Mercredi 23 septembre 2026

Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8 · Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9 · Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 for RHEL 9 · Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6

A flaw was found in Ansible Automation Platform's automation-controller. The custom Credential Type environment-variable injector validates variable names against a deny-list (an ANSIBLE_* prefix check plus a fixed ENV_BLOCKLIST) that omits process-hijacking loader variables such as BASH_ENV, ENV, LD_PRELOAD, LD_LIBRARY_PATH, PYTHONSTARTUP and GIT_SSH_COMMAND. Combined with the credential file injector, a privileged user can write an attacker-controlled script into the execution environment and point BASH_ENV at it, obtaining arbitrary code execution inside the execution-environment container for any job that attaches a credential of that type.

Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 8 · Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.5 for RHEL 9 · Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6 for RHEL 9 · Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform 2.6

A flaw was found in Red Hat Ansible Automation Platform's automation- controller. The setting that formats the log message emitted for API 4XX errors is an administrator-controlled Python format-string template that is rendered with a live user object as an argument. Because Python string formatting permits attribute and item traversal on its arguments, an administrator can craft a template that walks from the user object into the application settings and reads the Django secret key and the database password. The formatted message is written to a logger that can be forwarded to an external log aggregator, whose destination is also administrator-controlled, allowing the secrets to be sent off the host. An authenticated administrator can thereby obtain the master encryption key used to protect all stored credentials and the database service password, enabling offline decryption of every stored credential, forgery of user sessions, and direct access to the controller database.

OpenC3 cosmos

OpenC3 COSMOS provides the functionality needed to send commands to and receive data from one or more embedded systems. From 5.12.0 until 7.3.0, an authenticated actor can write the pypi_url setting through set_setting at POST /openc3-api/api, then cause OpenC3::PluginModel.install_phase2 in openc3/lib/openc3/models/plugin_model.rb to interpolate the value into a shell command while installing a plugin with Python dependency metadata. Shell metacharacters in the setting are interpreted by the command shell, allowing arbitrary operating-system commands to run as the openc3 service user with access to Redis and bucket credentials. Open-source deployments permit any authenticated user to reach the affected operations, while Enterprise deployments require an administrator. This issue is fixed in version 7.3.0.

webpy web.py 0.76 is vulnerable to server-side template injection (SSTI). The template engine can be tricked into executing attacker-controlled template code that built-in security checks are designed to reject. When an application precompiles templates from a directory the attacker can write to and later renders them through the precompiled template loader, the sandbox is bypassed and the attacker's code runs, resulting in arbitrary Python code execution and OS command execution on the server.

Pollen Robotics Reachy Mini

The Reachy Mini daemon exposes an HTTP API for managing the robot. Its app installation endpoint, POST /apps/install in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/routers/apps.py, has no authentication. The handler's only dependency is Depends(get_app_manager), which just hands back the manager object from application state, so nothing in the chain ever checks a credential. The endpoint takes an AppInfo body naming a Hugging Face Space. The daemon downloads that Space and installs it as a Python package through install_package in src/reachy_mini/apps/sources/local_common_venv.py, using uv or pip. Installing a Python package runs the package's own build and setup code, so whoever chooses the Space chooses what code the robot runs. Anyone can publish a public Hugging Face Space, so this is not a meaningful restriction on the attacker. How far this reaches depends on the model. In _resolve_bind_host in src/reachy_mini/daemon/app/main.py the daemon binds 0.0.0.0 when it runs as the wireless version and 127.0.0.1 otherwise, with the vendor's own comment explaining that the robot has to be reachable on the LAN. On a wireless unit, then, any host on the same network can install and run code on the robot without credentials. One related change has already shipped but does not fix this. Version 1.8.2 replaced the wildcard CORS policy with an allow list of localhost and Tauri origins. That closes the browser drive-by route, where a web page the victim visits silently calls the endpoint in the background. It has no effect on this issue: CORS is enforced by browsers and governs whether script may read a response, while a direct HTTP request from another machine on the network involves no browser, no preflight and no CORS check at all.