Recherche « moby sys »
4 CVE
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CVE-2026-61801 5.5 Moyenne
moby sys
The `github.com/moby/sys/user` package provides Go utilities for parsing and looking up entries in Unix-style user and group database files. Versions before 0.4.1 do not sufficiently limit entries when parsing `/etc/passwd`- or `/etc/group`-style files, allowing an attacker who can supply a specially crafted file to cause excessive memory consumption and potentially terminate the affected process due to an out-of-memory condition. This issue is patched in version 0.4.1. As a workaround, avoid parsing attacker-controlled user or group database files, or validate and limit untrusted input before parsing it.
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CVE-2026-17106 7.1 Élevée
moby go-archive · Docker Sandboxes · Docker Desktop · Docker Engine
The tar extraction routines in moby/go-archive (Unpack, UnpackLayer, Untar/UntarUncompressed, and the ApplyLayer helpers) do not confine filesystem operations to the destination directory. The extractor decides where each archive entry lands using lexical string checks and then performs the filesystem operation on a path that is resolved by the OS, so links introduced by the archive can be followed out of the destination directory. An attacker who controls the contents of an archive can create or overwrite files at arbitrary paths writable by the extracting process.
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CVE-2026-41568 6.1 Moyenne
moby · Docker engine · Mobyproject moby · Mobyproject moby\/v2
Moby is an open source container framework. In Docker Engine prior to version 29.5.1, Docker Daemon versions 28.5.2 and prior, and Moby Daemon prior to version 2.0.0-beta.14, a race condition during docker cp mount setup allows a malicious container to create empty files or directories at arbitrary absolute paths on the host filesystem. This issue has been patched in Docker Engine version 29.5.1 and Moby Daemon version 2.0.0-beta.14.
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CVE-2026-41567 7.2 Élevée
moby/v2/daemon · moby Docker Engine · docker/daemon · Red Hat Multicluster Global Hub 1.4.5
Moby is an open source container framework. In versions prior to 29.5.1 and in moby/moby v2 prior to v2.0.0-beta.14, when a compressed archive is uploaded to a container via `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` or piped through `docker cp -`, the daemon resolves decompression binaries (such as `xz` or `unpigz`) from the container's filesystem rather than the host's due to incorrect ordering of operations. A malicious container image containing a trojanized decompression binary can achieve arbitrary code execution with full daemon privileges, including host root UID and unrestricted capabilities, when a user uploads a compressed (xz or gzip) archive into that container. This issue is fixed in Docker Engine 29.5.1 and moby/moby v2.0.0-beta.14. Workarounds include only running containers from trusted images, using authorization plugins to restrict access to the `PUT /containers/{id}/archive` endpoint, and avoiding piping compressed archives into containers created from untrusted images