Semaine du 10 août au 16 août 2026
8 CVE
-
CVE-2026-74496 7.8 Élevée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fou: Fix use-after-free in fou_create() fou_create() publishes struct fou through sk_user_data before adding the new FOU port to the per-netns list. If fou_add_to_port_list() fails, the error path frees fou while it is still reachable through sk_user_data. A concurrent receive can then dereference the freed object in fou_from_sock(). This ordering issue was previously noted in the linked discussion. The failure is reachable when local port 0 is requested. Each socket binds to a different ephemeral port, but fou_cfg_cmp() compares the requested port 0 and reports -EALREADY once an entry already exists. Release the tunnel socket before freeing fou so sk_user_data is cleared first, and defer reclamation with kfree_rcu() to protect concurrent RCU readers. This matches the lifetime handling in fou_release().
-
CVE-2026-49282 5.1 Moyenne
capstone-engine capstone
Capstone is a disassembly framework. Prior to version 6.0.0-Alpha9, Capstone's public `cs_insn_name()` API forwards caller-supplied instruction IDs directly to the selected architecture backend. Most backends validate the ID before indexing instruction-name tables, but the M68K and RISCV backends have missing or incomplete bounds checks. On a Capstone handle opened for M68K or RISCV, a caller-controlled invalid instruction ID can trigger an out-of-bounds read and crash the process. The demonstrated impact is availability loss in applications or bindings that expose instruction-name lookup to untrusted IDs. No code execution or data disclosure was demonstrated. Version 6.0.0-Alpha9 patches the issue.
-
CVE-2026-16713 5.3 Moyenne
IBM Documentation Offline
IBM Documentation Offline 1.0.0 through 1.4.1 IBM Documentation could allow a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information due to a security misconfiguration where the documentation server binds to an unrestricted IP address.
-
CVE-2026-73068 5.9 Moyenne
ToolJet
ToolJet is the open-source foundation am AI-native platform for building and deploying internal tools, workflows and AI agents. Prior to 3.20.207, the ToolJet Database HTTP API in server/src/modules/tooljet-db/controller.ts authorizes operations against the :organizationId URL path value without verifying that the caller belongs to that organization. JwtAuthGuard validates the tj-workspace-id header against the caller's memberships, while server/src/modules/tooljet-db/ability/index.ts grants VIEW_TABLES, VIEW_TABLE, and JOIN_TABLES without binding them to the path organization. An authenticated user can set tj-workspace-id to the user's own workspace and target another workspace through GET /api/tooljet-db/organizations/:organizationId/tables, GET /api/tooljet-db/organizations/:organizationId/table/:tableName, POST /api/tooljet-db/organizations/:organizationId/join, and the related table-management routes, allowing disclosure of table names, schemas, and rows and allowing tables to be created, altered, bulk populated, or dropped across tenant boundaries. This issue is fixed in version 3.20.207-lts.
-
CVE-2026-68398 7.8 Élevée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ppp: defer channel free to an RCU grace period to fix pppol2tp RX UAF pppol2tp_recv() runs in the L2TP UDP-encap softirq RX path: l2tp_udp_encap_recv() -> l2tp_recv_common() -> pppol2tp_recv() -> ppp_input(&po->chan) It runs under rcu_read_lock() holding only an l2tp_session reference and takes NO reference on the internal PPP channel (struct channel, chan->ppp) that ppp_input() dereferences. The pppox socket is SOCK_RCU_FREE, so 'po' and the embedded ppp_channel are RCU-safe. But the internal struct channel is a separate allocation that ppp_release_channel() frees with a plain kfree(): close(data socket) -> pppol2tp_release() -> pppox_unbind_sock() -> ppp_unregister_channel() -> ppp_release_channel() -> kfree(pch) For a channel that is bound (PPPIOCGCHAN) but not attached to a ppp unit (no PPPIOCCONNECT, pch->ppp == NULL) and not bridged, teardown skips both ppp_disconnect_channel()'s synchronize_net() and ppp_unbridge_channels()'s synchronize_rcu(), so the kfree() has no grace period. rcu_read_lock() in pppol2tp_recv() does not protect against a plain kfree(), so an in-flight ppp_input() on one CPU can dereference the channel just freed by close() on another CPU. The bug is reachable by an unprivileged user. Defer the channel free to an RCU callback via call_rcu() so the grace period fences any in-flight ppp_input(). The disconnect and unbridge teardown paths already fence with synchronize_net()/synchronize_rcu(); call_rcu() does the same here without stalling the close() path.
