Semaine du 20 juillet au 26 juillet 2026

Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) · Microsoft edge chromium

Files or directories accessible to external parties in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network.

Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) · Microsoft edge chromium

Origin validation error in Microsoft Edge (Chromium-based) allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network.

codexu NoteGen · Notegen notegen

NoteGen before 0.32.0 grants the Tauri shell plugin shell:allow-execute capability for bash, python, and python3 with arbitrary arguments in the default desktop capabilities. JavaScript running in the application webview can therefore invoke plugin:shell|execute to run attacker-controlled operating system commands with the privileges of the NoteGen process. In combination with script execution in the webview (for example via chat XSS), this enables full remote code execution on the user's machine.

codexu NoteGen · Notegen notegen

NoteGen before 0.32.0 renders AI chat responses with markdown-it configured with html:true and injects the result into the DOM via dangerouslySetInnerHTML in chat-preview, without HTML sanitization and with CSP set to null. Attacker-controlled content that reaches the model prompt (for example a malicious skill REFERENCE.md that instructs the model to emit HTML) can cause the model response to include executable markup such as an img onerror handler. When the user views the chat response, that markup runs as JavaScript in the privileged Tauri webview, enabling arbitrary script execution in the application context (cross-site scripting).

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: nexthop: Increase weight to u16 In CLOS networks, as link failures occur at various points in the network, ECMP weights of the involved nodes are adjusted to compensate. With high fan-out of the involved nodes, and overall high number of nodes, a (non-)ECMP weight ratio that we would like to configure does not fit into 8 bits. Instead of, say, 255:254, we might like to configure something like 1000:999. For these deployments, the 8-bit weight may not be enough. To that end, in this patch increase the next hop weight from u8 to u16. Increasing the width of an integral type can be tricky, because while the code still compiles, the types may not check out anymore, and numerical errors come up. To prevent this, the conversion was done in two steps. First the type was changed from u8 to a single-member structure, which invalidated all uses of the field. This allowed going through them one by one and audit for type correctness. Then the structure was replaced with a vanilla u16 again. This should ensure that no place was missed. The UAPI for configuring nexthop group members is that an attribute NHA_GROUP carries an array of struct nexthop_grp entries: struct nexthop_grp { __u32 id; /* nexthop id - must exist */ __u8 weight; /* weight of this nexthop */ __u8 resvd1; __u16 resvd2; }; The field resvd1 is currently validated and required to be zero. We can lift this requirement and carry high-order bits of the weight in the reserved field: struct nexthop_grp { __u32 id; /* nexthop id - must exist */ __u8 weight; /* weight of this nexthop */ __u8 weight_high; __u16 resvd2; }; Keeping the fields split this way was chosen in case an existing userspace makes assumptions about the width of the weight field, and to sidestep any endianness issues. The weight field is currently encoded as the weight value minus one, because weight of 0 is invalid. This same trick is impossible for the new weight_high field, because zero must mean actual zero. With this in place: - Old userspace is guaranteed to carry weight_high of 0, therefore configuring 8-bit weights as appropriate. When dumping nexthops with 16-bit weight, it would only show the lower 8 bits. But configuring such nexthops implies existence of userspace aware of the extension in the first place. - New userspace talking to an old kernel will work as long as it only attempts to configure 8-bit weights, where the high-order bits are zero. Old kernel will bounce attempts at configuring >8-bit weights. Renaming reserved fields as they are allocated for some purpose is commonly done in Linux. Whoever touches a reserved field is doing so at their own risk. nexthop_grp::resvd1 in particular is currently used by at least strace, however they carry an own copy of UAPI headers, and the conversion should be trivial. A helper is provided for decoding the weight out of the two fields. Forcing a conversion seems preferable to bending backwards and introducing anonymous unions or whatever.

koxudaxi datamodel-code-generator

datamodel-code-generator prior to version 0.70.0 contains a code injection vulnerability that allows attackers who control input schemas to achieve remote code execution by supplying a malicious customBasePath value containing embedded newlines and a dot-free Python expression. The crafted value is emitted verbatim into a generated 'from ... import ...' statement without identifier validation, causing arbitrary Python code to execute when the generated module is imported.

techjewel Fluent Forms Pro Add On Pack

The Fluent Forms Pro Add On Pack plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to PHP Object Injection in all versions up to, and including, 6.2.6 via deserialization of untrusted input. This makes it possible for authenticated attackers, with Subscriber-level access and above, to inject a PHP Object. The additional presence of a POP chain allows attackers to change user passwords and potentially take over administrator accounts. Note: This can only be exploited if user update integration is enabled and a user meta field is mapped.

zephyrproject zephyr

In Zephyr's userspace dynamic-objects subsystem, thread_idx_alloc() in kernel/userspace/userspace.c allocated a new thread permission index from the global _thread_idx_map[] bitmap without holding lists_lock. On SMP systems, two user-mode threads invoking the k_object_alloc(K_OBJ_THREAD) syscall concurrently can both observe the same low free bit, perform the same non-atomic RMW to clear it, and return the identical tidx. The two newly created K_OBJ_THREAD objects are then assigned the same thread_id, so the two user threads alias a single bit position in every kernel object's perms[] bitfield: any subsequent grant of access on a kernel object to one thread is implicitly a grant to the other, defeating userspace ACL isolation. A secondary lost-update window between the unlocked &=~BIT() in alloc and the locked |= BIT() in thread_idx_free() can also leak entries from the thread-index pool. The defect is reachable from any user-mode thread via the unrestricted __syscall k_object_alloc and is gated on CONFIG_USERSPACE, CONFIG_DYNAMIC_OBJECTS, and CONFIG_SMP. The flaw was introduced when the per-thread permission index was added in 2018 and is present in every release up to and including v4.4.0. Fixed by holding lists_lock across the bitmap RMW and the permissions clear (and inlining the obj_list traversal that previously took the lock itself).

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qat - remove unused character device and IOCTLs The QAT driver exposes a character device (qat_adf_ctl) with IOCTLs for device configuration, start, stop, status query and enumeration. These IOCTLs are not part of any public uAPI header and have no known in-tree or out-of-tree users. Device lifecycle is already managed via sysfs. The ioctl interface also increases the attack surface and is the subject of a number of bug reports. Remove the character device, the IOCTL definitions, and the related data structures (adf_dev_status_info, adf_user_cfg_key_val, adf_user_cfg_section, adf_user_cfg_ctl_data). Drop the now-unused adf_cfg_user.h header and strip adf_ctl_drv.c down to the minimal module_init/module_exit hooks for workqueue, AER, and crypto/compression algorithm registration. Clean up leftover dead code that was only reachable from the removed IOCTL paths: adf_cfg_del_all(), adf_devmgr_verify_id(), adf_devmgr_get_num_dev(), adf_devmgr_get_dev_by_id(), adf_get_vf_real_id() and the unused ADF_CFG macros. Additionally, drop the entry associated to QAT IOCTLs in ioctl-number.rst.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/hyperv: validate resolution_count and fix WIN8 fallback A SYNTHVID_RESOLUTION_RESPONSE with resolution_count > 64 walks past the supported_resolution[SYNTHVID_MAX_RESOLUTION_COUNT] array in the parse loop. Bound resolution_count against the array size, folded into the existing zero-check. When the WIN10 resolution probe fails, the caller in hyperv_connect_vsp() left hv->screen_*_max / preferred_* unpopulated, which sets mode_config.max_width / max_height to 0 and makes drm_internal_framebuffer_create() reject every userspace framebuffer with -EINVAL. The pre-WIN10 branch had the same gap for preferred_width / preferred_height. Use a single post-probe fallback guarded by screen_width_max == 0 so both paths converge on the WIN8 defaults.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/mlx5e: Fix eswitch mode block underflow on IPsec acquire SA mlx5e_xfrm_add_state() handles acquire-flow temporary SAs by allocating software state and skipping hardware offload setup. That path jumps to the common success label before taking the eswitch mode block. After tunnel-mode validation was moved earlier, the common success label unconditionally calls mlx5_eswitch_unblock_mode(). For acquire SAs, this decrements esw->offloads.num_block_mode without a matching increment. Return directly after installing the acquire SA offload handle, so only the paths that successfully called mlx5_eswitch_block_mode() call the matching unblock.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: firmware: arm_ffa: Bound PARTITION_INFO_GET_REGS copies The register-based PARTITION_INFO_GET path trusted the firmware-provided indices when copying partition descriptors into the caller buffer. Reject inconsistent counts or index progressions so the copy loop cannot write past the allocated array. (fixed cur_idx when exactly one descriptor in the first fragment)

