Recherche « strapi »

strapi

Strapi 5.47.0 through 5.57.0 contains an improper authorization vulnerability that allows admin API tokens to retain all-field Content Manager access after the owner's role is field-restricted. Because reconcileTokenPermissionsToUserCeiling ignores token permissions with omitted or null fields, token holders can keep reading content fields an administrator removed from the role.

n8n-io n8n · N8n n8n

n8n before 1.123.73, 2.35.4, and 2.36.2 contains a credential exposure vulnerability in the Strapi, SeaTable, and Mailcheck nodes. These nodes send their decrypted credentials to the authentication endpoint via the raw legacy HTTP helper outside any error handling, causing the plaintext secret to be persisted in execution error data. Any authenticated user can read the plaintext secret from their own execution through the REST API, bypassing the blank-value redaction enforced by the credentials API.

strapi · Strapi strapi

Strapi users-permissions plugin fails to restrict JWT algorithms when plugin::users-permissions.jwt.algorithm is not explicitly configured, allowing acceptance of HS384 and HS512 tokens alongside HS256. Attackers possessing the jwtSecret can mint tokens with non-standard HMAC variants to bypass algorithm restrictions and weaken authentication controls.

strapi · strapi @strapi/upload · Strapi strapi

Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.33.3, the Upload plugin's Content API endpoints did not enforce the administrator-configured MIME type restrictions (`plugin.upload.security.allowedTypes` and `deniedTypes`). The same restrictions were correctly enforced on the Admin Panel upload path. The upload plugin's `enforceUploadSecurity` security check was invoked in the admin upload controller but was missing from the Content API controller. The Content API handlers `uploadFiles` and `replaceFile` (and the `upload` wrapper that dispatches to them) called the underlying upload service directly, bypassing both the magic-byte MIME detection and the configured allow/deny lists. An authenticated user with the Content API upload permission could therefore upload file types the administrator had explicitly disallowed, including HTML and SVG content. In deployments serving uploaded files from the same origin as the admin panel (default), an attacker could upload an HTML or SVG file that, when opened directly by an admin, executed JavaScript in the admin origin, enabling admin-session hijack and authenticated administrative actions against the admin API. The patch in version 5.33.3 introduces a shared `prepareUploadRequest` helper that wraps `enforceUploadSecurity` and is called from both the Content API and admin upload controllers, ensuring identical security policy enforcement on every upload entry point.

strapi · strapi @strapi/admin · strapi @strapi/plugin-users-permissions · Strapi strapi

Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.33.3, changing or resetting a user's password did not invalidate the user's existing refresh-token sessions by default. The refresh-token invalidation step in the users-permissions and admin authentication controllers was conditional on a caller-supplied `deviceId`. When a password change or reset request did not include a `deviceId`, no refresh tokens were revoked, leaving every prior session active. An attacker who had previously obtained a refresh token could continue minting new access tokens after the legitimate user reset their password, allowing persistent unauthorized access for the lifetime of the refresh token (up to 30 days by default). Rotating credentials no longer terminated an active attacker session, defeating password reset as a containment measure. The patch in version 5.33.3 invalidates all refresh tokens associated with the user on every password change and password reset, regardless of whether a `deviceId` is supplied. A new device-scoped session is then issued to the caller as part of the response.

strapi · strapi @strapi/plugin-users-permissions · Strapi strapi

Strapi is an open source headless content management system. In Strapi versions prior to 5.45.0, the rate-limit middleware in the users-permissions plugin derived its rate-limit key in part from `ctx.request.body.email`, including on routes whose body schema does not contain an `email` field (`/auth/local`, `/auth/reset-password`, `/auth/change-password`). An unauthenticated attacker could include an arbitrary `email` value in the request body to obtain a fresh rate-limit key per request, effectively bypassing per-IP throttling on those routes and enabling high-volume credential brute-force, password-reset code brute-force, and credential-stuffing attempts. The rate-limit key was constructed as `${userIdentifier}:${requestPath}:${ctx.request.ip}`, where `userIdentifier = ctx.request.body.email`. On routes that legitimately use email as their identifier (e.g. `/auth/forgot-password`, `/auth/local/register`), this scoping is correct. On routes that use a different identifier (`identifier` for login, `code` for password reset, `currentPassword` for password change), the email field was not part of the route contract, but the middleware still incorporated it into the key, allowing a caller to rotate the value and obtain a unique key on every request. The patch in version 5.45.0 maintains an allow-list of routes that legitimately key on the email field and excludes that key component on every other route the middleware is mounted on. OAuth callback paths (`/connect/*`) are treated identifier-less. On routes outside the allow-list, the middleware now falls back to a fixed identifier-less key, ensuring per-IP throttling remains effective even when the request body is attacker-controlled.

Strapi strapi

Strapi through 4.5.5 allows attackers (with access to the admin panel) to discover sensitive user details by exploiting the query filter. The attacker can filter users by columns that contain sensitive information and infer a value from API responses. If the attacker has super admin access, then this can be exploited to discover the password hash and password reset token of all users. If the attacker has admin panel access to an account with permission to access the username and email of API users with a lower privileged role (e.g., Editor or Author), then this can be exploited to discover sensitive information for all API users but not other admin accounts.