after-free. Switch from timer_delete_sync() to timer_shutdown_sync(). This guarantees that any in-flight timer handler has finished and prevents subsequent re-arming attempts from running workers from succeeding. When monitoring is restarted later, timer_setup() is invoked, which cleanly re-initializes the timer.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: bridge: vlan: fix bugs caused by switchdev deletion errors Allowing switchdev to prevent vlan deletion and error out in __vlan_del could cause multiple different issues - inconsistent state, memory leaks when flushing, NULL pointer dereference on bridge error when flushing. It doesn't make sense to allow it to stop __vlan_del, so log the error and continue with software vlan deletion. This is also consistent with 8021q behaviour.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netlink: do not free nlk->groups while lockless readers can use it netlink_realloc_groups() uses krealloc() under netlink_table_grab(). Whenever NLGRPSZ(groups) lands in a different kmalloc bucket, the old bitmap is freed immediately. Two readers of nlk->groups / nlk->ngroups do not hold the netlink table lock: 1) sk_diag_dump_groups(). Hashed (bound) sockets are dumped from the rhashtable walk in __netlink_diag_dump(), which only holds RCU. Only the mc_list part of the dump takes nl_table_lock. 2) netlink_native_seq_show() (/proc/net/netlink), whose walk has been lockless since commit 21e4902aea80 ("netlink: Lockless lookup with RCU grace period in socket release"). Both can read a freed buffer, and sk_diag_dump_groups() can also read past the end of the old (smaller) buffer if it happens to load the old @groups pointer together with the new @ngroups value, copying the result into a NETLINK_DIAG_GROUPS attribute. This is the same class of bug that commit f773608026ee ("netlink: access nlk groups safely in netlink bind and getname") fixed for bind() and getname(); these two readers were missed. Simply grabbing the table lock in sk_diag_dump_groups() is not an option, because it is also called with nl_table_lock already held from the mc_list section of the dump. Make the lockless readers safe instead: - Allocate a new bitmap and free the old one after an RCU grace period, instead of relying on the implicit kfree() done by krealloc(). - Publish @groups before @ngroups, both with release semantics, and have the lockless readers load @ngroups first. A reader can then never pair the new (bigger) size with the old (smaller) buffer, and a reader picking up the new pointer while still seeing the old size is guaranteed to see the initialized bitmap. netlink_realloc_groups() is called from process context (bind() and setsockopt()), so kfree_rcu_mightsleep() can be used, once the table has been released.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/xe/i2c: Disable IRQ on unbind Currently, struct xe_i2c is freed before SGUnit IRQ is disabled in unbind path, leaving a potential UAF in case I2C IRQ is hit during this small window. Explicitly disable I2C IRQ in xe_i2c_remove() and fix this. (cherry picked from commit 8ba5c8b8ab3fd362267c11df2cd5a90ee46f6e24)

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: handle lack of space when cleaning up verity items When enable_verity() hits the qgroup limit, rollback_verity() needs its own metadata reservation. When the qgroup limit or lack of space refuses the rollback, the whole filesystem is forced read-only even though the qgroup limit was for one subvolume only. Also orphan cleanup at the next mount fails the same way, so the leftover items are never removed: with -EDQUOT the subvolume stays unreachable, and with -ENOSPC on a full filesystem the next read-write mount fails. Start transactions with btrfs_start_transaction_fallback_global_rsv() in btrfs_orphan_cleanup(), drop_verity_items() and rollback_verity(). Those calls only delete items and free the space in the end, so they may use the global reserve and skip the qgroup limit, which avoids -ENOSPC and -EDQUOT.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: remove WARN_ON_ONCE() from the dev_fill_forward_path() loop check ipip_fill_forward_path() and ip6_tnl_fill_forward_path() look up the route to the tunnel's remote endpoint and set ctx->dev to its device, which is the tunnel itself when that route resolves back to the tunnel. dev_fill_forward_path() then makes no progress and trips WARN_ON_ONCE(last_dev == ctx->dev) as soon as a flowtable tries to offload a flow through the tunnel. That routing loop is a configuration any CAP_NET_ADMIN user can set up, and ip_tunnel_xmit() and ip6_tnl_xmit() already treat it as a tx error, so remove the warning and just fail the walk, as commit 008e7a7c293b ("net: remove WARN_ON_ONCE when accessing forward path array") did for the path stack overflow.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: eth: fbnic: ring the doorbell if a burst ends in a drop fbnic_tx_map() skips the doorbell write, and the completion request, for every packet handed to it with xmit_more set, counting on the packet which ends the burst to publish them all. When that packet is dropped instead - skb_put_padto(), skb_cow_head() or a DMA mapping failure - nothing rings. The descriptors of the preceding packets stay invisible to the HW until the next transmit on that queue, which for a burst-then-idle workload may never come. Remember the meta descriptor of the last packet left without a doorbell and flush it from the error paths. The completion request has to be set on that descriptor rather than simply writing the tail, otherwise the HW would transmit the packets but never report a head, and the ring would fill up and stall for good. This is very similar to Joe's recent series of fixes for bnxt. Not seen in real life, reproduced under QEMU with failure injection.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ethernet: cortina: Ack RX overrun interrupt correctly The RX overrun interrupt is reported in interrupt status register 4, but gmac_irq() acknowledges it using the RX descriptor error bit from status register 0. For GMAC0 this writes the GMAC1 overrun bit, while for GMAC1 the shift leaves no bit in the 32-bit register. Acknowledge the same per-port RX overrun bit that was detected.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: psp: avoid conflicts with skb->decrypted and sk_validate_xmit_skb() PSP conflicts with TLS ULP in its usage of both skb->decrypted and sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb(). Make PSP mutually exclusive with TLS ULP, the only other user of either of these. As other users of skb->decrypted come along, they can be added to sk_has_decrypt_user(). It would make sense to also assert that sk->sk_validate_xmit_skb() is also NULL in both of these setup paths for similar future proofing, but the PSP listener/sk_clone() path is still broken and it could be seen as a regression to not allow rx assoc to run on a child of a listener socket with PSP tx assoc state. Include all TCP ULPs in the sk_has_decrypt_user() check, even though TLS is the only one that conflicts with PSP via the decrypted bit. This is intentional because PSP was not designed to be used with ULPs. It is best to close off surface area that may make bugs reachable, until someone wishes to design and test an actual user of PSP with ULPs.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: x86/kprobes: Fix crash when probing CS CALL instructions When using eBPF to probe CS CALL instructions within a function, a crash can be triggered. The eBPF tool probes offset 257 of the __hrtimer_run_queues() function: <__hrtimer_run_queues+249>: nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1) <__hrtimer_run_queues+254>: mov %r14,%rdi <__hrtimer_run_queues+257>: cs call <__x86_indirect_thunk_r12> <__hrtimer_run_queues+263>: mov %eax,%r12d <__hrtimer_run_queues+266>: xchg %ax,%ax <__hrtimer_run_queues+268>: mov %r13,%rdi Which triggers this crash: BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: 00000000000f41c9 #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page PGD 0 P4D 0 Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 1 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: P RIP: 0010:__hrtimer_run_queues+0x106/0x230 Note that __hrtimer_run_queues+0x106 is __hrtimer_run_queues+262, which is at the 6th byte of the above CS CALL instruction. Since the CS CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, the exception occurred in the middle of that call instruction. The root cause is that when using eBPF tools to probe in the middle of a function, a kprobe with INT3 is used as the underlying implementation. During single-step emulation of the original CALL instruction, int3_emulate_call() assumes that the probed CALL instruction is 5 bytes long. However, the actual CS-prefixed CALL instruction occupies 6 bytes, so it constructs an incorrect exception return address. When the CPU returns from the kprobe handler, the next instruction to be executed is at the address of the last byte of that CS CALL instruction. Coincidentally, starting from that address, the CPU fetches and decodes a completely different instruction, which ultimately triggers a kernel crash. Fix the issue by using the actual instruction length obtained from the instruction decoder when constructing the exception return address, rather than relying on the hardcoded CALL_INSN_SIZE macro. [ mingo: Refined the changelog ]