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/vce1: Fix VCE 1 firmware size and offsets The VCPU BO contains the actual FW at an offset, but it was not calculated into the VCPU BO size. Subtract this from the FW size to make sure there is no out of bounds access. Make sure the stack and data offsets are aligned to the 32K TLB size. Check that the FW microcode actually fits in the space that is reserved for it. (cherry picked from commit c16fe59f622a080fc457a57b3e8f14c780699449)

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wifi: mac80211: fix MLE defragmentation If either reconf or EPCS multi-link element (MLE) is contained in a non-transmitted profile, the defragmentation routine is called with a pointer to the defragmented copy, but the original elements. This is incorrect for two reasons: - if the original defragmentation was needed, it will not find the correct data - if the original frame is at a higher address, the parsing will potentially overrun the heap data (though given the layout of the buffers, only into the new defragmentation buffer, and then it has to stop and fail once that's filled with copied data. Fix it by tracking the container along with the pointer and in doing so also unify the two almost identical defragmentation routines.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ACPI: NFIT: core: Fix acpi_nfit_init() error cleanup If acpi_nfit_init() fails after adding the acpi_desc object to the acpi_descs list, that object is never removed from that list because the acpi_nfit_shutdown() devm action is not added for the NFIT device in that case. Next, the acpi_nfit_init() failure causes acpi_nfit_probe() to fail, the acpi_desc object is freed, and a dangling pointer is left behind in the acpi_descs. Any subsequent ACPI Machine Check Exception will trigger nfit_handle_mce() which iterates over acpi_descs and so a use-after-free will occur. Moreover, if acpi_nfit_probe() returns 0 after installing a notify handler for the NFIT device and without allocating the acpi_desc object and setting the NFIT device's driver data pointer, the acpi_desc object will be allocated by acpi_nfit_update_notify() and acpi_nfit_init() will be called to initialize it. Regardless of whether or not acpi_nfit_init() fails in that case, the acpi_nfit_shutdown() devm action is not added for the NFIT device and acpi_desc is never removed from the acpi_descs list. If the acpi_desc object is freed subsequently on driver removal, any subsequent ACPI MCE will lead to a use-after-free like in the previous case. To address the first issue mentioned above, make acpi_nfit_probe() call acpi_nfit_shutdown() directly on acpi_nfit_init() failures and to address the other one, add a remove callback to the driver and make it call acpi_nfit_shutdown(). Also, since it is now possible to pass NULL to acpi_nfit_shutdown() or the acpi_desc object passed to it may not have been initialized, add checks against NULL for acpi_desc and its nvdimm_bus field to that function and make acpi_nfit_unregister() clear the latter after unregistering the NVDIMM bus.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: fix clear_pending_event for registerless devices ad_sigma_delta_clear_pending_event() falls through to the status register read path for devices with has_registers = false and no rdy_gpiod. For such devices, ad_sd_read_reg() skips the address byte entirely and clocks raw MISO bytes with no address phase — making it byte-for-byte identical to reading conversion data. If a pending conversion result is present, this partially consumes it and corrupts the data stream for the subsequent ad_sd_read_reg() call in ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(). Furthermore, with num_resetclks = 0 on these devices, data_read_len evaluates to 0. If the clocked byte has bit 7 clear, pending_event is set and the code attempts memset(data + 2, 0xff, 0 - 1), overflowing to SIZE_MAX and corrupting the heap. Fix by returning 0 immediately when neither rdy_gpiod nor has_registers is set. This is safe for all current registerless devices: ad7191 and ad7780 (with powerdown GPIO) are reset between conversions by CS deassertion, so there is no stale result to drain; ad7780 (without powerdown GPIO) and max11205 are continuously-converting and cycle ~DRDY at the output data rate regardless of whether the previous result was read, so the next falling edge fires naturally. A future registerless device that holds ~DRDY asserted until data is read would be broken by this early return and would require either num_resetclks set or a rdy-gpio. The same heap corruption is reachable on any device with rdy_gpiod set but num_resetclks = 0: if the GPIO indicates a pending event, the drain path executes memset(data + 2, 0xff, 0 - 1) regardless of has_registers. Add an explicit data_read_len == 0 guard after the pending event check; the stale result is then consumed by the first ad_sd_read_reg() call in ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion().

