Mercredi 12 août 2026

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: clamp v9 CRIU control stack checkpoint copy to BO size CRIU checkpoint copies the MQD control stack using cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size from hardware without bounding it to the allocated BO region. If the HW field is larger than the queue's control stack allocation, memcpy reads past the BO into adjacent GTT memory and can leak kernel data to userspace. Store the page-aligned control stack BO size in mqd_manager and clamp checkpoint copies and reported checkpoint sizes to min(cp_hqd_cntl_stack_size, mm->ctl_stack_size). Apply the same bound for multi-XCC v9.4.3 checkpoint layout. (cherry picked from commit 6c2abd0ec09e86c6323010673766f76050e28aa3)

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: Validate vmw_surface_metadata::array_size This field comes from userspace and should be validated against specific limits depending on which Shader Model (SM) is available.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: Prevent shader BO mappings from becoming writable vc4_gem_object_mmap() rejects a writable mapping of a validated shader BO, but leaves VM_MAYWRITE set. Userspace can map the BO read-only and then turn it writable with mprotect(). Validated shader BOs must stay read-only: the validator checks the instructions once and the GPU trusts them afterwards. A writable mapping lets userspace rewrite the code after validation, bypassing the validator. Clear VM_MAYWRITE on the read-only path so the mapping cannot be upgraded, as i915 already does for its read-only objects.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: don't propagate EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING to split extent maps When btrfs_drop_extent_map_range() splits an extent map, the new split maps inherit the original map's flags through a local 'flags' variable. Commit f86f7a75e2fb ("btrfs: use the flags of an extent map to identify the compression type") changed the EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING clearing to operate on em->flags instead of that local 'flags' copy, so a split of an extent map that is currently being logged wrongly inherits EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING. The flag is then never cleared on the split, and when it is freed while still on the inode's modified_extents list (for example by the extent map shrinker) it trips the WARN_ON(!list_empty(&em->list)) in btrfs_free_extent_map() and leads to a use-after-free. Clear EXTENT_FLAG_LOGGING from the local 'flags' copy used for the splits and only clear EXTENT_FLAG_PINNED from em->flags, restoring the behaviour prior to f86f7a75e2fb.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: txgbe: fix heap overflow when reading module EEPROM txgbe_read_eeprom_hostif() always copies round_up(length, 4) bytes into the caller buffer, which ethtool allocates with exactly 'length' bytes. A non-4-aligned length therefore causes an out-of-bounds write. Copy only the remaining bytes on the final dword instead.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound get_version reply decode to front len handle_get_version_reply() uses msg->front_alloc_len as the decode boundary for MON_GET_VERSION_REPLY. That is the size of the reused reply buffer, not the number of bytes actually received. A truncated reply can therefore pass ceph_decode_need() and decode the second u64 from stale tail bytes left in the buffer by an earlier message, causing an uninitialized memory read. Use msg->front.iov_len as the receive-side decode boundary, matching other libceph reply handlers and limiting decoding to the bytes that were actually read from the wire.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink A tunnel changelink() operates on at most two netns, dev_net(dev) and the sticky underlay netns vxlan->net. They differ once the device is created in or moved to a netns other than the one the request runs in. The rtnl changelink path checks CAP_NET_ADMIN only against dev_net(dev), so a caller privileged there but not in vxlan->net can rewrite a vxlan device whose underlay lives in vxlan->net. vxlan_changelink() validates and applies the new configuration against vxlan->net (vxlan_config_validate(vxlan->net, ...)) and can reopen the underlay socket in that netns, so the same reasoning as the tunnel changelink series applies here. Gate vxlan_changelink() with rtnl_dev_link_net_capable(), at the top of the op before any attribute is parsed, matching ipgre_changelink() and the rest of the "require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the device netns for changelink" series. Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).