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: mvpp2: prevent buffer overflow in page_pool allocation The per‑processor buffering scheme is supported only if the number of pools (nrxqs * 2) does not exceed MVPP2_BM_MAX_POOLS (8). This is already checked in mvpp2_probe() during the initial activation of percpu_pools. However, mvpp2_change_mtu() may later call mvpp2_bm_switch_buffers(priv, true) without this check, which can lead to an out-of-bounds access in the priv->page_pool array in mvpp2_bm_init(). The array is sized to hold MVPP2_PORT_MAX_RXQ entries, and mvpp2_get_nrxqs() may return exactly that value. The per-CPU scheme then doubles it to nrxqs * 2, exceeding the array bounds. Check that the hardware version is MVPP22 or newer and that the number of pools (nrxqs * 2) does not exceed MVPP2_BM_MAX_POOLS before switching to per-CPU mode. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: skbuff: do not leave stale header offsets after pskb_carve() pskb_carve_inside_header() and pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() remove the first bytes of a packet and reallocate skb->head. All the headers that were present before the operation are gone, but both functions call skb_headers_offset_update(skb, 0), which is a no-op : skb->mac_header, skb->network_header, skb->transport_header and skb->csum_start keep their old values and now describe bytes which are no longer there. Both helpers size the new head from the old skb_end_offset(), so the stale offsets still land inside the new allocation. They point past skb_tail_pointer() though, to bytes that were never initialized. pskb_carve_inside_nonlinear() is the worst case, because it leaves a zombie skb with an empty linear part (skb->data == skb_tail_pointer(skb), skb_headlen(skb) == 0), while skb_mac_header_was_set() is still true and skb->mac_header is way ahead of skb->data. The only user of pskb_extract() is rds_tcp_data_recv(), and the carved skb is queued on tinc->ti_skb_list. When the RDS incoming message is released, rds_tcp_inc_free() calls skb_queue_purge(), which frees the skbs with SKB_DROP_REASON_QUEUE_PURGE. This is visible from drop_monitor, which then tries to pull back to the (bogus) mac header : skbuff: __skb_pull(len=234) skb len=6968 data_len=6968 headroom=0 headlen=0 tailroom=0 end-tail=384 mac=(234,14) mac_len=14 net=(248,40) trans=288 shinfo(txflags=0 nr_frags=1 gso(size=1428 type=16 segs=5)) csum(0x100120 start=288 offset=16 ip_summed=3 complete_sw=0 valid=1 level=0) hash(0x7b446c6c sw=0 l4=1) proto=0x86dd pkttype=0 iif=60 kernel BUG at ./include/linux/skbuff.h:2847! Add skb_carve_reset_headers() to mark the mac and transport headers as not set, reset the network header, clear skb->mac_len, and drop a now meaningless CHECKSUM_PARTIAL (csum_start no longer describes anything). Invalidate the inner offsets as well. Unlike mac_header and transport_header they have no "unset" sentinel, so a leftover non-zero value still looks like a real header. Zero skb->inner_mac_header, skb->inner_network_header, skb->inner_transport_header, skb->inner_protocol and skb->encapsulation, so that all the header state is invalidated in one place. v2: fixed an inaccurate changelog. The stale offsets stay inside the new skb->head, which is never smaller than the old one, they simply point past skb_tail_pointer() to bytes that are gone. Thanks to Xuanqiang Luo for insisting on this. Also invalidate the inner header state, as suggested by the netdev AI review : https://netdev-ai.bots.linux.dev/sashiko/#/patchset/20260911114922.621937-1-edumazet%40google.com

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: check ras and obj before dereference nbio_v7_9_handle_ras_controller_intr_no_bifring() dereferences ras and obj without checking either for NULL. Both amdgpu_ras_get_context() and amdgpu_ras_find_obj() can return NULL, e.g. during the window between adev->nbio.ras being set (early in amdgpu_ras_init(), by design, to enable the fatal-error interrupt as soon as possible) and the PCIE_BIF ras object actually being created in RAS late_init. Any interrupt in that window crashes in hard-IRQ context. This is analogous to commit d190b459b2a4 ("drm/amdgpu: the warning dereferencing obj for nbio_v7_4"), which fixed the same issue in the nbio_v7_4 handler. Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with SVACE. (cherry picked from commit c7071767a50a32ed727cf800ac84372429e3b4b3)

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: abort transaction on failure to update inode for hole punching and reflinking If we fail to update the inode we error out without aborting the transaction, which can result in a persistent inconsistency if after the failure the transaction is committed, as we have dropped file extent items from a range and either punched a hole or insert a new file extent item for that range (for reflinks). So add the missing transaction abort.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf: Fix null pointer access in is_include_guest_event() A typical module unload occurring event when there is an active perf connection leads to freeing of the pmu pointer. The call log is something like: .. __pmu_detach_event pmu_detach_event pmu_detach_events perf_pmu_unregister .. __pmu_detach_event() sets event->pmu to null. When the perf connection finally is closed, the following stack trace is observed: Oops: general protection fault, kernel NULL pointer dereference ... RIP: 0010:_free_event+0x3e/0x370 ... Call Trace: ... perf_event_release_kernel+0x260/0x2d0 perf_release+0x12/0x20 A call to mediated_pmu_unaccount_event() inside _free_event() is the root cause of this crash. Adding a check inside is_include_guest_event() ensures we don't accidentally access a null pmu ptr. In addition to this, we will now call mediated_pmu_unaccount_event() before clearing the pmu ptr so that nr_include_guest_events counts are maintained correctly.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 9p: Fix v9fs_issue_write() to update i_size and remote_i_size Fix v9fs_issue_write() to update i_size and remote_i_size to the new size of the server file if we made it larger, using the start fpos and the count returned by p9_client_write() to calculate the new minimum file size. This assumes that if the 9P server makes a short write (say it hits ENOSPC), a reduced count is returned.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: core: Fix potential UAF after asynchronous card release Usually a sound driver releases the resources assigned to the card via snd_card_free(), and it synchronizes with the whole release procedure. However, when the card is released asynchronously via snd_card_free_when_closed() like USB-audio driver, the situation is slightly different; although the snd_card_disconnect() call at the disconnection guarantees that any newer accesses will be gated, the in-flight tasks might be still accessing to the underlying card->dev device even after the disconnection, which would cause a use-after-free in the end, as reported by fuzzers. For addressing the bug above, this patch takes the refcount of card->dev at initialization of the card object, and releases at its destructor. This assures the availability of the card->dev in its whole lifecycle.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: Clamp implicit feedback packet count to URB capacity data_ep_set_params() allocates each data URB for exactly u->packets isochronous frames, so urb->iso_frame_desc[] has u->packets slots and ctx->packets is the driver's only record of that limit. For an implicit feedback sink, snd_usb_queue_pending_output_urbs() overwrites it with the sync source's packet count, which is calculated independently from the capture endpoint's parameters. When that count is larger, prepare_playback_urb() and prepare_silent_urb() can write iso_frame_desc[] past the allocation; their existing bounds limit payload bytes, not the descriptor index. The reproducer uses a high-speed UAC2 device declaring bInterval 1 for implicit feedback capture (8 packets) and bInterval 4 for playback (1 packet). On the first capture completion after the stream starts, it accesses seven descriptors spanning 112 bytes beyond the one-packet URB: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in prepare_playback_urb (sound/usb/pcm.c:1560) Write of size 4 at addr ffff88801e696ad0 by task vhci_rx/178 prepare_playback_urb (sound/usb/pcm.c:1560) prepare_outbound_urb (sound/usb/endpoint.c:340) snd_usb_queue_pending_output_urbs (sound/usb/endpoint.c:501) snd_complete_urb (sound/usb/endpoint.c:1834) __usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1657) usb_hcd_giveback_urb (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1741) vhci_rx_loop (drivers/usb/usbip/vhci_rx.c:107) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88801e696a00 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-256 of size 256 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 208-byte region [ffff88801e696a00, ffff88801e696ad0) Record the allocated packet count per endpoint and clamp both the adopted count and the packet-size copy to it. Fold the Format Type II delimiter into urb_packs before the allocation loop so the recorded limit matches every URB.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: virtio: reset device before deleting virtqueues virtsnd_remove() and virtsnd_freeze() delete the virtqueues before resetting the device. del_vqs() frees the vring backing, but does not provide a generic device quiesce operation. In particular, modern virtio-pci keeps enabled queues active until the device is reset. Reset the device before deleting the virtqueues so it can no longer access the vring memory when that memory is released. This also covers probe failures after DRIVER_OK, which unwind through virtsnd_remove().