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: adc: ad_sigma_delta: fix CS held asserted and state leaks In ad_sigma_delta_single_conversion(), set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_IDLE) and disable_one() were called from the out: block while keep_cs_asserted was still true. This caused any SPI transfer issued by those callbacks to carry cs_change=1, leaving CS permanently asserted after the conversion. Fix by moving both calls into the out_unlock: block, after keep_cs_asserted is cleared, matching the pattern already used in ad_sd_calibrate(). In the error path of ad_sd_buffer_postenable(), if an operation fails after set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_CONTINUOUS) has already succeeded (e.g. spi_offload_trigger_enable()), the device is left in continuous conversion mode with CS physically asserted. Additionally, bus_locked remaining true after spi_bus_unlock() causes subsequent SPI operations to call spi_sync_locked() without the bus lock actually held, allowing concurrent SPI access. Fix the error path by clearing keep_cs_asserted first, then calling set_mode(AD_SD_MODE_IDLE) to revert the device mode and deassert CS, then clearing bus_locked before releasing the bus. For devices that implement neither set_mode nor disable_one (such as MAX11205, which has no physical CS pin), no SPI transfer is issued during cleanup and the cs_change flag has no effect on any physical line.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iio: event: Fix event FIFO reset race `iio_event_getfd()` creates the event file descriptor with `anon_inode_getfd()`, which allocates a new fd, creates the anonymous file and installs it in the process fd table before returning to the caller. The IIO code resets the event FIFO after `anon_inode_getfd()` has returned, but before `IIO_GET_EVENT_FD_IOCTL` has copied the fd number to userspace. But since fd tables are shared between threads, another thread can guess the newly allocated fd number and issue a `read()` on it as soon as the fd has been installed. This means the `kfifo_to_user()` in `iio_event_chrdev_read()` can run in parallel with the `kfifo_reset_out()` in `iio_event_getfd()`. The kfifo documentation says that `kfifo_reset_out()` is only safe when it is called from the reader thread and there is only one concurrent reader. Otherwise it is dangerous and must be handled in the same way as `kfifo_reset()`. If that happens, `kfifo_to_user()` can advance the FIFO `out` index based on state from before the reset, after the reset has already moved the `out` index to the current `in` index. That can leave the FIFO with an `out` index past the `in` index. A later `read()` can then see an underflowed FIFO length and copy more data than the event FIFO buffer contains. This can result in an out-of-bounds read and leak adjacent kernel memory to userspace. Move the FIFO reset before `anon_inode_getfd()`. At that point the event fd is marked busy, but the new fd has not been installed yet, so userspace cannot access it while the FIFO is reset.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: virtio: Validate control metadata from the device virtio-snd control handling trusts the device-provided control type and value count returned by the device. That metadata is then used directly to index g_v2a_type_map[] in virtsnd_kctl_info(), and to size loops and memcpy() operations in virtsnd_kctl_get() and virtsnd_kctl_put() against fixed-size virtio_snd_ctl_value and snd_ctl_elem_value arrays. A buggy or malicious device can therefore trigger out-of-bounds access by advertising an invalid control type or an oversized value count. Validate control type and count once in virtsnd_kctl_parse_cfg(), before querying enumerated items or exposing the control to ALSA.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: compress: Fix task creation error unwind snd_compr_task_new() allocates the driver task before validating the returned DMA buffers and reserving file descriptors. When either of those later steps fails, the core frees its task wrapper and DMA-buffer references without calling the driver's task_free() callback. Any driver resources allocated by task_create() are therefore leaked. The dual-fd allocation path also jumps to cleanup without storing the negative get_unused_fd_flags() result in retval. Since retval still contains the successful task_create() return value, TASK_CREATE can incorrectly report success although the task was discarded. Preserve the fd allocation errors and call task_free() when failure occurs after a successful task_create() callback.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: hda/cs35l41: Fix firmware load work teardown cs35l41_hda creates ALSA controls whose private data points at the cs35l41_hda object. The firmware load control can also queue fw_load_work. Those controls are not removed on component unbind, and device remove only cancels fw_load_work through cs35l41_remove_dsp(). That helper is skipped when halo_initialized is false. With firmware_autostart disabled, a firmware load can be requested before the DSP has been initialized. If the component or device is removed before the queued work runs, the worker can run after teardown and dereference driver state that is no longer valid. Track the created controls and remove them on unbind so no new control callback can reach the driver data or queue more work. Then cancel fw_load_work to drain any request that was already queued. Also cancel the work unconditionally during device remove before runtime PM teardown.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vfio/pci: Release the VGA arbiter client on register_device() failure The re-order in the Fixes commit below displaced vfio_pci_vga_init() as the last failure point of what is now vfio_pci_core_register_device() without introducing an unwind for the VGA arbiter registration. In current kernels this is mostly benign because vfio_pci_set_decode() only uses pci_dev state, but the original failure path could leave a callback with a freed vdev cookie. The stale registration also becomes unsafe again once the callback follows drvdata to the vfio device. Add the required VGA unwind callout.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binder: fix UAF in binder_thread_release() When a thread exits, binder_thread_release() walks its transaction stack to clear the t->from and t->to_proc that correspond with the exiting thread. However, a process dying in parallel might attempt to kfree some of these transactions. And if one of them has no associated t->to_proc, the t->to_proc->inner_lock will not be acquired. This means that transaction accesses in binder_thread_release() after t->to_proc has been cleared might race with binder_free_transaction() and cause a use-after-free error as reported by KASAN: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798 Write of size 8 at addr ffff000016627500 by task X/715 CPU: 17 UID: 0 PID: 715 Comm: X Not tainted 7.1.0-rc5-00149-g8fde5d1d47f6 #30 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: binder_thread_release+0x5d0/0x798 binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x299c [...] Allocated by task 717 on cpu 18 at 67.267803s: __kasan_kmalloc+0xa0/0xbc __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444 binder_transaction+0x554/0x8150 binder_thread_write+0xa30/0x4354 binder_ioctl+0x20f0/0x299c [...] Freed by task 202 on cpu 18 at 90.416221s: __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80 kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4 binder_free_transaction+0x150/0x294 binder_send_failed_reply+0x398/0x6d8 binder_release_work+0x3e4/0x4ec binder_deferred_func+0xbd8/0x104c [...] ================================================================== In order to avoid this, make sure that binder_free_transaction() reads the t->to_proc under the transaction lock. This will serialize the transaction release with the accesses in binder_thread_release(). Plus, it matches the documented locking rules for @to_proc.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: binder: fix UAF in binder_free_transaction() In binder_free_transaction(), the t->to_proc is read under the t->lock. However, once the t->lock is dropped, the to_proc can die in parallel. This leads to a use-after-free error when we attempt to acquire its inner lock right afterwards: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0 Write of size 4 at addr ffff00001125da70 by task B/672 CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 672 Comm: B Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-00284-g8e65320d91cd #4 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Call trace: _raw_spin_lock+0xe4/0x1a0 binder_free_transaction+0x8c/0x320 binder_send_failed_reply+0x21c/0x2f8 binder_thread_release+0x488/0x7e0 binder_ioctl+0x12c0/0x29a0 [...] Allocated by task 675: __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x174/0x444 binder_open+0x118/0xb70 do_dentry_open+0x374/0x1040 vfs_open+0x58/0x3bc [...] Freed by task 212: __kasan_slab_free+0x58/0x80 kfree+0x1a0/0x4a4 binder_proc_dec_tmpref+0x32c/0x5e0 binder_deferred_func+0xc48/0x104c process_one_work+0x53c/0xbc0 [...] ================================================================== To prevent this, pin the target thread (t->to_thread) to guarantee the target process remains alive. Undelivered transactions without a target thread are already safe, as the target process can only be the current context in those paths.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rust_binder: use a u64 stride when cleaning up the offsets array Allocation's Drop walks the offsets array (binder_size_t = u64 entries), cleaning up the objects, but it used usize instead of u64 for both the stride and the per-entry read. On 64-bit kernels (usize == u64) this is harmless, but on 32-bit kernels it walks the 8-byte entries in 4-byte steps, iterating an N-entry array 2N times, and reads the always-zero high word as offset 0, cleaning up the object at offset 0 N extra times. As a result the referenced node or handle ends up with a lower reference count than it actually has (a refcount over-decrement), and binder's reference accounting is corrupted; for example, the owner can be notified of a strong reference release (BR_RELEASE) even though references still remain. Change the stride to u64, and read each entry as a u64, narrowing it to usize with try_into(). On 32-bit ARM, when this over-decrement would drive a count below zero, the driver's existing refcount guard refuses it and fires: rust_binder: Failure: refcount underflow!

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpci_rt1711h: unregister TCPCI port with devres rt1711h_probe() registers the TCPCI port before requesting the interrupt and enabling alert interrupts. If either of those later steps fails, the probe function returns without unregistering the TCPCI port. The explicit unregister currently only happens from the remove callback. Register a devres action immediately after tcpci_register_port() succeeds, so tcpci_unregister_port() runs on later probe failures and on driver detach. Drop the remove callback to avoid unregistering the same port twice. This issue was identified during our ongoing static-analysis research while reviewing kernel code.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: PCI/IOV: Skip VF Resizable BAR restore on read error sriov_restore_vf_rebar_state() uses the VF Resizable BAR Control register to decide how many VF BARs to restore (nbars) and which VF BAR each iteration addresses (bar_idx). bar_idx indexes into dev->sriov->barsz[], which has only PCI_SRIOV_NUM_BARS (6) entries. When a device does not respond, config reads typically return PCI_ERROR_RESPONSE (~0). Both fields are 3 bits wide, so nbars and bar_idx both evaluate to 7. The barsz[] access then goes out of bounds. UBSAN reports this as: UBSAN: array-index-out-of-bounds in drivers/pci/iov.c:948:51 index 7 is out of range for type 'resource_size_t [6]' Observed on an NVIDIA RTX PRO 1000 GPU (GB207GLM) that stopped responding during a failed GC6 power state exit. The subsequent pci_restore_state() invoked sriov_restore_vf_rebar_state() while config reads returned 0xffffffff, triggering the splat. Bail out if any VF Resizable BAR Control read returns PCI_ERROR_RESPONSE. No further VF BARs are touched, which is safe because a config read that returns PCI_ERROR_RESPONSE indicates the device is unreachable and restoration is pointless. This mirrors the guard in pci_restore_rebar_state().