-
CVE-2026-68372 – Non évaluée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: core: port: Deattach Type-C connector on component unbind connector_unbind() is the mirror of connector_bind(), but it is missing the symmetric call to typec_deattach() that connector_bind() makes via: if (port_dev->child) typec_attach(port_dev->connector, &port_dev->child->dev); When a Thunderbolt dock is unplugged, two teardown paths race: 1. The component framework calls connector_unbind() first, which sets port_dev->connector = NULL without calling typec_deattach(). This leaves port->usb2_dev/port->usb3_dev in struct typec_port pointing at the USB device that is about to be freed. 2. usb_disconnect() then calls typec_deattach(port_dev->connector, ...), but port_dev->connector is already NULL, so the call is a no-op and port->usb2_dev is never cleared. 3. Concurrently, UCSI detects a PD partner-disconnect event and calls typec_unregister_partner(), which reads port->usb2_dev (now a dangling pointer to freed memory) and passes it to typec_partner_unlink_device() -> sysfs_remove_link() -> dev_name() on the freed device, corrupting the typec/UCSI partner state. This corruption leaves the Thunderbolt tunnel in an inconsistent state on the next dock hot-plug. On affected hardware the dock's I225/igc NIC fails to enumerate: AER fires a slot reset while the igc driver is still initialising ("PCIe link lost"), and the subsequent igc_reset attempt hits igc_rd32 on an already-detached device: igc 0000:2e:00.0 eth0: PCIe link lost, device now detached igc: Failed to read reg 0x0! WARNING: CPU: 9 PID: 129 at drivers/net/ethernet/intel/igc/igc_main.c:7005 igc_rd32+0xa4/0xc0 [igc] Call Trace: igc_disable_pcie_master+0x16/0xa0 [igc] igc_reset_hw_base+0x14/0x170 [igc] igc_reset+0x63/0x110 [igc] igc_io_slot_reset+0x9e/0xd0 [igc] report_slot_reset+0x5d/0xc0 pcie_do_recovery+0x209/0x400 aer_isr_one_error_type+0x235/0x430 aer_isr+0x4e/0x80 irq_thread+0xf4/0x1f0 4. UCSI later handles the PD partner-disconnect and calls typec_unregister_partner(), which still sees the stale port->usb2_dev and tries to remove its sysfs link a second time: kernfs: can not remove 'typec', no directory WARNING: CPU: 6 PID: 55 at fs/kernfs/dir.c:1706 kernfs_remove_by_name_ns+0xe9/0xf0 Workqueue: events ucsi_handle_connector_change [typec_ucsi] Call Trace: sysfs_remove_link+0x19/0x50 typec_unregister_partner+0x6e/0x120 [typec] ucsi_unregister_partner+0x107/0x150 [typec_ucsi] ucsi_handle_connector_change+0x3ec/0x490 [typec_ucsi] process_one_work+0x18e/0x3e0 worker_thread+0x2e3/0x420 kthread+0x10a/0x230 ret_from_fork+0x121/0x140 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 With worse timing the same stale pointer is dereferenced after the backing memory is freed, turning the warning into a use-after-free. Fix the asymmetry: call typec_deattach() before clearing port_dev->connector, matching what connector_bind() does on the bind side. typec_partner_deattach() is already protected by port->partner_link_lock, so it serialises safely with the concurrent typec_unregister_partner() path.
-
CVE-2026-68344 – Non évaluée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: atm: ueagle-atm: reject descriptors that confuse probe and disconnect uea_probe() distinguishes a pre-firmware device from a post-firmware one using the USB id (UEA_IS_PREFIRM()), and stores a different object as the interface data in each case: a 'struct completion' for a pre-firmware device (to be waited on in .disconnect()), or a 'struct usbatm_data' for a post-firmware one. uea_disconnect() instead tells the two apart by the number of interfaces of the active configuration (a pre-firmware device exposes a single interface, ADI930 has 2 and eagle has 3), and casts the interface data accordingly. Because the two handlers use different criteria, a crafted device that advertises a pre-firmware id together with a multi-interface descriptor (or a post-firmware id with a single interface) makes them disagree: the small 'struct completion' stored by uea_probe() is then passed to usbatm_usb_disconnect(), which casts it to 'struct usbatm_data' and takes instance->serialize, reading past the end of the allocation: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in __mutex_lock+0x152a/0x1b80 Read of size 8 at addr ffff8880470e2c60 by task kworker/1:2/982 ... __mutex_lock+0x152a/0x1b80 usbatm_usb_disconnect+0x70/0x820 uea_disconnect+0x133/0x2c0 usb_unbind_interface+0x1dd/0x9e0 ... which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 96-byte region [ffff8880470e2c00, ffff8880470e2c60) Reject such inconsistent descriptors in uea_probe() so that both handlers always make the same pre/post-firmware decision.
-
CVE-2026-68227 – Non évaluée
Linux
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: cx231xx: fix devres lifetime USB drivers bind to USB interfaces and any device managed resources should have their lifetime tied to the interface rather than parent USB device. This avoids issues like memory leaks when drivers are unbound without their devices being physically disconnected (e.g. on probe deferral or configuration changes). Fix the driver state lifetime so that it is released on driver unbind.