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: codecs: rt712-sdca-dmic: fix uninitialized stream_config->type stream_config is not initialized before being passed to sdw_stream_add_slave(). The type field may contain garbage and is later copied to stream->type by sdw_config_stream(). Zero-initialize stream_config so type defaults to SDW_STREAM_PCM. While at it, use snd_sdw_params_to_config() helper instead of open-coding the same logic.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ata: libahci: clear PxCLBU and PxFBU for AHCI_HFLAG_32BIT_ONLY A user reported that commit 105c42566a55 ("ata: ahci: force 32-bit DMA for JMicron JMB582/JMB585") made the JMicron JMB585 unusable on his board. The failure is seen as soon as the ahci driver is probed, and booting with iommu=off does not solve the problem. Looking at the AHCI specification, PxCLBU and PxFBU are both read only '0' for HBAs that do not support 64-bit addressing. For HBAs that do support 64-bit addressing, the registers are read write, with a reset value that is Implementation Specific. When using the AHCI_HFLAG_32BIT_ONLY flag, the HBA does support 64-bit addressing, and a 32-bit DMA mask is set by simply clearing HOST_CAP_64. Thus, in this case, we need to explicitly clear the registers to 0.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/dax: check zero or empty entry before converting xarray entry Calling dax_to_folio() with empty entry causes kernel panic below when booting a VM with DAX enabled storage. This patch checks empty entry before calling dax_to_folio() on dax_associate_entry(), dax_disassociate_entry(), and dax_busy_page(). Commit 98c183a4fccf ("fs/dax: don't disassociate zero page entries") added guards in the associate and disassociate paths, but the guards still come after dax_to_folio(), and dax_busy_page() still has the same problem. [ 0.737679] EXT4-fs (pmem0p1): mounted filesystem 79676804-7c8b-491a-b2a6-9bae3c72af70 ro with ordered data mode. Quota mode: disabled. [ 0.737891] VFS: Mounted root (ext4 filesystem) readonly on device 259:1. [ 0.739119] devtmpfs: mounted [ 0.739476] Freeing unused kernel memory: 1920K [ 0.740156] Run /sbin/init as init process [ 0.740229] with arguments: [ 0.740286] /sbin/init [ 0.740321] with environment: [ 0.740369] HOME=/ [ 0.740400] TERM=linux [ 0.743162] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address fffffdffbf000008 [ 0.743285] Mem abort info: [ 0.743316] ESR = 0x0000000096000006 [ 0.743371] EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits [ 0.743444] SET = 0, FnV = 0 [ 0.743489] EA = 0, S1PTW = 0 [ 0.743545] FSC = 0x06: level 2 translation fault [ 0.743610] Data abort info: [ 0.743656] ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000006, ISS2 = 0x00000000 [ 0.743720] CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0 [ 0.743785] GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0 [ 0.743848] swapper pgtable: 4k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000000b9d17000 [ 0.743931] [fffffdffbf000008] pgd=10000000bfa3d403, p4d=10000000bfa3d403, pud=1000000040bfe403, pmd=0000000000000000 [ 0.744070] Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000006 [#1] SMP [ 0.748888] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: init Not tainted 6.18.4 #1 NONE [ 0.749421] pstate: 004000c5 (nzcv daIF +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [ 0.749969] pc : dax_disassociate_entry.constprop.0+0x20/0x50 [ 0.750444] lr : dax_insert_entry+0xcc/0x408 [ 0.750802] sp : ffff80008000b9e0 [ 0.751083] x29: ffff80008000b9e0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000 [ 0.751682] x26: 0000000001963d01 x25: ffff0000004f7d90 x24: 0000000000000000 [ 0.752264] x23: 0000000000000000 x22: ffff80008000bcc8 x21: 0000000000000011 [ 0.752836] x20: ffff80008000ba90 x19: 0000000001963d01 x18: 0000000000000000 [ 0.753407] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000 x15: 0000000000000000 [ 0.753970] x14: ffffbf3154b9ae70 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: ffffbf3154b9ae70 [ 0.754548] x11: ffffffffffffffff x10: 0000000000000000 x9 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.755122] x8 : 000000000000000d x7 : 000000000000001f x6 : 0000000000000000 [ 0.755707] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : fffffdffc0000000 [ 0.756287] x2 : 0000000000000008 x1 : 0000000040000000 x0 : fffffdffbf000000 [ 0.756871] Call trace: [ 0.757107] dax_disassociate_entry.constprop.0+0x20/0x50 (P) [ 0.757592] dax_iomap_pte_fault+0x4fc/0x808 [ 0.757951] dax_iomap_fault+0x28/0x30 [ 0.758258] ext4_dax_huge_fault+0x80/0x2dc [ 0.758594] ext4_dax_fault+0x10/0x3c [ 0.758892] __do_fault+0x38/0x12c [ 0.759175] __handle_mm_fault+0x530/0xcf0 [ 0.759518] handle_mm_fault+0xe4/0x230 [ 0.759833] do_page_fault+0x17c/0x4dc [ 0.760144] do_translation_fault+0x30/0x38 [ 0.760483] do_mem_abort+0x40/0x8c [ 0.760771] el0_ia+0x4c/0x170 [ 0.761032] el0t_64_sync_handler+0xd8/0xdc [ 0.761371] el0t_64_sync+0x168/0x16c [ 0.761677] Code: f9453021 f2dfbfe3 cb813080 8b001860 (f9400401) [ 0.762168] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]--- [ 0.762550] note: init[1] exited with irqs disabled [ 0.762631] Kernel panic - not syncing: Attempted to kill init! exitcode=0x0000000b

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tcp: exclude old ACKs from tcp fast path Exclude old ACKs before SND.UNA from the tcp fast path as well as ACKs after SND.NXT. Such ACKs will fall through to the slow path, where tcp_ack() performs the appropriate validation and challenge ACK handling according to RFC5961 and Commit 3d501dd326fb1c7 ("tcp: do not accept ACK of bytes we never sent"). This prevents old ACKs from being accepted or modifying connection state as part of the fast path before appropriate ACK validation is applied. In particular, this prevents payload carried by a segment with an excessively old ACK from advancing RCV.NXT before the ACK is rejected.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: nfsd: fix handling of NFSEXP_PNFS in the netlink codepath The rework of how block layouts were checked moved the check for NFSEXP_PNFS out of nfsd4_setup_layout_type() and into the callers. That patch didn't account for the new call in nfsd4_setup_layout_type().

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: hibernate: pass HVC_SET_VECTORS args to the resume hvc swsusp_arch_suspend_exit() reinstalls the restored kernel's hyp stub vectors with an hvc, but never passes the arguments. x0 is not set to HVC_SET_VECTORS and x1 is not set to the vector address, so the stub dispatch falls through and returns without writing vbar_el2. EL2 is left pointing at the trans_pgd copy of the vectors, a page that swsusp_free() releases right after resume. Set the arguments up the same way __hyp_set_vectors() does. Without this fix, Vladimir was able to trigger a hang when resuming from hibernation with CONFIG_PAGE_POISONING=y and page_poison=on.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: percpu: Fix LSE operations on {8,16}-bit types The assembly for __percpu_##name##_case_##sz() and __percpu_##name##_return_case_##sz() doesn't use the 'sfx' macro argument to form the LSE instruction. Without 'sfx', a W register argument will imply a 32-bit memory location, and consequently {8,16}-bit ops will erroneously read and write 32 bits of memory when the LSE instruction is used. Fix this by appending 'sfx' to 'op_lse' to LSE instruction. It is not necessary (and not valid) to append 'sfx' to 'op_llsc', as 'op_llsc' is a register-register operation which does not access memory (and does not take a size suffix).