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwrng: virtio: clamp device-reported used.len at copy_data() random_recv_done() stores the device-reported used.len directly into vi->data_avail. copy_data() then indexes vi->data[] using vi->data_idx (advanced by previous copy_data() calls) and issues a memcpy() without re-validating either value against the posted buffer size sizeof(vi->data) (SMP_CACHE_BYTES bytes, typically 32 or 64). A malicious or buggy virtio-rng backend can set used.len beyond sizeof(vi->data), steering the memcpy() past the end of the inline array into adjacent kmalloc-1k slab bytes. hwrng_fillfn() mixes those bytes into the guest RNG, and guest root can also observe them directly via /dev/hwrng. Concrete impact is inside the guest: - Memory-safety / hardening: any virtio-rng backend that over-reports used.len causes the driver to read past vi->data into unrelated slab contents. hwrng_fillfn() is a kernel thread that runs as soon as the device is probed; no guest userspace interaction is required to first-trigger the OOB. - Cross-boundary leak (confidential-compute threat model): a malicious hypervisor cooperating with a malicious or compromised guest root userspace can use /dev/hwrng as a leak channel for guest-kernel heap data. The host sets a large used.len, guest root reads /dev/hwrng, and the returned bytes contain guest kernel slab contents that were adjacent to vi->data. In practice, confidential-compute guests (SEV-SNP, TDX) usually disable virtio-rng entirely, so this path is narrow, but the fix is still worth carrying because the underlying memory-safety bug contaminates the guest RNG on any host. KASAN confirms the OOB on a 7.1-rc4 guest whose virtio-rng backend has been patched to report used.len = 0x10000: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 Read of size 64 at addr ffff88800ae0ba20 by task hwrng/52 Call Trace: __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 virtio_read+0x394/0x5d0 hwrng_fillfn+0xb2/0x470 kthread+0x2cc/0x3a0 Allocated by task 1: probe_common+0xa5/0x660 virtio_dev_probe+0x549/0xbc0 The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff88800ae0b800 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-1k of size 1024 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 544-byte region [ffff88800ae0b800, ffff88800ae0ba20) Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened usb9pfs_rx_complete() against unchecked device-reported length in the USB 9p transport. With the clamp at point of use and array_index_nospec() in place, the same harness boots cleanly: copy_data() returns zero for the bogus report, the device-supplied bytes after data_idx are discarded, and the driver issues a fresh request.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: misc: usbio: fix disconnect UAF in client teardown usbio_disconnect() walks usbio->cli_list in reverse and uninitializes each auxiliary device. auxiliary_device_uninit() drops the device reference, and for an unbound child that can run usbio_auxdev_release() and free the containing struct usbio_client. list_for_each_entry_reverse() advances after the loop body by reading client->link.prev. If the current client is freed by auxiliary_device_uninit(), the iterator dereferences freed memory. Use list_for_each_entry_safe_reverse() so the previous client is cached before the body can drop the final reference. This preserves reverse teardown order while keeping the next iterator cursor independent of the current client's lifetime. Validation reproduced this kernel report: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x66/0xa0 print_report+0xce/0x630 ? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x188/0x320 ? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 kasan_report+0xe0/0x110 ? usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 usbio_disconnect+0x12e/0x150 usb_unbind_interface+0xf3/0x400 really_probe+0x316/0x660 __driver_probe_device+0x106/0x240 driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x110 __device_attach_driver+0xf1/0x1a0 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 bus_for_each_drv+0xf9/0x160 ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 __device_attach+0x133/0x2a0 ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 device_initial_probe+0x55/0x70 bus_probe_device+0x4a/0xd0 device_add+0x9b9/0xc10 ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xea/0x1a0 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? usb_enable_lpm+0x3c/0x260 usb_set_configuration+0xb64/0xf20 usb_generic_driver_probe+0x5f/0x90 usb_probe_device+0x71/0x1b0 really_probe+0x46b/0x660 __driver_probe_device+0x106/0x240 driver_probe_device+0x4a/0x110 __device_attach_driver+0xf1/0x1a0 ? __pfx___device_attach_driver+0x10/0x10 bus_for_each_drv+0xf9/0x160 ? __pfx_bus_for_each_drv+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x18/0x130 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x44/0x60 __device_attach+0x133/0x2a0 ? __pfx___device_attach+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? do_raw_spin_unlock+0x9a/0x100 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 device_initial_probe+0x55/0x70 bus_probe_device+0x4a/0xd0 device_add+0x9b9/0xc10 ? __pfx_device_add+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? add_device_randomness+0xb7/0xf0 usb_new_device+0x492/0x870 hub_event+0x1b10/0x29c0 ? __pfx_hub_event+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lock_acquire+0x187/0x300 ? process_one_work+0x475/0xb90 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? lock_release+0xc8/0x290 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 process_one_work+0x4d7/0xb90 ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __list_add_valid_or_report+0x37/0xf0 ? __pfx_hub_event+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 worker_thread+0x2d8/0x570 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x1ad/0x1f0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x3c9/0x540 ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5 ? __switch_to+0x2e9/0x730 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK>

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: 6lowpan: fix NHC entry use-after-free on error path lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression() looks up an NHC descriptor while holding lowpan_nhc_lock. If the descriptor has no uncompress callback, the error path drops the lock before printing nhc->name. lowpan_nhc_del() removes descriptors under the same lock and then relies on synchronize_net() before the owning module can be unloaded. That only waits for net RX RCU readers. lowpan_header_decompress() is also exported and can be reached from callers that are not necessarily covered by the net core RX critical section, for example the Bluetooth 6LoWPAN L2CAP receive path. This leaves a race where one task drops lowpan_nhc_lock in the error path, another task unregisters and frees the matching descriptor after synchronize_net() returns, and the first task then dereferences nhc->name for the warning. With the post-unlock window widened, KASAN reports: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression+0x1f4/0x220 Read of size 8 lowpan_nhc_do_uncompression lowpan_header_decompress Fix this by printing the warning before dropping lowpan_nhc_lock, so the descriptor name is read while unregister is still excluded. The malformed packet is still rejected with -ENOTSUPP.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: vme_user: bound slave read/write to the kern_buf size The SLAVE-path helpers buffer_to_user() and buffer_from_user() copy 'count' bytes into/out of the fixed-size kern_buf (size_buf == PCI_BUF_SIZE == 0x20000, 128 KiB) using *ppos as the offset, without bounding *ppos + count against size_buf. vme_user_write()/vme_user_read() only clamp count to the VME window size (image_size = vme_get_size(resource)), which VME_SET_SLAVE sets from the user-supplied slave.size -- validated against the VME address space (up to VME_A32_MAX = 4 GiB), not against PCI_BUF_SIZE. When the window exceeds 128 KiB, a write()/read() copies past the kern_buf allocation. Clamp count against size_buf in both helpers, with an early return when *ppos is already at/after the buffer end. *ppos is >= 0 here (the caller rejects negative offsets), so size_buf - *ppos cannot wrap. This mirrors the existing clamp in the MASTER-path helpers resource_to_user() / resource_from_user(), and matches the read()/write() convention of a short transfer at end-of-buffer. Found by static analysis (CodeQL taint tracking + CBMC bounded model checking) and confirmed dynamically under KASAN with the vme_fake bridge: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80 Write of size 262144 at addr ffff888004100000 by task trigger/68 _copy_from_user+0x2d/0x80 vme_user_write+0x13e/0x240 [vme_user] vfs_write+0x1b8/0x7a0 ksys_write+0xb8/0x150

