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WPO365 | SEAMLESS WORDPRESS + MICROSOFT INTEGRATION (WPO365 | LOGIN)

The WPO365 | SEAMLESS WORDPRESS + MICROSOFT INTEGRATION (WPO365 | LOGIN) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Stored Cross-Site Scripting via the 'id_token' parameter in all versions up to, and including, 44.1 due to insufficient input sanitization and output escaping. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to inject arbitrary web scripts in pages that will execute whenever a user accesses an injected page. The payload is stored in the wpo365_errors transient for up to three days by submitting a crafted unauthenticated request with a forged id_token whose base64url-decoded unique_name or iss claim contains malicious HTML, requiring no prior authentication or user interaction beyond an administrator later visiting the WPO365 wizard page.

WPO365 | SEAMLESS WORDPRESS + MICROSOFT INTEGRATION (WPO365 | LOGIN)

The WPO365 | SEAMLESS WORDPRESS + MICROSOFT INTEGRATION (WPO365 | LOGIN) plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via OIDC Nonce Replay in all versions up to, and including, 44.1 This is due to `Id_Token_Service_Deprecated::process_openidconnect_token()` using the incompatible WordPress core `wp_verify_nonce()` function to validate a nonce produced by `Nonce_Service::create_nonce()` — a 64-character hex value that `wp_verify_nonce()` can never successfully verify — causing the nonce check to silently fail without terminating authentication, so execution continues into `authenticate_oidc_user()` with the attacker-supplied `id_token`. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers who have obtained a previously-issued, valid `id_token` for a target account to replay that token and authenticate as any WordPress user, including administrators, resulting in full site takeover. This vulnerability is only exploitable when the `use_id_token_parser_v2` plugin option is enabled, as this is the configuration that routes token processing through the deprecated parser containing the broken nonce check.

WPO365 | SEAMLESS WORDPRESS + MICROSOFT INTEGRATION (WPO365 | LOGIN)

The WPO365 | Login plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery in versions up to, and including, 43.2. This is due to the Ajax_Service::verify_ajax_request() helper gating its wp_verify_nonce() call behind the boolean option 'enable_nonce_check', which is absent from the default 'wpo365_options' array and therefore evaluates to false via get_global_boolean_var(); as a result, the wp_ajax_wpo365_update_settings handler (Ajax_Service::update_settings) accepts POSTs from cross-origin pages and forwards the attacker-supplied 'settings' payload (base64/JSON) to Options_Service::update_options(), which merges every key/value into wpo365_options without a key allowlist. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to overwrite arbitrary plugin options — including enabling the SCIM REST endpoint (enable_scim), planting an attacker-known scim_secret_token, and setting new_usr_default_role to 'administrator' — via a forged request granted they can trick a site administrator into performing an action such as clicking on a link.