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_codec: validate vendor codec count length The Read Local Supported Codecs parsers consume the variable-sized standard codec array before parsing the vendor codec count. Although the initial reply-size check includes a vendor count byte in the fixed layout, it does not guarantee that the byte remains after the standard codec array. If a controller reply ends immediately after that array, calculating the vendor codec array size reads vnd_codecs->num beyond the skb data. Use skb_pull_data() to validate and consume each codec header before using its count in both command variants.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: hci_sync: Serialize local codec list cleanup hci_dev_close_sync() clears hdev->local_codecs after releasing hdev->lock. Codec list additions and both traversals in sco_sock_getsockopt() use that lock, but the close path does not. A close and BT_CODEC query can therefore interleave as follows: hci_dev_close_sync() sco_sock_getsockopt() hci_dev_lock() fetch codec entry hci_codec_list_clear() kfree(entry) read entry->id The reader then accesses an entry which the close path has freed. KASAN BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in sco_sock_getsockopt+0xfa0/0xfe0 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8881001c3450 Call Trace: sco_sock_getsockopt+0xfa0/0xfe0 do_sock_getsockopt+0x537/0x7b0 __sys_getsockopt+0xf2/0x170 Allocated by task 92: hci_codec_list_add.isra.0+0x2c/0x440 hci_read_codec_capabilities+0x224/0x590 hci_read_supported_codecs+0x2c2/0x640 Freed by task 92: kfree+0x131/0x3c0 hci_codec_list_clear+0xd8/0x160 hci_dev_close_sync+0x92a/0xfa0 Take hdev->lock around the clear operation at its existing point in the close path. This makes the clear wait for active readers and prevents a new traversal until the list is empty without changing teardown ordering.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: take commit root semaphore when iterating in mark_block_group_to_copy() mark_block_group_to_copy() iterates over the commit root with skip_locking=true. A concurrent transaction commit can swap and free the commit root during iteration, causing use-after-free when accessing extent buffers. Fix it by using path->need_commit_sem to protect the commit root search.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: clear free space tree creation state on rebuild failure btrfs_rebuild_free_space_tree() sets BTRFS_FS_CREATING_FREE_SPACE_TREE before rebuilding the free space tree. Several error paths return without clearing this flag. The transaction restart failure path can leave the flag set on a live filesystem, causing delayed reference processing to be skipped. Clear it on all free space tree rebuild failure paths. Keep BTRFS_FS_FREE_SPACE_TREE_UNTRUSTED set, since a failed rebuild leaves the free space tree untrusted. Callers must fall back to extent-tree caching.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: dma-buf: Fix silent overflow for phys vec to sgt In case MMIO size is bigger than 4G and peer2peer DMA goes through host bridge, we trigger a code path that assigns the total linked IOVA (which is greater than 4G) to mapped_len. Previously, `mapped_len` was declared as 32-bit `unsigned int`. When accumulating `size_t` lengths, this leads to a silent wrap-around. This truncation causes truncated lengths to be passed to functions like `fill_sg_entry()`. Fix this by changing `mapped_len` to `size_t` (64-bit). While at it, fix similar potential overflow issues in `calc_sg_nents` by using `check_add_overflow()` for `nents` and using `unsigned int` for the loop iterator in `fill_sg_entry` to match.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ip_tunnel: initialize `options_len` before referencing options The following command triggers a kernel panic: ip link add d0 type dummy; ip link set d0 up ip route add 10.30.0.0/16 \ encap ip id 300 geneve_opts 4660:66:11223344 dev d0 memcpy: detected buffer overflow: 4 byte write of buffer size 0 kernel BUG at lib/string_helpers.c:1044! ... ip_tun_parse_opts.part.0.cold+0x10/0x10 ip_tun_build_state+0x116/0x2a0 On kernels built with GCC 15+ and `CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE`, the fortified `memcpy()` got 0 sized destination with request of 4 bytes length: static int ip_tun_parse_opts_geneve(...) { ... attr = tb[LWTUNNEL_IP_OPT_GENEVE_DATA]; data_len = nla_len(attr); /* == 4 */ struct geneve_opt *opt = ip_tunnel_info_opts(info) + opts_len; memcpy(opt->opt_data, nla_data(attr), data_len); /* ^^^^^^^^^^^^^ 0 since options_len is assigned afterwards */ Fixed by initializing the counter before the options are referenced. Matching what `tunnel_key_opts_set()` already does.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: wwan: t7xx: validate the netif index in t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb() The netif index carried in the DPMAIF PIT header is five bits wide, but ccmni_inst[] only has room for NIC_DEV_MAX (21) entries. t7xx_ccmni_recv_skb() indexes the array without a bounds check, so indexes 21 to 31 read past it. The out-of-bounds value lands in the callback table that follows the array, which is never NULL, so the existing !ccmni check does not catch it and the driver dereferences whatever sits there as a struct t7xx_ccmni. Drop the skb when the index is out of range. Verified in a QEMU guest with a fault injector setting the netif index to 25: the unpatched driver reads a value past ccmni_inst[], which lands in the callback table, and dereferences it far enough to queue the skb. With this check the packet is dropped. Well-formed traffic on index 0 is unaffected. Changes in v2: none.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: wwan: mhi_wwan_mbim: guard against a cyclic NDP chain The NDP traversal in mhi_mbim_rx() only stops when wNextNdpIndex is zero. Nothing requires the offsets to advance, so a modem that points an NDP at itself, or at an earlier NDP, keeps the loop spinning forever on one CPU. Break out when the next NDP offset is not larger than the current one. Verified in a QEMU guest with a fault injector feeding the driver's receive callback an NTB whose single NDP points at itself: the unpatched driver spins in mhi_mbim_rx() with one CPU pinned at 100% and the thread never returns. With this check the loop terminates within one iteration. Changes in v2: move the non-increasing check to the wNextNdpIndex retrieval site, as suggested by Loic Poulain, instead of tracking the previous offset in a separate variable.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: wwan: mhi_wwan_mbim: check skb_copy_bits() return value mhi_mbim_rx() ignores the return value of skb_copy_bits() when it copies each datagram out of the NTB. The datagram offset and length come from the DPE, which is only checked to lie within the NTB itself, so a modem can point a datagram outside the received skb. The copy then fails and the freshly allocated skbn is passed to netif_rx() with its uninitialized contents still in place, leaking kernel heap memory into the network stack. Free the skb and account an error when the copy fails. Verified in a QEMU guest with a fault injector pointing a DPE outside the received NTB: the copy fails, and the unpatched driver hands the uninitialized skbn to the network stack (observed as "unknown protocol" on bytes that were never written). With this check the failed datagram is dropped and counted as an rx error. Changes in v2: factor the free-and-count sequence out into mhi_mbim_rx_drop(), shared with the unknown-protocol path, as suggested by Loic Poulain.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_api: release tail references on DELACTION failure A batched RTM_DELACTION request takes a temporary reference on each action before attempting any deletion. tcf_action_delete() clears each processed slot and drops its temporary reference before attempting the deletion. If deletion fails, tca_action_gd() calls tcf_action_put_many() to release the remaining references, but its tcf_act_for_each_action() iterator stops at the first NULL slot. When a batch stops at an action bound to a filter, this leaks a reference on each subsequent action. A later delete of an unbound action can then return success without removing it from the IDR. Walk the full array in tcf_action_put_many() and skip NULL slots to release the references held on the unprocessed actions.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: hhf: cap hh_flows_limit at change time hhf_change() stores TCA_HHF_HH_FLOWS_LIMIT with no upper bound. A huge hh_flows_limit lets each new heavy-hitter flow pass the hh_flows_current_cnt check in alloc_new_hh() and forces a fixed-size kzalloc(GFP_ATOMIC) per flow under spoofed traffic, for unbounded memory growth. Bound the attribute with NLA_POLICY_MAX() at 2*HH_FLOWS_CNT (the hhf_init() default) and report the rejected value via extack. The deprecated nested parse is kept: legacy tc does not set NLA_F_NESTED on TCA_OPTIONS. Configs relying on hh_limit above the default were relying on unbounded, unsafe behaviour and are not supported going forward. hhf_init() also ran hhf_change() before setting the default hh_flows_limit, so a user-supplied hh_limit at add time was clobbered back to 2048. Set the default before hhf_change() so the configured value sticks. This is a follow-up to commit eb56a495f59b ("net/sched: hhf: clamp quantum in change and init paths"), which bounded the quantum of the same qdisc; the hh_flows_limit bound is the remaining unbounded knob of that series' scope. Conditions to recreate the bug: CAP_NET_ADMIN in a user namespace; tc qdisc change dev X root hhf hh_limit 4294967295 succeeds and the value is echoed by tc qdisc show, unbounding heavy-hitter flow allocations; also tc qdisc add dev X root hhf hh_limit 500 stores 2048 instead of 500.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/packet: clear RX owner on VNET header error Commit 61fad6816fc1 ("net/packet: tpacket_rcv: avoid a producer race condition") added rx_owner_map and made tpacket_rcv() claim a V1 or V2 ring slot before converting the virtio-net header. If the conversion fails, the drop path leaves the slot claimed. With a one-frame TPACKET_V2 ring, an unsupported UDP GSO packet leaves the only slot unavailable, so the ring also drops the next valid packet. Clear the ownership bit on this error path. TPACKET_V3 already clears its block state here.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: core: Validate MODE SENSE lengths in scsi_cdl_enable() scsi_cdl_enable() uses length fields returned by MODE SENSE to locate the ATA feature mode page in a 64-byte stack buffer. A target can report a total length shorter than its mode header and block descriptors. The unsigned subtraction used for the MODE SELECT length can wrap, and the separately computed buf_data can point beyond buf. During automatic scan, enable is false, so the read-modify-write of buf_data[4] can clear the low two bits of a target-selected out-of-bounds stack byte. scsi_mode_select() can then copy up to 64 bytes from outside the buffer into the outgoing MODE SELECT payload, disclosing stack contents to the target. This is reachable while scanning a USB storage device that identifies as an ATA device and advertises CDL support. No filesystem mount or userspace access to the block device is required. On upstream commit cee9395acd80 ("Linux 7.3-rc1"), a build-specific, one-vCPU QEMU/Raw Gadget proof using QEMU-only multi-UDC allocator sampling executed a fixed proof command inside the guest and created a UID-0-owned marker during automatic enumeration, with KASLR and NX enabled. The issue was independently found during security research at Drivesec S.r.l. Cap the available length to the buffer size. Validate and consume the mode header and block descriptor lengths before using the page, and require the five bytes needed to access the CDL field.