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: restrict implied bcc[0] exemption to responses without data area smb2_check_message() has a long-standing quirk that accepts a response whose calculated length is one byte larger than the bytes actually received ("server can return one byte more due to implied bcc[0]"). This was introduced to accommodate servers that omit the trailing bcc[0] overlap byte when no data area is present. However, the exemption is applied unconditionally, regardless of whether the command actually carries a data area (has_smb2_data_area[]). When a response with a data area is subject to the +1 exemption, the reported data can extend one byte beyond the bytes actually received, yet smb2_check_message() still accepts it. The subsequent decoder then reads past the end of the receive buffer. This is reachable during NEGOTIATE and SESSION_SETUP, before the session is established. The resulting out-of-bounds reads are visible under KASAN when mounting against a non-conforming server; both the SPNEGO/negTokenInit and the NTLMSSP challenge decoders are affected: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in asn1_ber_decoder+0x16a7/0x1b00 Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880084d67c0 by task mount.cifs/81 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 81 Comm: mount.cifs Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6 #1 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 print_report+0x157/0x4c9 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 asn1_ber_decoder+0x16a7/0x1b00 decode_negTokenInit+0x19/0x30 SMB2_negotiate+0x31d9/0x4c90 cifs_negotiate_protocol+0x1f2/0x3f0 cifs_get_smb_ses+0x93f/0x17e0 cifs_mount_get_session+0x7f/0x3a0 cifs_mount+0xb4/0xcf0 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x23a/0x1500 smb3_get_tree+0x3b0/0x630 vfs_get_tree+0x82/0x2d0 fc_mount+0x10/0x1b0 path_mount+0x50d/0x1de0 __x64_sys_mount+0x20b/0x270 do_syscall_64+0xee/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Allocated by task 85: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x106/0x380 mempool_alloc_noprof+0x116/0x1e0 cifs_small_buf_get+0x31/0x80 allocate_buffers+0x10d/0x2b0 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x1d5/0x1d50 kthread+0x2c6/0x390 ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 448-byte region [ffff8880084d6600, ffff8880084d67c0) which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448 BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x36/0x50 Read of size 329 at addr ffff88800726c678 by task mount.cifs/89 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 89 Comm: mount.cifs Tainted: G B 7.1.0-rc6 #1 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x4e/0x70 print_report+0x157/0x4c9 kasan_report+0xce/0x100 kasan_check_range+0x10f/0x1e0 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_noprof+0x36/0x50 decode_ntlmssp_challenge+0x457/0x680 SMB2_sess_auth_rawntlmssp_negotiate+0x6f0/0xcb0 SMB2_sess_setup+0x219/0x4f0 cifs_setup_session+0x248/0xaf0 cifs_get_smb_ses+0xf79/0x17e0 cifs_mount_get_session+0x7f/0x3a0 cifs_mount+0xb4/0xcf0 cifs_smb3_do_mount+0x23a/0x1500 smb3_get_tree+0x3b0/0x630 vfs_get_tree+0x82/0x2d0 fc_mount+0x10/0x1b0 path_mount+0x50d/0x1de0 __x64_sys_mount+0x20b/0x270 do_syscall_64+0xee/0x590 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Allocated by task 93: kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x106/0x380 mempool_alloc_noprof+0x116/0x1e0 cifs_small_buf_get+0x31/0x80 allocate_buffers+0x10d/0x2b0 cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x1d5/0x1d50 kthread+0x2c6/0x390 ret_from_fork+0x36e/0x5a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 The buggy address is located 120 bytes inside of allocated 448-byte region [ffff88800726c600, ffff88800726c7c0) which belongs to the cache cifs_small_rq of size 448 Restrict the +1 exemption to responses that have no data area, so that it still covers the bcc[0] omission it was meant for. When a data area is present, the +1 discrepancy instead means the reported data length overruns the ---truncated---

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: media: ipu7: fix double-free and use-after-free in error paths In both ipu7_isys_init() and ipu7_psys_init(), pdata is allocated and then passed to ipu7_bus_initialize_device(), which stores it in adev->pdata. The ipu7_bus_release() function frees adev->pdata when the device's reference count drops to zero. Two error paths incorrectly call kfree(pdata) after the device teardown has already freed it: 1. When ipu7_mmu_init() fails: put_device() is called, which drops the reference count to zero and triggers ipu7_bus_release() -> kfree(pdata). The subsequent kfree(pdata) is a double-free. 2. When ipu7_bus_add_device() fails: it calls auxiliary_device_uninit() internally, which calls put_device() -> ipu7_bus_release() -> kfree(pdata). The subsequent kfree(pdata) is again a double-free. Note that the kfree(pdata) when ipu7_bus_initialize_device() itself fails is correct, because in that case auxiliary_device_init() failed and the release function was never set up, so pdata must be freed manually. Additionally, the error code was not saved before calling put_device(), causing ERR_CAST() to dereference the already-freed adev pointer when constructing the return value. Fix this by saving the error from dev_err_probe() before put_device() and returning ERR_PTR() instead. Remove the redundant kfree(pdata) calls and fix the use-after-free in the return values of the two affected error paths.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie() supplicant_ie is a 256-byte array in struct security_priv. The WPA and WPA2 IE copy paths use: memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie, &pwpa[0], wpa_ielen + 2); where wpa_ielen is the raw IE length field (u8, 0-255). When a local user supplies a connect request via nl80211 with a crafted WPA IE of length 255, wpa_ielen + 2 equals 257, overflowing the 256-byte buffer by one byte into the adjacent last_mic_err_time field. rtw_parse_wpa_ie() does not prevent this: its length consistency check compares *(wpa_ie+1) against (u8)(wpa_ie_len-2), which is (u8)(255) == 255 when wpa_ie_len = 257, so the check passes silently. Add explicit bounds checks for both the WPA and WPA2 paths before the memcpy, rejecting any IE whose total size (wpa_ielen + 2) exceeds the supplicant_ie buffer.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix WEP length underflow and OOB read in OnAuth() OnAuth() has two bugs in the shared-key authentication path. When the Privacy bit is set, rtw_wep_decrypt() is called without verifying that the frame is long enough to contain a valid WEP IV and ICV. Inside rtw_wep_decrypt(), length is computed as: length = len - WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN - iv_len and then passed as (length - 4) to crc32_le(). If len is less than WLAN_HDR_A3_LEN + iv_len + icv_len (32 bytes), length - 4 is negative and, after the implicit cast to size_t, causes crc32_le() to read far beyond the frame buffer. Add a minimum length check before accessing the IV field and calling the decryption path. When processing a seq=3 response, rtw_get_ie() stores the Challenge Text IE length in ie_len, but the subsequent memcmp() always reads 128 bytes regardless of ie_len. IEEE 802.11 mandates a challenge text of exactly 128 bytes; reject any IE whose length field differs, matching the check already applied to OnAuthClient().

