Veille CVE

Août 2026

4 CVE

Critique 0 Élevée 2 Moyenne 1 Faible 1 Non évaluée 0 Exploitées (KEV) Tri : plus récentes « Moby » ✕
  1. CVE-2026-75593 7.2 Élevée

    moby buildkit

    BuildKit is a toolkit for converting source code to build artifacts in an efficient, expressive and repeatable manner. Prior to 0.31.2, a custom client can produce such an upload request to the BuildKit daemon that files can escape from the BuildKit-controlled state directory. The client needs to have valid permissions to access BuildKit control API to issue builds, eg., bypass authentication, etc. This issue is fixed in version 0.31.2.

  2. CVE-2026-61712 2.3 Faible

    moby buildkit

    BuildKit is a toolkit for converting source code to build artifacts in an efficient, expressive and repeatable manner. Prior to 0.31.1, BuildKit read attacker-controlled /etc/passwd and /etc/group files without an upper bound while resolving a username to a user identifier or group identifier in executor/oci/user.go and solver/llbsolver/ops/user_linux.go. A malicious base image or build could provide oversized files that exhausted memory during user resolution and caused out-of-memory termination of the buildkitd process. This issue is fixed in version 0.31.1.

  3. CVE-2026-61711 5.3 Moyenne

    moby buildkit

    BuildKit is a toolkit for converting source code to build artifacts in an efficient, expressive and repeatable manner. Prior to 0.31.1, a custom frontend could place an invalid SecurityMode value in a crafted build request, and executor/oci/spec_linux.go treated the unsupported value as a non-sandbox mode without requiring the security.insecure entitlement. This disabled Seccomp and AppArmor protections for the build container even though Linux capabilities remained restricted. This issue is fixed in version 0.31.1.

  4. CVE-2026-17106 7.1 Élevée

    moby go-archive · Docker Sandboxes · Docker Desktop · Docker Engine

    The tar extraction routines in moby/go-archive (Unpack, UnpackLayer, Untar/UntarUncompressed, and the ApplyLayer helpers) do not confine filesystem operations to the destination directory. The extractor decides where each archive entry lands using lexical string checks and then performs the filesystem operation on a path that is resolved by the OS, so links introduced by the archive can be followed out of the destination directory. An attacker who controls the contents of an archive can create or overwrite files at arbitrary paths writable by the extracting process.