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfrm: serialize state GC with device state flush The deferred-device pass in xfrm_dev_state_flush() finds states under xfrm_state_dev_gc_lock, but drops the lock before calling xfrm_dev_state_free() because the driver callback may sleep. The device GC list does not hold an xfrm_state reference, so the state GC worker can destroy the same state concurrently. The race can proceed as follows: CPU 0 CPU 1 find x on the device GC list drop xfrm_state_dev_gc_lock read x->xso.dev xfrm_state_gc_destroy(x) xfrm_dev_state_free(x) xfrm_state_free(x) continue xfrm_dev_state_free(x) Both paths can invoke the driver callback and drop the device reference. CPU 0 can also access the xfrm_state after CPU 1 has freed it. KASAN reported: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in xfrm_dev_state_free+0x24c/0x2a0 Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810bbaa960 by task poc/102 Call Trace: xfrm_dev_state_free+0x24c/0x2a0 xfrm_dev_state_flush+0x353/0x400 xfrm_dev_event+0x26d/0x3a0 notifier_call_chain+0xc0/0x280 __dev_notify_flags+0x169/0x250 netif_change_flags+0xe7/0x160 dev_change_flags+0x96/0x220 devinet_ioctl+0x7f4/0x1880 Allocated by task 87: xfrm_state_alloc+0x1e/0x5c0 xfrm_add_sa+0xe7f/0x5820 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x4f3/0x940 Freed by task 57: kmem_cache_free+0xcb/0x3d0 xfrm_state_gc_task+0x4a8/0x650 process_one_work+0x63a/0x1070 Serialize xfrm_state destruction against the deferred-device pass with a mutex. Keep xfrm_state_dev_gc_lock limited to list operations and retain the existing callback and device-reference release ordering.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: memstick: ms_block: destroy io_queue workqueue on removal msb_init_disk() creates the per-card ordered workqueue msb->io_queue with alloc_ordered_workqueue(). It is torn down with destroy_workqueue() only on the init error path; msb_remove() never destroys it. msb_stop() merely flushes the queue, and neither msb_data_clear() nor put_disk() free it. As a result every card insert/remove cycle leaks the workqueue and its kworker, exhausting kernel memory over repeated cycles. Destroy the workqueue in msb_remove() after the disk has been removed and the queue drained.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm, swap: fix SWAP_USAGE_OFFLIST_BIT collision with real usage count SWAP_USAGE_OFFLIST_BIT is embedded in the si->inuse_pages usage counter, and is meant to sit above any value that counter can reach. However, it is defined from BITS_PER_TYPE(atomic_t), so it is bit 30. On a system with 4 KiB pages the flag collides with the usage count once that count reaches 4 TiB. swap_usage_in_pages() masks bit 30 out, so whenever the real count has that bit set, every caller of it reads 4 TiB low: * /proc/swaps understates Used by 4 TiB. * A raw count of exactly 2^30 masks to zero, so try_to_unuse() takes its "if (!swap_usage_in_pages(si)) goto success;" early exit and swapoff tears the device down while pages are still swapped out. Nothing in the rest of swapoff aborts the teardown, so those pages are lost. Independently of swapoff, the collision also corrupts the counter and the plist. On a device in normal use, a free that leaves bit 30 set in the count makes swap_usage_sub() see the flag where there is only count, and call add_to_avail_list(). It clears the bit with fetch_and(~SWAP_USAGE_OFFLIST_BIT), leaving the stored count 4 TiB below the real one, and calls plist_add() on a device that is already listed, tripping the WARN_ON(!plist_node_empty(node)) in plist_add() and linking the node a second time. Change the definition of SWAP_USAGE_OFFLIST_BIT to be based on atomic_long_t instead. Note that the usage counter field itself is of this same type, so it is still a valid bit.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/shrinker: fix bogus set_shrinker_bit() with cgroup.memory=nokmem With cgroup.memory=nokmem, shrinker_memcg_alloc() bails out early and never allocates an id, so shrinker->id keeps the 0 it got from the kzalloc() in shrinker_alloc(). __list_lru_init() then copies that 0 into lru->shrinker_id, where it looks like a valid bit index. Nothing calls expand_shrinker_info() on nokmem either, so shrinker_nr_max stays 0 and every memcg ends up with an empty map (map_nr_max == 0). deferred_split_folio() hands a real memcg to __list_lru_add() regardless of whether the lru is memcg aware, so the first THP queued in a cgroup does set_shrinker_bit(memcg, nid, 0) and trips the bounds check: WARNING: mm/shrinker.c:212 at set_shrinker_bit+0x7d/0x90, CPU#126 Call Trace: <TASK> deferred_split_folio+0x18c/0x220 map_anon_folio_pmd_nopf+0xdd/0x130 map_anon_folio_pmd_pf+0x14/0xb0 do_huge_pmd_anonymous_page+0x1a1/0x620 __handle_mm_fault+0xea9/0x10d0 handle_mm_fault+0xe5/0x320 do_user_addr_fault+0x1cc/0x870 exc_page_fault+0x81/0x1b0 asm_exc_page_fault+0x27/0x30 </TASK> Harmless, the WARN_ON_ONCE() is what keeps the out of bounds unit[] read from happening, but the id should not look valid in the first place. Clear it before returning. Two other spots could paper over this: drop the id in __list_lru_init() when nokmem turns memcg_aware off, or make deferred_split_folio() pass NULL like list_lru_add_obj() does. Both leave shrinker->id lying around for the next caller, so fix it where the id is handed out.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/vma: correctly unaccount on mmap_prepare() failure __mmap_setup() accounts memory for relevant mappings via: security_vm_enough_memory_mm() -> __vm_enough_memory() -> vm_acct_memory() If __mmap_setup() fails, this indicates that this accounting did not take place, and thus it's appropriate for __mmap_region() to jump to abort_munmap. However if call_mmap_prepare() fails, it also jumps there and any accounted memory is not correctly unaccounted. Fix this by handling each error separately.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: filemap: retain mapped dropbehind folios Fault-around can map ready dropbehind folios without going through the normal page-cache lookup that clears dropbehind. A mapping represents a competing cached user, so retain the folio instead of forcibly unmapping it when writeback completes. For a mapped folio, folio_unmap_invalidate() can call unmap_mapping_folio(), which takes i_mmap_rwsem and may sleep. Retaining mapped folios avoids this path when folio_end_dropbehind() runs in non-preemptible task context. Tal was able to trigger a sleeping-in-atomic warning due to this [1]. Unmapped dropbehind folios continue through the existing invalidation path.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: encrypted: fix integer overflow of datablob_len encrypted_key_alloc() stores datablob_len in a u16. It is computed from multiple string and payload lengths. If the result exceeds U16_MAX, the assignment truncates the allocation size. KASAN reports a 32760-byte slab-out-of-bounds write when __ekey_init() copies the master key description into the undersized buffer. The total payload length stored in key->datalen is also a u16. Use check_add_overflow() to reject values that do not fit either destination, and use kzalloc_flex() for the flexible-array allocation.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KEYS: trusted: Fix tpm2_load_cmd() boundary check tpm2_load_cmd() does boundary checks against the ASN.1 size i.e., payload->blob_len. Address this by passing the decoded blob size to tpm2_load_cmd(), and use it for the boundary checks.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Fix NULL sched deref in kfunc sub-sched error paths When the root scheduler has sub-scheds attached, the COMPAT kfunc wrappers scx_bpf_select_cpu_and() and scx_bpf_dsq_insert_vtime() refuse the call and report to @p's scheduler: scx_error(scx_task_sched(p), "... must be used"); The wrappers are reachable with tasks that have no scheduler. scx_bpf_select_cpu_and() is in the select_cpu kfunc group, which scx_kfunc_context_filter() opens to BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL programs; scx_bpf_dsq_insert_vtime() is in the enqueue_dispatch group, which ops.enqueue() and ops.dispatch() may call with any KF_RCU task -- the group has no kf_tasks validation, and scx_dsq_insert_preamble() checks task ownership with scx_task_on_sched() precisely because @p may be an arbitrary task. scx_task_sched(p) is p->scx.sched, which is NULL for tasks past sched_ext_dead() -- which clears it via scx_disable_and_exit_task() on exit -- and for idle tasks, which the enable paths skip as they are never scheduled through SCX. It is also an rcu_dereference_protected() that expects @p's pi_lock or rq lock, which neither wrapper holds. Passing NULL to scx_error() reaches scx_vexit(), which dereferences sch->exit_info, oopsing the kernel. One concrete trigger exercised while developing the fix: a BPF_PROG_TYPE_SYSCALL program calling the select_cpu_and wrapper on an exited-but-not-reaped task while a sub-scheduler was attached (its pid stays findable while the zombie is unreaped; faulting instruction is the scx_vexit() prologue "mov r15,[rdi+0x398]" with RDI=NULL and 0x398 the offset of sch->exit_info): sched_ext: BPF scheduler "kfunc_subsched_null" enabled sched_ext: BPF sub-scheduler "kfunc_subsched_null" enabled sched_ext: Unassociated program run_select_cpu_ (id 76) BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000398 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 7 UID: 0 PID: 8201 Comm: kfunc_test_runn Tainted: G W RIP: 0010:scx_vexit+0x25/0xa0 Code: ... <4c> 8b bf 98 03 00 00 ... CR2: 0000000000000398 Call Trace: <TASK> __scx_exit+0x4f/0x70 scx_bpf_select_cpu_and+0xab/0xb0 bpf_prog_430ed61a7b66e03a_run_select_cpu_and+0x9c/0xe7 ? __x64_sys_bpf+0x2c/0x40 bpf_prog_test_run_syscall+0x130/0x2f0 __sys_bpf+0x930/0x10d0 ? __x64_sys_bpf+0x2c/0x40 __x64_sys_bpf+0x2c/0x40 do_syscall_64+0xbc/0x460 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e </TASK> Read @p's scheduler under RCU instead, which the wrappers can do from their guard(rcu)(): fault it when it can be determined, and when it can't be determined -- @p is a task past sched_ext_dead() or an idle task -- there is nothing obviously wrong to report, so just refuse the call as before without faulting any scheduler. These COMPAT wrappers are scheduled for eventual removal once the deprecation grace period elapses, but until then -- and regardless of their removal timeline -- they must not oops the kernel on a task they are handed.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sched_ext: Close the pre-enable ops error claim window scx_alloc_and_add_sched() publishes ops->priv before scx_root_enable_workfn() switches the state to SCX_ENABLING. An error claimed via scx_bpf_error_bstr() from an associated BPF program in that window is consumed by scx_disable_workfn(), which takes the pre-enable shortcut in scx_root_disable(). The shortcut returns without any teardown and restores SCX_DISABLED with an unconditional scx_set_enable_state() xchg racing the enable workfn's own transition. The enable then completes with the claim consumed: the scheduler stays up but can never be disabled again, and bpf_scx_unreg() frees it while still in use, resulting in a use-after-free. Both WARN_ON_ONCE()s fire back to back: WARNING: kernel/sched/ext/ext.c:7522 at scx_root_enable_workfn+0xeec/0x1be0, CPU#3: scx_enable_help/276 WARNING: kernel/sched/ext/ext.c:6398 at scx_root_disable+0xb50/0xdb8, CPU#0: sched_ext_helpe/664 scx_root_enable_workfn() switches to SCX_ENABLING before the scheduler allocation, so ops->priv is never visible while SCX_DISABLED. The allocation failure path restores SCX_DISABLED.