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in OnAssocRsp() IE loop The IE parsing loop in OnAssocRsp() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < pkt_len. When a malicious AP sends an AssocResponse whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at pkt_len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from pframe[pkt_len], which is one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond pkt_len, silently passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past pkt_len.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB read in update_beacon_info() IE loop The IE parsing loop in update_beacon_info() advances by (pIE->length + 2) each iteration but only guards on i < len. When a malicious AP sends a Beacon whose last IE has only one byte remaining in the frame (the element_id byte lands at len-1), the loop reads pIE->length from one byte past the allocated receive buffer. Additionally, even when the header bytes are in bounds, pIE->length itself can extend the data window beyond len, passing a truncated IE to the handler functions. Add two guards at the top of the loop body: 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain (can't read header). 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past len. Also replace i += (pIE->length + 2) with i += sizeof(*pIE) + pIE->length for consistency with the sizeof(*pIE) guards added above.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in IE loops in issue_assocreq() and join_cmd_hdl() Two IE parsing loops are missing the header bounds checks before they dereference pIE->length: - issue_assocreq() walks pmlmeinfo->network.ies to build the association request. If the stored IE data ends with only an element_id byte and no length byte, pIE->length is read one byte past the end of the buffer. - join_cmd_hdl() walks pnetwork->ies during station join and has the same problem under the same conditions. Both buffers are filled from AP beacon and probe-response frames, so a malicious AP that sends a truncated final IE can trigger the issue. Apply the two-guard pattern established in update_beacon_info(): 1. Break if fewer than sizeof(*pIE) bytes remain. 2. Break if the IE's declared data extends past the buffer end.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_sec_ie(), rtw_get_wapi_ie(), and rtw_get_wps_attr() Three IE/attribute parsing functions have missing bounds checks. rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wapi_ie() iterate over a raw IE buffer without verifying that the header bytes (tag + length) are within the remaining buffer before reading them. Additionally, rtw_get_sec_ie() compares the 4-byte WPA OUI at cnt+2 without checking that at least 6 bytes remain, and rtw_get_wapi_ie() compares a 4-byte WAPI OUI at cnt+6 without checking that at least 10 bytes remain. rtw_get_wps_attr() reads wps_ie[0] and wps_ie+2 unconditionally at entry, before verifying that wps_ielen is large enough to contain the 6-byte WPS IE header (element_id + length + 4-byte OUI). Inside the attribute loop, get_unaligned_be16() is called on attr_ptr and attr_ptr+2 without checking that 4 bytes remain in the buffer. Add a cnt+2 bounds check before each loop body in rtw_get_sec_ie() and rtw_get_wapi_ie(), guard each multi-byte comparison with a minimum IE length requirement, add a wps_ielen < 6 early return in rtw_get_wps_attr(), and add a 4-byte bounds check in its inner loop.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB write in HT_caps_handler() HT_caps_handler() iterates pIE->length bytes and writes into HT_caps.u.HT_cap[], which is a fixed 26-byte array (sizeof struct HT_caps_element). Because pIE->length is a raw u8 from an over-the-air 802.11 AssocResponse frame and is never validated, a malicious AP can set it up to 255, causing up to 229 bytes of out-of-bounds writes into adjacent fields of struct mlme_ext_info. Truncate the iteration count to the size of HT_caps.u.HT_cap using umin() so that data from a longer-than-expected IE is silently ignored rather than written out of bounds, preserving interoperability with APs that pad the element. An early return on oversized IEs was considered but rejected: it would bypass the pmlmeinfo->HT_caps_enable = 1 assignment that precedes the loop, silently disabling HT mode for APs that append extra bytes to the HT Capabilities IE.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qat - fix VF2PF work teardown race in adf_disable_sriov() The VF2PF interrupt handler queues PF-side response work that stores a raw pointer to per-VF state (struct adf_accel_vf_info). Currently, adf_disable_sriov() destroys per-VF mutexes and frees vf_info without stopping new VF2PF work or waiting for in-flight workers to complete. A concurrently scheduled or already queued worker can then dereference freed memory. This manifests as a use-after-free when KASAN is enabled: BUG: KASAN: null-ptr-deref in mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0 Write of size 8 at addr 0000000000000260 by task kworker/24:2/... Workqueue: qat_pf2vf_resp_wq adf_iov_send_resp [intel_qat] Call Trace: kasan_report+0x119/0x140 mutex_lock+0x76/0xe0 adf_gen4_pfvf_send+0xd4/0x1f0 [intel_qat] adf_recv_and_handle_vf2pf_msg+0x290/0x360 [intel_qat] adf_iov_send_resp+0x8c/0xe0 [intel_qat] process_one_work+0x6ac/0xfd0 worker_thread+0x4dd/0xd30 kthread+0x326/0x410 ret_from_fork+0x33b/0x670 Add a PF-local flag, vf2pf_disabled, that gates work queueing, worker processing, and interrupt re-enabling during teardown. Set this flag atomically with the hardware interrupt mask inside adf_disable_all_vf2pf_interrupts(). After masking, synchronize the AE cluster MSI-X interrupt and flush the PF response workqueue before tearing down per-VF locks and state so all in-flight work completes before vf_info is destroyed. Introduce adf_enable_all_vf2pf_interrupts() to clear the flag and unmask all VF2PF interrupts under the same lock when SR-IOV is re-enabled. This ensures the software flag and hardware state transition atomically on both the enable and disable paths.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on SMB2_CLOSE then SMB2_CANCEL Commit f580d27e8928 ("ksmbd: fix use-after-free of a deferred file_lock on double SMB2_CANCEL") made smb2_cancel() skip a work whose state is KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED, so its cancel_fn cannot be fired a second time. But KSMBD_WORK has three states (ACTIVE, CANCELLED, CLOSED), and the same freeing producer path is reached for CLOSED too: SMB2_CLOSE on the locking handle -> set_close_state_blocked_works() sets the deferred work's state to KSMBD_WORK_CLOSED and wakes the smb2_lock() worker. The worker takes the non-ACTIVE early-exit, locks_free_lock()s the file_lock and, because the state is not KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED, takes the STATUS_RANGE_NOT_LOCKED branch with "goto out2" -- which, like the cancelled branch, skips release_async_work(). The work stays on conn->async_requests with a live cancel_fn = smb2_remove_blocked_lock pointing at the freed file_lock. A subsequent SMB2_CANCEL for the same AsyncId then passes the KSMBD_WORK_CANCELLED-only guard (its state is KSMBD_WORK_CLOSED), so smb2_cancel() fires cancel_fn again over the freed file_lock -- the same use-after-free fixed, via SMB2_CLOSE instead of a first SMB2_CANCEL: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __locks_delete_block __locks_delete_block locks_delete_block ksmbd_vfs_posix_lock_unblock smb2_remove_blocked_lock smb2_cancel <- 2nd SMB2_CANCEL fires cancel_fn handle_ksmbd_work Allocated by ...: locks_alloc_lock <- smb2_lock Freed by ...: locks_free_lock <- smb2_lock (non-ACTIVE early-exit) ... cache file_lock_cache of size 192 Reproduced on mainline 7.1-rc7 (which already contains f580d27e8928) with KASAN by an authenticated SMB client; the double-SMB2_CANCEL control is silent on that kernel, so the splat is attributable to the CLOSE trigger. Only an ACTIVE deferred work may have its cancel_fn fired: both terminal states (CANCELLED and CLOSED) reach the smb2_lock() early-exit that frees the file_lock and skips release_async_work(). Guard on KSMBD_WORK_ACTIVE so any non-active work is skipped.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: af_key: initialize alg_key_len for IPComp states pfkey_msg2xfrm_state() handles the IPComp (SADB_X_SATYPE_IPCOMP) case by allocating x->calg and copying only the algorithm name: x->calg = kmalloc_obj(*x->calg); if (!x->calg) { err = -ENOMEM; goto out; } strcpy(x->calg->alg_name, a->name); x->props.calgo = sa->sadb_sa_encrypt; Unlike the authentication (x->aalg) and encryption (x->ealg) branches of the same function, the compression branch never initializes calg->alg_key_len. IPComp carries no key and the allocation only reserves sizeof(struct xfrm_algo) (i.e. no room for a key), so the field is left containing uninitialized slab data. calg->alg_key_len is later used as a length by xfrm_algo_clone() when an IPComp state is cloned during XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE: xfrm_state_migrate() xfrm_state_clone_and_setup() x->calg = xfrm_algo_clone(orig->calg); kmemdup(orig, xfrm_alg_len(orig)); where xfrm_alg_len() returns sizeof(*alg) + (alg_key_len + 7) / 8. With a non-zero garbage alg_key_len, kmemdup() reads past the end of the 68-byte calg object. Adding an IPComp SA via PF_KEY and then migrating it triggers (net-next, KASAN, init_on_alloc=0): BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60 Read of size 4164 at addr ff11000025a74980 by task diag2/9287 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 9287 Comm: diag2 7.1.0-rc6-g903db046d557 #1 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x10e/0x1f0 print_report+0xf7/0x600 kasan_report+0xe4/0x120 kasan_check_range+0x105/0x1b0 __asan_memcpy+0x23/0x60 kmemdup_noprof+0x44/0x60 xfrm_state_migrate+0x70a/0x1da0 xfrm_migrate+0x753/0x18a0 xfrm_do_migrate+0xb47/0xf10 xfrm_user_rcv_msg+0x411/0xb50 netlink_rcv_skb+0x158/0x420 xfrm_netlink_rcv+0x71/0x90 netlink_unicast+0x584/0x850 netlink_sendmsg+0x8b0/0xdc0 ____sys_sendmsg+0x9f7/0xb90 ___sys_sendmsg+0x134/0x1d0 __sys_sendmsg+0x16d/0x220 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x7d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f </TASK> Allocated by task 9287: kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60 kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30 __kasan_kmalloc+0xaa/0xb0 pfkey_add+0x2652/0x2ea0 pfkey_process+0x6d0/0x830 pfkey_sendmsg+0x42c/0x850 __sys_sendto+0x461/0x4b0 __x64_sys_sendto+0xe0/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x116/0x7d0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f The buggy address belongs to the object at ff11000025a74980 which belongs to the cache kmalloc-96 of size 96 The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of allocated 68-byte region [ff11000025a74980, ff11000025a749c4) Depending on the uninitialized value the same field can instead request an oversized kmemdup() allocation and make the migration clone fail. The XFRM netlink path is not affected: verify_one_alg() rejects an XFRMA_ALG_COMP attribute shorter than xfrm_alg_len(), so a calg added via XFRM_MSG_NEWSA is always self-consistent. Initialize calg->alg_key_len to 0, matching the aalg/ealg branches.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: audit: Fix data races of skb_queue_len() readers on audit_queue Multiple readers access audit_queue.qlen via skb_queue_len() without holding the queue lock or using READ_ONCE(), while kauditd writes to this field via the skb_dequeue() → __skb_unlink() path with WRITE_ONCE() protected by a spinlock. This constitutes data races. All affected skb_queue_len(&audit_queue) call sites: - kauditd_thread() wait_event_freezable() condition - audit_receive_msg() AUDIT_GET handler (s.backlog assignment) - audit_receive() backlog check - audit_log_start() backlog check and pr_warn() KCSAN reports the following conflicting access pattern (one example): ================================================================== BUG: KCSAN: data-race in audit_log_start / skb_dequeue write (marked) to 0xffffffff8512ee20 of 4 bytes by task 661 on cpu 57: skb_dequeue+0x70/0xf0 kauditd_send_queue+0x71/0x220 kauditd_thread+0x1cb/0x430 kthread+0x1c2/0x210 ret_from_fork+0x162/0x1a0 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 read to 0xffffffff8512ee20 of 4 bytes by task 36586 on cpu 1: audit_log_start+0x2a0/0x6b0 audit_core_dumps+0x64/0xa0 do_coredump+0x14b/0x1260 get_signal+0xeb2/0xf70 arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x41/0x170 exit_to_user_mode_loop+0xa2/0x1c0 do_syscall_64+0x1a3/0x1c0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0xe0 value changed: 0x00000001 -> 0x00000000 ================================================================== Resolve the race by switching to lockless helper skb_queue_len_lockless(), which internally uses READ_ONCE() and properly pairs with the WRITE_ONCE() write accesses already present on the writer side. [PM: line length tweak]

