Septembre 2026

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/rds: acquire the fastpath locks in rds_conn_shutdown() rds_conn_shutdown() quiesces the transmit and receive-refill paths by waiting for RDS_IN_XMIT and RDS_RECV_REFILL to be sampled clear, and then runs the transport shutdown and rds_conn_path_reset(). Sampling the bits clear is not the same as owning them: the moment after the wait_event() returns, rds_send_xmit() can re-acquire RDS_IN_XMIT (or rds_ib_recv_refill() can re-acquire RDS_RECV_REFILL) and run concurrently with the teardown. The sender does recheck the connection state after taking the lock, but that recheck is a classic store-buffering pattern: teardown writes the state and reads the bit while the sender writes the bit and reads the state. acquire_in_xmit() is only an acquire operation, so on weakly ordered architectures both sides can miss each other's write, and the transmit path then runs while the transport zeroes its rings (e.g. rds_ib_ring_init()) and rds_send_path_reset() rewrites the transmit state under it. Oracle UEK fixed the same class of crashes - a 14-year tail of BUG_ON()s in rds_ib_sub_signaled(), unexpected op-codes and NULL dereferences in rds_ib_send_cqe_handler() during failover testing - by making the teardown path *acquire* the fastpath bit locks instead of testing them ("rds: Make sure transmit path and connection tear-down does not run concurrently"). Ownership of a single word is decided by RMW atomicity, so no cross-variable ordering is needed. Do the same here: take both locks before calling the transport shutdown, hold them across rds_conn_path_reset(), and release them explicitly with a wake-up afterwards. Both are released with clear_bit_unlock(), so that the ring re-initialization done by the transport shutdown and the transmit state rewritten by rds_send_path_reset() are ordered before either bit is seen clear by the next acquire_in_xmit() or acquire_refill(). The fastpath users of these bits - rds_send_xmit() and rds_ib_recv_refill() - are trylock style and back off while teardown owns the locks, so no new lock dependency is introduced for them. rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is different: since the previous patch it acquires RDS_IN_XMIT as well, and it blocks doing so, so its wait now spans the teardown instead of at most one send batch. That waiter runs from rds_tcp_accept_one() on the single-threaded krdsd workqueue and holds rds_tcp_accept_lock and t_conn_path_lock while it waits, so a duelling SYN accepted while its path is being torn down parks accept processing for the duration of the teardown - for TCP bounded by the (up to 5 s) drain loop in rds_tcp_conn_path_shutdown(). An IB path's drain in rds_ib_conn_path_shutdown() has no round cap, but no blocking waiter either: rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() is the only blocking acquirer of these bits and waits only on its own TCP path, and the fastpaths are trylock-and-back-off on both transports, so a long IB drain lengthens only that path's own quiesce. The window is narrow: the accept-side state check has to pass before the teardown moves the path to RDS_CONN_DISCONNECTING. Because krdsd is a single global workqueue, everything else queued there - accept processing for other connections and network namespaces, and the flush_workqueue(rds_wq) in rds_tcp_listen_stop() during namespace teardown - waits behind the parked accept worker for that time. It cannot deadlock, although the waits do point at each other: the teardown blocks until the bit's holder releases it, and the holder may be that krdsd accept worker. The holder finishes without needing anything the teardown owns: the sync cancels rds_tcp_reset_callbacks() issues target cp_send_w and cp_recv_w on the path's ordered cp_wq, whose only execution slot is occupied by the blocked cp_down_w itself, so they are pending at most and cancel without flushing - a reliance on cp_wq being ordered that is now noted next to those cancels (on ---truncated---

Oracle Corporation Oracle Banking Origination

Vulnerability in the Oracle Banking Origination product of Oracle Financial Services Applications (component: Onboarding Batch Processes). Supported versions that are affected are 14.5.0.0.0-14.9.0.0.0. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Banking Origination. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Banking Origination. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.5 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).

Oracle Corporation Oracle Work in Process

Vulnerability in the Oracle Work in Process product of Oracle E-Business Suite (component: Workbenches). Supported versions that are affected are 12.2.3-12.2.15. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows unauthenticated attacker with access to the physical communication segment attached to the hardware where the Oracle Work in Process executes to compromise Oracle Work in Process. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized creation, deletion or modification access to critical data or all Oracle Work in Process accessible data as well as unauthorized access to critical data or complete access to all Oracle Work in Process accessible data. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 8.1 (Confidentiality and Integrity impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N).

Oracle Corporation Oracle Banking Corporate Lending Process Management

Vulnerability in the Oracle Banking Corporate Lending Process Management product of Oracle Financial Services Applications (component: Base). Supported versions that are affected are 14.5.0.0.0-14.9.0.0.0. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows low privileged attacker with network access via HTTP to compromise Oracle Banking Corporate Lending Process Management. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in takeover of Oracle Banking Corporate Lending Process Management. CVSS 3.1 Base Score 7.1 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: (CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H).