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: atr: fix dangling adapter pointer on add failure i2c_atr_add_adapter() stores atr->adapter[chan_id] before i2c_add_adapter() so that the I2C bus notifier can match child clients during registration. On failure the channel is freed but the slot was left pointing at freed memory, which can lead to use-after-free in i2c_atr_del_adapter() / cleanup and also block reuse with -EEXIST. Clear the slot on the i2c_add_adapter() error path before freeing chan.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: IB/mlx4: Fix use-after-free on pkey sysfs registration failure register_pkey_tree() ignores errors from register_one_pkey_tree() and continues registering the remaining slaves. The per-slave error path has already released the pkey parent kobjects, but their pointers remain stored in the device. A later device cleanup therefore passes the stale pointers to kobject_put(), causing a use-after-free. Clear the parent pointers after releasing a failed slave tree and skip unregistered trees during device cleanup. This preserves the existing best-effort registration behavior while preventing a second cleanup of the failed tree.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: preserve user SID across nested backing files SELinux saves the user file SID in a backing-file security blob so it remains available after mmap() replaces vma->vm_file with a backing file. For nested backing files (overlayfs over overlayfs, or FUSE passthrough backed by overlayfs), user_file may itself be a backing file. Its fsec->sid is the SID of the mounter that opened it, rather than the user that opened the top-level file. mprotect() then checks fd { use } against the mounter SID. This can incorrectly deny access without a domain transition, or check the wrong target SID after one. Copy the saved user SID when user_file is a backing file. Keep using the regular file SID for the first backing layer. With two nested overlayfs mounts and SELinux enforcing, mprotect(PROT_READ) returns EACCES with an fd { use } denial against the mounter SID. With this change, mprotect() succeeds. Tested on arm64 QEMU with a small BusyBox initramfs and a purpose-built SELinux policy. The original test was also repeated with Fedora Cloud Base 44 userspace and gave the same result.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux: recheck intermediate backing files on mprotect() mprotect() can be used to bypass the SELinux checks that mmap() performs against the intermediate layers of a stacked filesystem. mmap() checks every backing layer as the request descends through the stack. mprotect() only has the lowest backing file in vma->vm_file, so it rechecks the top-level user and the lowest mounter, but skips the mounters of every layer in between. With two nested overlayfs mounts and a policy denying mounter_t -> middle_file_t:file { execute }, a direct mmap(PROT_EXEC) is denied: avc: denied { execute } for pid=71 comm="nested_exec" path="/payload" dev="overlay" ino=9 scontext=user_u:base_r:mounter_t tcontext=user_u:object_r:middle_file_t tclass=file permissive=0 while mmap(PROT_NONE) followed by mprotect(PROT_EXEC) succeeds. Preserve each intermediate path, mounter SID and file-description SID in the backing-file security blob, copying the saved entries when another backing layer is opened. Allocate the array only for nested backing files, and release it and the path references in the backing_file_free hook. During mprotect(), recheck fd { use } and the requested inode permissions for every saved mounter, and include the intermediate layers in the execmod checks. Policy for nested stacking may then need to grant intermediate mounters what a direct mmap() already requires, and execmod on intermediate labels for binaries using text relocations. Tested on arm64 QEMU with a small BusyBox initramfs and a purpose-built SELinux policy, on a mainline tree containing commit f2381b546e7e ("fs: fix user path of nested backing files"). [PM: subject tweak]

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: core: Cancel SDIO IRQ work before freeing host A host controller that uses sdio_signal_irq() schedules host->sdio_irq_work from its interrupt handler. That work is only cancelled on the suspend path (mmc_sdio_suspend()), not on the remove/free path, so a worker armed just before the controller freed its IRQ can run after mmc_host_classdev_release() has freed the host and dereference it through container_of(). Cancel host->sdio_irq_work in mmc_free_host(), like the existing host->detect drain added by commit 1036f69e2513 ("mmc: core: Cancel delayed work before releasing host"). This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: hsq: Fix use-after-free in retry work mmc_hsq_pump_requests() queues retry_work when request_atomic() returns -EBUSY; today sdhci-sprd is the only consumer that implements request_atomic(). The work is embedded in a devm-allocated mmc_hsq, but is never cancelled during driver removal. Work still pending at unbind can therefore run after the devm allocation has been released and dereference hsq->mmc and hsq->mrq. Use devm_work_autocancel() to cancel and drain retry_work before the devm allocation is released. By the time devres cleanup begins, mmc_remove_host() has already stopped the host, so no new requests can arm the work. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: mmci: Fix use-after-free in busy-timeout work ux500_busy_complete() can queue ux500_busy_timeout_work for an R1b command, but mmci_remove() never cancels it. The work can subsequently dereference the devm-allocated mmci_host after it has been released. Mask the controller interrupts and disable the delayed work during removal. This drains any queued instance and stops an IRQ handler that is still in progress from queueing the work again once it has been disabled. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: mxcmmc: cancel data work and watchdog on remove mxcmci_remove() frees the host through the devm tail, but neither it nor mmc_remove_host() drains the driver's own asynchronous state. host->watchdog, a 10 s timer armed on the DMA path in mxcmci_setup_data(), is deleted only by the DMA- and IRQ-complete paths, which the remove path does not explicitly drain; it can therefore fire after the host is freed and dereference it in mxcmci_watchdog(). host->datawork, armed from the IRQ handler on the PIO path, is not cancelled by the remove path either. Free the devm-registered IRQ, then cancel datawork and delete the watchdog in mxcmci_remove(), before dma_release_channel(). Freeing the IRQ first keeps a trailing handler from re-arming datawork between the cancel and the host free. Both callbacks are non-self-rearming. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: sdhci-of-aspeed: Remove children before releasing SDC resources Probe failure and removal leave SDHCI child devices registered after the parent clock and managed resources are released. Unregister the OF children in reverse order before disabling the parent clock on both paths. Use of_platform_device_destroy() because manual child creation does not set the flag required by of_platform_depopulate(). This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: sdio_uart: fix xmit_fifo leak when the port table is full sdio_uart_add_port() allocates the transmit fifo before claiming a slot in sdio_uart_table[]. When all UART_NR slots are taken, it returns -EBUSY with the fifo still allocated, but the probe error path only kfree()s the port, leaking the transmit fifo. Free the fifo in the failure path of sdio_uart_add_port() itself so the function retains nothing on error.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: spi: reset bytes_xfered before retrying CRC failures mmc_spi_data_do() updates data->bytes_xfered after each block has been transferred successfully. If a later block in the same data request fails with a CRC error, data->bytes_xfered may therefore contain the number of bytes completed before the failing block. mmc_spi_request() has a private recovery path for such CRC failures. It sends STOP_TRANSMISSION, clears data->error and jumps back to crc_recover to issue the same command and data request again. However, it does not clear data->bytes_xfered before the retry. If the retry succeeds, the request is completed with the bytes from the failed attempt still included in data->bytes_xfered. For a multi-block request this can make the completed request report more bytes than were transferred by the successful retry, and can even exceed the request size when most blocks completed before the CRC error. This is most likely to be observed on MMC-over-SPI systems where long multi-block transfers occasionally hit a data CRC error but the mmc_spi-internal retry succeeds. The data itself is retried, but the completion accounting is not. Clear data->bytes_xfered together with data->error before repeating the request so the final completion reports only the bytes transferred by the successful attempt.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: cyttsp5 - clamp the HID report size before memcpy The size field comes from the device and is used as the memcpy() length into response_buf, which is CY_MAX_INPUT bytes.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: evdev - zero absinfo before partial copy in EVIOCSABS The EVIOCSABS handler copies at most the user supplied ioctl size into an uninitialized on-stack struct input_absinfo: if (copy_from_user(&abs, p, min_t(size_t, size, sizeof(struct input_absinfo)))) The size comes from _IOC_SIZE() of the ioctl command and is therefore fully controlled by userspace. A short size leaves the trailing part of the structure holding whatever was on the kernel stack, and the whole structure is then stored into the device: dev->absinfo[t] = abs; EVIOCGABS hands that back to userspace, disclosing the stale stack bytes. Only the resolution field is currently cleared, which covers the legacy struct layout but not an arbitrarily short size. Zero the structure before the copy so any part not supplied by the caller reads back as zero. The existing resolution fixup is kept, since it also handles a size that partially overlaps that field.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: rmi_smbus - fix out-of-bounds read in rmi_smb_write_block() When chunking writes into SMBus blocks in rmi_smb_write_block(), the loop calculates block_len using the original total length (len) instead of the remaining length (cur_len). If len is greater than 32 bytes (SMB_MAX_COUNT), block_len remains 32 for every iteration, even on the final partial chunk where fewer than 32 bytes remain. This causes smb_block_write() to read 32 bytes from the advanced data buffer pointer, reading past the end of the input buffer. Fix this by calculating block_len using cur_len and advancing the buffer and address pointers by block_len.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: soc_button_array - check btns_desc->package.count Check that btns_desc->package.count is not 0 before accessing btns_desc->package.elements[0].