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: Fix UAF in channel timeout by holding conn ref l2cap_chan_timeout() runs asynchronously and accesses chan->conn. If the connection is torn down while the timer is running or pending, chan->conn can be freed, leading to a use-after-free when the timer worker attempts to lock conn->lock: | BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline] | BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline] | BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline] | BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318 | Write of size 8 at addr ffff8881298d9550 by task kworker/2:1/83 | | CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 83 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.1.0-rc6-next-20260601-dirty #6 PREEMPT(full) | Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014 | Workqueue: events l2cap_chan_timeout | Call Trace: | <TASK> | instrument_atomic_read_write include/linux/instrumented.h:112 [inline] | atomic_long_try_cmpxchg_acquire include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:4456 [inline] | __mutex_trylock_fast kernel/locking/mutex.c:161 [inline] | mutex_lock+0x4f/0xa0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:318 | l2cap_chan_timeout+0x5d/0x1b0 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:422 | process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline] | process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409 | worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490 | kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436 | ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 | ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 | </TASK> | | Allocated by task 320: | l2cap_conn_add+0xa7/0x820 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7075 | l2cap_connect_cfm+0xdb/0xd70 net/bluetooth/l2cap_core.c:7452 | hci_connect_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2139 [inline] | hci_remote_features_evt+0x52f/0x9f0 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:3760 | hci_event_func net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7796 [inline] | hci_event_packet+0x561/0xa70 net/bluetooth/hci_event.c:7847 | hci_rx_work+0x370/0x890 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:4040 | process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3326 [inline] | process_scheduled_works+0x7c8/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3409 | worker_thread+0x8a9/0xcf0 kernel/workqueue.c:3490 | kthread+0x346/0x430 kernel/kthread.c:436 | ret_from_fork+0x1a3/0x470 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 | ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245 | | Freed by task 322: | hci_disconn_cfm include/net/bluetooth/hci_core.h:2154 [inline] | hci_conn_hash_flush+0x101/0x1f0 net/bluetooth/hci_conn.c:2736 | hci_dev_close_sync+0x889/0xde0 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:5405 | hci_dev_do_close net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:502 [inline] | hci_unregister_dev+0x1f7/0x370 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2679 | vhci_release+0x12a/0x180 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:690 | __fput+0x369/0x890 fs/file_table.c:510 | task_work_run+0x160/0x1d0 kernel/task_work.c:233 | get_signal+0xf5b/0x1120 kernel/signal.c:2810 | arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x4d/0x600 arch/x86/kernel/signal.c:337 | __exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:64 [inline] | exit_to_user_mode_loop+0x85/0x510 kernel/entry/common.c:98 | do_syscall_64+0x263/0x3d0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:100 | entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f | | The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff8881298d9400 | which belongs to the cache kmalloc-512 of size 512 | The buggy address is located 336 bytes inside of | freed 512-byte region [ffff8881298d9400, ffff8881298d9600) Fix it by having chan->conn hold a reference to l2cap_conn (via l2cap_conn_get) when the channel is added to the connection, and releasing it in the channel destructor. This ensures the l2cap_conn remains alive as long as the channel exists. A new FLAG_DEL channel flag is introduced to indicate that the ch ---truncated---

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: MGMT: Fix UAF of hci_conn_params in add_device_complete add_device_complete() runs from the hci_cmd_sync_work kworker, which holds only hci_req_sync_lock and *not* hci_dev_lock. It calls hci_conn_params_lookup() and then dereferences the returned object (params->flags) without taking hci_dev_lock: params = hci_conn_params_lookup(hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, le_addr_type(cp->addr.type)); ... device_flags_changed(NULL, hdev, &cp->addr.bdaddr, cp->addr.type, hdev->conn_flags, params ? params->flags : 0); hci_conn_params_lookup() walks hdev->le_conn_params and is documented to require hdev->lock. A concurrent MGMT_OP_REMOVE_DEVICE (remove_device()), which does run under hci_dev_lock, can call hci_conn_params_free() to list_del() and kfree() the very object the lookup returned, so the subsequent params->flags read touches freed memory [0]. Hold hci_dev_lock() across the hci_conn_params_lookup() and the read of params->flags (and the matching event emission) so the lookup result cannot be freed by a concurrent remove_device() before it is used, honouring the locking contract of hci_conn_params_lookup(). [0]: (trailing page/memory-state dump trimmed) BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in add_device_complete+0x358/0x3d8 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:7671 Read of size 1 at addr ffff000017ab26c1 by task kworker/u9:8/388 CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 388 Comm: kworker/u9:8 Not tainted 7.0.11 #20 PREEMPT Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT) Workqueue: hci0 hci_cmd_sync_work Call trace: show_stack+0x2c/0x3c arch/arm64/kernel/stacktrace.c:499 (C) __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:94 [inline] dump_stack_lvl+0xb4/0xd4 lib/dump_stack.c:120 print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline] print_report+0x118/0x5d8 mm/kasan/report.c:482 kasan_report+0xb0/0xf4 mm/kasan/report.c:595 __asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x2c mm/kasan/report_generic.c:378 add_device_complete+0x358/0x3d8 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:7671 hci_cmd_sync_work+0x14c/0x240 net/bluetooth/hci_sync.c:334 process_one_work+0x628/0xd38 kernel/workqueue.c:3289 process_scheduled_works kernel/workqueue.c:3372 [inline] worker_thread+0x7a8/0xac0 kernel/workqueue.c:3453 kthread+0x39c/0x444 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:860 Allocated by task 3401: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 mm/kasan/common.c:57 kasan_save_track+0x20/0x3c mm/kasan/common.c:78 kasan_save_alloc_info+0x40/0x54 mm/kasan/generic.c:570 poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:398 [inline] __kasan_kmalloc+0xd4/0xd8 mm/kasan/common.c:415 kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:263 [inline] __kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x1b0/0x458 mm/slub.c:5385 kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:950 [inline] kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1188 [inline] hci_conn_params_add+0x10c/0x4b0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:2279 hci_conn_params_set net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:5162 [inline] add_device+0x5b4/0xa54 net/bluetooth/mgmt.c:7755 hci_mgmt_cmd net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1721 [inline] hci_sock_sendmsg+0x10b4/0x1dd0 net/bluetooth/hci_sock.c:1841 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:727 [inline] __sock_sendmsg+0xe0/0x128 net/socket.c:742 sock_write_iter+0x250/0x390 net/socket.c:1195 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:595 [inline] vfs_write+0x66c/0xab0 fs/read_write.c:688 ksys_write+0x1fc/0x24c fs/read_write.c:740 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:751 [inline] __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:748 [inline] __arm64_sys_write+0x70/0xa4 fs/read_write.c:748 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:35 [inline] invoke_syscall+0x84/0x2a8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:49 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0xe4/0x294 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:132 do_el0_svc+0x44/0x5c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:151 el0_svc+0x38/0xac arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:724 el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe4 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:743 el0t_64_sync+0x198/0x19c arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:596 Freed by task 3740: kasan_save_stack+0x3c/0x64 ---truncated---

