Dimanche 27 septembre 2026

universal-tool-calling-protocol python-utcp

utcp-gql before 1.1.1 and utcp-websocket before 1.1.1 contain server-side request forgery vulnerabilities due to incomplete application of CVE-2026-44661 fixes. The GraphQL plugin uses a vulnerable prefix check allowing bypass URLs like http://127.0.0.1.attacker.example, while the WebSocket plugin performs no URL validation despite documented security requirements. Attackers can force connections to internal services and cloud metadata endpoints by supplying malicious tool URLs in call templates, and receive configured API keys and OAuth tokens sent to attacker-controlled hosts.

universal-tool-calling-protocol python-utcp

python-utcp (pip package utcp-http) before 1.1.12 does not verify whether tool URLs declared in a hand-written UTCP manual point at the agent's own loopback interface when that manual is discovered from a remote, non-loopback origin. Because ensure_secure_url intentionally permits loopback HTTP for local development and native manuals bypassed the loopback check performed by the OpenAPI converter, an attacker who can serve a UTCP manual that a victim registers can cause the client to issue requests to services bound only to 127.0.0.1 on the victim host and have the response bodies returned to the caller (server-side request forgery). The http, sse and streamable_http protocols are all affected. Reach is limited to loopback, and exploitation further requires a loopback service that answers unauthenticated requests with useful data. Fixed in utcp-http 1.1.12, which rejects manuals fetched from a non-loopback origin that declare loopback tool URLs, keyed off the final post-redirect discovery URL.

heymrun heym

Heym versions 0.0.90 and earlier contain two server-side request forgery (SSRF) egress gaps, both remediated in app/services/ssrf_guard.py in 0.0.91. First, the LLM image-edit input loader (_load_image_bytes) fetched caller-controlled HTTP/HTTPS URLs with a bare httpx.get, applying only a scheme check and bypassing the egress-pinning HTTP client; because the workflow DSL supports "imageInput": "$userInput.body.imageUrl", a webhook or API caller can choose the fetch target when a workflow author uses that expression, allowing requests to loopback, RFC1918, and cloud metadata endpoints. Second, _is_public_address unwrapped only IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses, so IPv6 transition forms — the NAT64 well-known prefix 64:ff9b::/96, deprecated IPv4-compatible ::x.x.x.x addresses, and 6to4 (2002::/16, classified as globally routable by Python 3.11.0 through 3.11.9) — could carry loopback, RFC1918, link-local, or cloud-metadata IPv4 destinations past both the initial URL validation and the dial-time IP pin. Version 0.0.91 routes the image loader through guard_http_url and the guarded client, evaluates NAT64 and IPv4-compatible addresses by their embedded IPv4 address, and refuses 64:ff9b:1::/48, 6to4, and Teredo (2001::/32) outright.