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - fix GPF in suspend and resume when unbound Transport drivers (such as rmi_i2c and rmi_spi) invoke rmi_driver_suspend() and rmi_driver_resume() on their child rmi_dev device during system power management events. However, transport drivers are fully registered and operational even if the physical RMI driver failed to bind or probe the rmi_dev device. When rmi_driver_suspend() or rmi_driver_resume() is called on an unbound rmi_dev, dev_get_drvdata() returns NULL. Calling rmi_disable_irq() or rmi_enable_irq() without driver data attached causes a NULL pointer dereference and General Protection Fault when attempting to lock data->enabled_mutex. Fix this by checking if driver data is attached to rmi_dev in rmi_driver_suspend() and rmi_driver_resume(), exiting early if no driver data is present.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: zero ff_effect before compat copy in input_ff_effect_from_user In the compat path input_ff_effect_from_user() aliases the caller's native struct ff_effect with the smaller struct ff_effect_compat and copies only the compat sized prefix: compat_effect = (struct ff_effect_compat *)effect; if (copy_from_user(compat_effect, buffer, sizeof(struct ff_effect_compat))) The tail of the native structure is never written. Callers pass an uninitialized on-stack object, for example evdev_do_ioctl() for EVIOCSFF, so those bytes keep their previous stack contents. input_ff_upload() then stores the full native structure in ff->effects[id], from where a uinput based force feedback daemon can read it back via UI_BEGIN_FF_UPLOAD, disclosing kernel stack memory to userspace. Zero the effect before the compat copy.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (hp-wmi-sensors) Fix use-after-free in fungible_show() nsensor->current_state is dynamically replaced as the sensor's state changes. update_numeric_sensor_from_wobj() does this by freeing the old string and installing a new one: if (strcmp(trimmed, nsensor->current_state)) { new_string = hp_wmi_strdup(dev, trimmed); if (new_string) { devm_kfree(dev, nsensor->current_state); nsensor->current_state = new_string; } } This function is only ever called from hp_wmi_update_info() while state->lock is held, so the free-and-replace itself is properly serialized against concurrent updates. fungible_show(), however, reads the same pointer after the lock has already been dropped: err = hp_wmi_update_info(state, info); if (err) return err; switch (prop) { ... case HP_WMI_PROPERTY_CURRENT_STATE: seq_printf(seqf, "%s\n", nsensor->current_state); break; hp_wmi_update_info() takes state->lock internally and releases it before returning, so by the time fungible_show() dereferences nsensor->current_state in seq_printf(), no lock is held. Two processes reading a sensor's current_state debugfs entry at overlapping times (or one reading it while another read of the same sensor triggers a refresh) can race: one thread's seq_printf() can be part-way through printing the string at the moment another thread's call into update_numeric_sensor_from_wobj() frees it with devm_kfree() and installs a new pointer, causing a use-after-free read. Take state->lock around the read in fungible_show() as well, so it can never run concurrently with the free-and-replace in update_numeric_sensor_from_wobj().

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (pmbus/core) increase number of phases and add new mask Increase the number of phases to 16 as a new upcoming device supports such a number. While at it, add a new mask for controlling the source of the output voltage. Note (groeck): This patch was meant to prepare for support of MAX20826 and compatible devices, which support more than 10 phases per page. However, Sashiko reports that the mp2975 driver already supports up to 14 phases, and the mp2856 driver supports up to 12 phases. This already has the potential for out-of-bounds writes when probing the affected chips, making this patch a bug fix.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (pwm-fan) Stop RPM timer before freeing tach data sample_timer() rearms the RPM timer and accesses the devm-managed ctx->tachs and ctx->pulses_per_revolution arrays. The cleanup action which stops the timer is registered before those arrays are allocated. Since devres releases entries in reverse order, driver detach can free the arrays before pwm_fan_cleanup() shuts down the timer. A timer expiry in that window accesses the freed tach data. With a KASAN kernel, a test-only kprobe delayed entry to pwm_fan_cleanup() while normal sysfs unbind ran. Each of three runs reported three four-byte reads and two four-byte writes in sample_timer() after its backing devm allocations had been freed. The helper did not invoke the timer callback, cleanup actions or free functions. With the fix, three matching unbind runs completed without KASAN, BUG, WARNING, Oops or panic. Instrumentation confirmed that timer retirement completed before the first timer backing allocation was released. Split timer retirement from the power cleanup and register its devres action after the timer backing data and IRQ actions are installed. This preserves the early power rollback action while ensuring the timer is retired before its backing data is released. Use timer_shutdown_sync() because the callback can rearm itself.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: brcmsmac: fix UAF in brcms_free_timer() brcms_free_timer() calls brcms_del_timer() which uses the non-synchronous cancel_delayed_work() to cancel the timer's underlying delayed work. If the work callback (_brcms_timer) is already running, cancel_delayed_work() returns false without waiting, and brcms_free_timer() proceeds to kfree(t) while the callback still accesses t through container_of(). Add an explicit cancel_delayed_work_sync() after brcms_del_timer() to guarantee that any in-flight callback has completed before the timer structure is freed.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: iwlegacy: fix broadcast stations deallocation On the error path of __il4965_up(), il_dealloc_bcast_stations() clears only IL_STA_UCODE_ACTIVE, leaving IL_STA_BCAST set. This causes the same broadcast stations to be deallocated again by __il4965_down(). This can occur when RF_KILL is toggled during driver startup. To fix clear the entire 'used' field, since we will not do any other operations on the station.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: libertas_tf: fix UAF in lbtf_free_adapter() lbtf_free_adapter() calls lbtf_free_cmd_buffer() to free the command buffers before calling timer_delete_sync() to wait for the command timer callback. If the timer callback (command_timer_fn) is already running when lbtf_free_cmd_buffer() frees the command array, the callback dereferences priv->cur_cmd->cmdbuf which points to freed memory. Swap the order so that timer_delete_sync() runs first, ensuring any in-flight callback has completed before the command buffers are freed.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: libipw: reject TKIP frames without a full MIC libipw_michael_mic_verify() assumes that an skb contains an eight-byte Michael MIC. A short TKIP frame makes the unsigned payload length wrap, causing michael_mic() to read past the skb. Check that the MIC is present before verifying it, and use the existing MICHAEL_MIC_LEN constant for all MIC lengths in the verifier.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wcn36xx: Fix potential use-after-free in TX ack timer teardown wcn36xx_dxe_deinit() tears down the TX ack timer with timer_delete(), which only dequeues the timer and does not wait for a callback that is already executing; the preceding free_irq() calls synchronize the interrupt handlers only. The callback, wcn36xx_dxe_tx_timer(), can therefore be running past the teardown and use the wcn freed along with the ieee80211_hw in wcn36xx_remove(): it takes wcn->dxe_lock, reads wcn->tx_ack_skb and passes wcn->hw to ieee80211_tx_status_irqsafe(). Fix this by using timer_shutdown_sync(), which waits for a running callback and also prevents the timer from being rearmed again. The timer is set up again by wcn36xx_dxe_init() on the next start, so the start/stop cycle is unaffected. This issue was found by an in-house static analysis tool.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wlcore: release runtime PM ref on regdomain config failure wlcore_regdomain_config() gets a runtime PM reference before sending the regulatory-domain command. When wlcore_cmd_regdomain_config_locked() fails, the function queues recovery and returns without dropping that reference. Release the reference after handling the command result so both success and failure paths balance the preceding pm_runtime_resume_and_get(). The recovery worker takes a separate runtime PM reference and cannot release the reference held here.