Samedi 29 août 2026
4 CVE
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CVE-2026-82364 4.2 Moyenne
macrozheng mall
A security vulnerability has been detected in macrozheng mall up to 1.0.3. This impacts an unknown function of the file /order/submit of the component Order Submission. The manipulation leads to race condition. It is possible to initiate the attack remotely. The attack is considered to have high complexity. The exploitability is said to be difficult. The vendor deleted the GitHub issue for this vulnerability without and explanation.
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CVE-2026-81533 7.1 Élevée
MongoDB BI Connector ODBC Driver
An application using the MongoDB BI Connector ODBC Driver may encounter a memory-safety issue when a submitted SQL statement contains an unusually long run of digits following a LIMIT clause. The issue occurs only on connections where the driver's optional prefetch setting is enabled, and stems from the driver copying the digit sequence into a fixed-size internal buffer without checking its length. A user able to influence the numeric portion of a LIMIT clause could cause the hosting application process to terminate unexpectedly or corrupt adjacent memory in that process.
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CVE-2026-81520 7.5 Élevée
MongoDB BI Connector
A network-reachable client that has not yet authenticated can hold a MongoDB Connector for BI authentication session open indefinitely by beginning a SASL-based login exchange and then declining to complete it. Because the negotiation loop had no overall time bound and the read from the client had no deadline, each such session retains a worker, a client connection slot, and its associated backend database connections until the process is restarted. Repeated use of this behavior can consume the configured connection capacity and prevent legitimate users from establishing new sessions.
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CVE-2026-13734 6.5 Moyenne
zephyrproject zephyr
Zephyr's WireGuard VPN data-plane receive handler wg_process_data_message() in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg_crypto.c validated the anti-replay counter too late. After AEAD decryption of a MESSAGE_TRANSPORT_DATA packet succeeded, the code committed several peer-state changes — update_peer_addr() (endpoint roaming update), the keypair->last_rx/peer->last_rx liveness timers, and keypair_update() (promote next→current and destroy the previous keypair) — and only afterward called wg_check_replay(). On a replayed packet the replay check returned -EINVAL, but none of the preceding mutations were rolled back. The AEAD tag authenticates content but not freshness, so a replayed-but-authentic transport packet decrypts correctly. An attacker who captures one valid ciphertext off the wire (an on-path or shared-medium observer) can re-inject it from an arbitrary spoofed source address. Reaching the handler requires no credentials: it is driven directly from inbound UDP datagrams via the dispatch in subsys/net/lib/wireguard/wg.c. Because the state mutations committed before the replay check, the replay repoints the peer endpoint to the attacker-chosen source address (roaming hijack), redirecting the victim's subsequent outbound tunnel traffic until the legitimate peer's next packet re-corrects it; it also prematurely destroys the previous keypair and refreshes the RX liveness timer. The tunnel payload stays encrypted under the session keypair, so this is an integrity/availability impact (traffic redirection and session disruption), not payload disclosure. The fix moves wg_check_replay() to immediately after a successful decrypt, before any peer-state mutation, matching the WireGuard specification and the Linux reference implementation.