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: fix out-of-bounds read in P2P public action frames wilc_wfi_p2p_rx() and mgmt_tx() start parsing a frame once ieee80211_is_public_action() returns true. That helper only verifies the frame is long enough for the action category field, that is offsetofend(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u.action.category), 25 bytes. Both functions then read the P2P public action header up to oui_subtype at offset 30 and pass "size - ie_offset" to cfg80211_find_vendor_ie(), where ie_offset is offsetof(struct ieee80211_mgmt, u) + sizeof(*d), i.e. 32. A public action frame of 25 to 31 bytes passes the check but is shorter than that 32 byte header, so oui_subtype can be read out of bounds, and because the length is unsigned, "size - ie_offset" underflows to a value close to 4 GiB. cfg80211_find_vendor_ie() takes an unsigned int length, so even the size_t subtraction in mgmt_tx() is truncated to the same value. It then walks far past the buffer searching for a vendor element until it reaches unmapped memory. In the receive path the frame arrives over the air and needs no association, so a nearby unauthenticated device can crash the host while it is in P2P listen. Reject frames shorter than the P2P public action header in both paths before dereferencing it.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: wilc1000: fix RX buffer OOB-write in wilc_wlan_handle_isr_ext() wilc_wlan_handle_isr_ext() takes the RX transfer size from the device-reported interrupt status register (a 15-bit field shifted left by 2, up to 131068 bytes) and reads that many bytes from the device into rx_buffer, which is only WILC_RX_BUFF_SIZE (96K) large. The wrap check only handles the current offset; the size itself is never compared against the buffer, so a bogus SDIO device can make the driver OOB-write rx_buffer by up to ~32K with data it controls. The oversized transfer also leaves rx_buffer_offset past the end of the buffer, after which the unsigned wrap check stops working and the overflow can repeat. Drop any transfer whose size exceeds the RX buffer, acknowledging the data interrupt and re-arming the RX engine so the bogus frame is discarded and reception can continue. This also restores the rx_buffer_offset <= WILC_RX_BUFF_SIZE invariant the wrap check relies on. This is not expected to change driver behavior in most cases: without this check, an oversized transfer would most likely corrupt neighboring kernel memory instead of completing anyway, and the drop path performs the same interrupt acknowledgment and RX engine re-arming as the normal path, so subsequent transfers are received unaffected. Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: p54: validate curve data length in the calibration curve converters p54_convert_rev0() and p54_convert_rev1() read calibration curve data from the device-supplied EEPROM entry using channel and points-per-channel counts taken verbatim from that same entry, so an entry that declares more data than it carries drives an out-of-bounds read past the EEPROM buffer (verified with a KASAN reproducer of the conversion loop). The sibling converters p54_convert_output_limits() and p54_convert_db() already validate their counts against the entry length; this path was missed. Reject the entry when the counts do not fit in the entry data.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: p54: require a full exp_if record in PDR_INTERFACE_LIST The PDR_INTERFACE_LIST loop only checks that the record start is within the entry before reading an entire struct exp_if from it. A truncated trailing record makes the if_id/variant reads cross the entry boundary into the heap beyond the EEPROM buffer (verified with a KASAN reproducer of the loop). The variant also feeds the synth front-end selection, so this is not only a leak. Advance only while a full record still fits in the entry.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe response is processed during scan-result parsing. Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or zero IE length cannot underflow to a large size_t and defeat the bound. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: validate scan response extents mwifiex_ret_802_11_scan() subtracts the fixed response fields and the firmware-provided BSS length from resp->size without first proving that either extent fits. A short response or oversized BSS length can therefore underflow tlv_buf_size and make the TLV parser walk beyond the command response. Compute the fixed extent from the selected normal or background scan response. Validate that the fixed fields and BSS data fit before deriving the TLV extent and entering the parser.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mwifiex: prevent authentication frame length truncation mwifiex_cfg80211_authenticate() derives the authentication frame length from req->ie_len and req->auth_data_len, both of type size_t, but stores it in a u16. NL80211_ATTR_AUTH_DATA only has a minimum length policy. Since nla_len is a u16, a single attribute can carry up to 65531 bytes of payload, so the sum can exceed U16_MAX before it is assigned to pkt_len. The truncated pkt_len determines the skb frame area, while the copy length remains req->auth_data_len - 4, resulting in a heap buffer overflow. For example, with auth_data_len equal to 65510 and no IEs, the sum is 65546. It is truncated to 10 and then reduced by four to 6. The driver appends only six bytes to the skb with skb_put(), but then copies 65506 user-provided bytes into the authentication body. Reaching this path requires CAP_NET_ADMIN in the user namespace owning the network namespace, an up station netdev, and a suitable BSS/SAE authentication request. Compute the length in size_t, reject values that cannot be represented by the firmware's u16 frame length field, and only then assign it to pkt_len.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: avoid out-of-bounds read for empty PREQ elements ieee80211_mesh_preq_size_ok() derives the location of the PREQ bottom fields before checking whether the element contains even the fixed header. ieee80211_mesh_hwmp_preq_get_bottom() reads the flags byte to account for the optional Address Extension field. Consequently, an empty PREQ element causes a one-byte read beyond its declared payload. Move the helper call after both size checks, so the bottom fields are only accessed when they are present.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: refuse to make a monitor active when it has no queue A monitor interface only gets a TXQ if it's created active, and one can't be added later. Setting the flag on a down interface is still allowed, so the driver is handed a monitor with no queue. ath9k dereferences it: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000066 RIP: 0010:ath_tx_node_init+0x49/0x170 [ath9k] ath9k_add_interface+0x10c/0x140 [ath9k] drv_add_interface+0x54/0x250 [mac80211] ieee80211_do_open+0x32f/0x800 [mac80211] Reached with CAP_NET_ADMIN by "iw dev X set monitor active" followed by "ip link set X up". RTNL is held, so netlink operations block behind it. Refuse the flag when there is no queue to give.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/gud: fix out-of-bounds write in gud_plane_atomic_check() The plane property loop uses req->properties[num_properties + i] as write index while simultaneously incrementing `num_properties` inside the loop. At iteration i, num_properties has also incremented by i, so the write is done at `initial_num_properties + 2*i`, skipping every other index and advancing by 2 per iteration. With just 2 connector and 32 plane properties the last write happens at index 64, one slot past the end of the 64-slot (indices 0–63) allocation. A USB device can trigger OOB by advertising the maximum number of properties. Fix by dropping the redundant `+ i`; num_properties is already the correct running index, as gud_connector_fill_properties() fills the preceding slots.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: fix rmmio iounmap skipped on device removal amdgpu_pci_remove() calls drm_dev_unplug() before fini_sw(), so drm_dev_enter() is already false there and the iounmap() guarded by it is skipped. This .remove path runs on both hot-unplug and plain rmmod, so the register BAR ioremap mapping leaks one instance per unload. Unmap rmmio unconditionally (guard only on non-NULL) and drop the now unused idx. (cherry picked from commit dd6f86a97260e5207d3329ad03aa89fdad61b1e6)

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu: Skip KFD mapping clear before initialization amdgpu_amdkfd_clear_kfd_mapping() assumes that a non-NULL kfd_dev has a fully populated node array. This is not true when KFD device initialization fails after probe. For example, kgd2kfd_device_init() sets num_nodes before checking PCIe atomics support. On Polaris systems without the required atomics, it returns before allocating nodes[0], but the kfd_dev remains attached to the amdgpu device. A later GPU reset then dereferences nodes[0]->id. Require the authoritative KFD initialization flag before walking the node array, matching the existing KFD reset and teardown paths. (cherry picked from commit 4ac1835823c47903fbb278bbf474773c46f59edc)

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: Avoid integer underflow in EOP ring size calculation. The low 6 bits of cp_hqd_eop_control store the base-2 logarithm of the EOP ring size. This was calculated as order_base_2(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / 4) - 1 But order_base_2 can in theory return 0, so this could underflow (although in practice the ring buffer size cannot be less than 4096). Change this to order_base_2(q->eop_ring_buffer_size / 8) using properties of logarithms. Also add to the above comment to make the mathematics more clear. (cherry picked from commit f0f43fcf8b2b3a924cad9444340921c96ed5f634)