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs/ntfs3: validate Dirty Page Table capacity in log_replay copy_lcns In the analysis pass of $LogFile journal replay, log_replay() copies LCNs from each action log record into an existing Dirty Page Table (DPT) entry without bounding the destination index. A crafted NTFS image with DPT entry lcns_follow=1 and an action log record with lcns_follow=2 produces a kernel slab out-of-bounds write at mount time: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in log_replay+0x654c/0xdb60 Write of size 8 at addr ffff8880095e1040 by task mount Two attacker-controlled fields can drive j+i past the allocated page_lcns[] array: 1. dp->lcns_follow (capacity) can be smaller than lrh->lcns_follow. 2. lrh->target_vcn may be smaller than dp->vcn, making the u64 subtraction wrap to a huge size_t. Validate target VCN delta and per-record LCN count against the DPT entry capacity, bail via the existing out: cleanup label with -EINVAL. This mirrors the bounds-check pattern added in commit b2bc7c44ed17 ("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot") and commit 0ca0485e4b2e ("fs/ntfs3: validate rec->used in journal-replay file record check").

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ntfs: avoid calling post_write_mst_fixup() for invalid index_block ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write() calls post_write_mst_fixup() when ntfs_ib_write() returns an error, intending to restore the buffer after a failed write. However, ntfs_ib_write() returns an error immediately if pre_write_mst_fixup() validation fails. The caller, ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write(), interprets any error as a write failure requiring rollback. It does not differentiate between I/O errors and validation failures, and calls post_write_mst_fixup() anyway. Since post_write_mst_fixup() assumes that the index_block contents is correct, it doesn't perform the boundary checks, which results in out-of-bounds memory access. An attacker can craft a malicious NTFS image with: - large index_block.usa_ofs offset, pointing outside the ntfs_record - index_block.usa_count = 0, causing integer underflow - or index_block.usa_count larger than actual number of sectors in the ntfs_record, causing out-of-bounds access KASAN reports describing the memory corruption: ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 Read of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c9018 by task p/9428 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 print_report+0x139/0x4ad ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 post_write_mst_fixup+0x19c/0x1d0 ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220 ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080 __ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480 ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0 ================================================================== BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 Write of size 2 at addr ffff8881586c91fe by task p/9428 Call Trace: <TASK> dump_stack_lvl+0x100/0x190 print_report+0x139/0x4ad ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 ? __virt_addr_valid+0x262/0x500 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 kasan_report+0xe4/0x1d0 ? post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 post_write_mst_fixup+0x1aa/0x1d0 ntfs_icx_ib_sync_write+0x179/0x220 ntfs_inode_sync_filename+0x83d/0x1080 __ntfs_write_inode+0x1049/0x1480 ntfs_file_fsync+0x131/0x9b0 ================================================================== Let's move the post_write_mst_fixup() call to ntfs_ib_write(). The ntfs_ib_write() function calls pre_write_mst_fixup() at the beginning. If the index_block contents is invalid, pre_write_mst_fixup() fails and ntfs_ib_write() returns early without calling post_write_mst_fixup() on bad index_block.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: NTB: epf: Avoid calling pci_irq_vector() from hardirq context ntb_epf_vec_isr() calls pci_irq_vector() in hardirq context to derive the vector number. pci_irq_vector() calls msi_get_virq() that takes a mutex and can therefore trigger "scheduling while atomic" splats: BUG: scheduling while atomic: kworker/u33:0/55/0x00010001 ... Call trace: ... schedule+0x38/0x110 schedule_preempt_disabled+0x28/0x50 __mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x848/0x908 __mutex_lock_slowpath+0x18/0x30 mutex_lock+0x4c/0x60 msi_domain_get_virq+0xe8/0x138 pci_irq_vector+0x2c/0x60 ntb_epf_vec_isr+0x28/0x120 [ntb_hw_epf] __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x70/0x3a8 handle_irq_event+0x48/0x100 handle_edge_irq+0x100/0x1c8 ... Cache the Linux IRQ number for vector 0 when vectors are allocated and use it as a base in the ISR. Running the ISR in a threaded IRQ handler would also avoid the problem, but that would be unnecessary here.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netpoll: fix a use-after-free on shutdown path There is a use-after-free error on netpoll, which is clearly detected by KASAN. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x3b/0x80 Read of size 1 at addr ... by task kworker/9:1 Workqueue: events queue_process Call Trace: skb_dequeue+0x1e/0xb0 queue_process+0x2c/0x600 process_scheduled_works+0x4b6/0x850 worker_thread+0x414/0x5a0 Allocated by task 242: __netpoll_setup+0x201/0x4a0 netpoll_setup+0x249/0x550 enabled_store+0x32f/0x380 Freed by task 0: kfree+0x1b7/0x540 rcu_core+0x3f8/0x7a0 The problem happens when there is a pending TX worker running in parallel with the cleanup path. This is what happens on netpoll shutdown path: 1) __netpoll_cleanup() is called 2) set dev->npinfo to NULL 3) call_rcu() with rcu_cleanup_netpoll_info() 3.1) rcu_cleanup_netpoll_info() tries to cancel all workers with cancel_delayed_work(), but doesn't wait for the worker to finish 4) and kfree(npinfo); Because 3.1) doesn't really cancel the work, as the comment says "we can't call cancel_delayed_work_sync here, as we are in softirq", the TX worker can run after 4). Tl;DR: queue_process() is not an RCU reader, it reaches npinfo through the work item via container_of(). Use disable_delayed_work_sync() to ensure the worker is completely stopped and prevent any future re-arming attempts. Once npinfo is set to NULL, senders will bail out and not queue new work. The disable flag ensures any in-flight re-arming attempts also fail silently. In the future, we can do the cleanup inline here without needing the npinfo->rcu rcu_head, but that is net-next material.

Linux · Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP · Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP · Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv4: igmp: remove multicast group from hash table on device destruction When a device is destroyed under RTNL, ip_mc_destroy_dev() iterates through the multicast list and calls ip_ma_put() on each membership, scheduling them for RCU reclamation. However, they are not unlinked from the device's multicast hash table (mc_hash). Since the device remains published in dev->ip_ptr until after ip_mc_destroy_dev() completes, concurrent RCU readers traversing mc_hash can still locate and access the multicast group after its refcount is decremented. If the RCU callback runs and frees the group while a reader is accessing it, a use-after-free occurs. Fix this by unlinking the multicast group from mc_hash using ip_mc_hash_remove() before scheduling it for reclamation. BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009bf1408 by task mausezahn/2276 Call Trace: <IRQ> dump_stack_lvl+0x67/0x90 print_report+0x175/0x7c0 kasan_report+0x147/0x180 ip_check_mc_rcu+0x149/0x3f0 udp_v4_early_demux+0x36d/0x12d0 ip_rcv_finish_core+0xb8b/0x1390 ip_rcv_finish+0x54/0x120 NF_HOOK+0x213/0x2b0 __netif_receive_skb+0x126/0x340 process_backlog+0x4f2/0xf00 __napi_poll+0x92/0x2c0 net_rx_action+0x583/0xc60 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0 do_softirq+0x57/0x80 </IRQ> Allocated by task 2239: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 __kasan_kmalloc+0x72/0x90 ____ip_mc_inc_group+0x31a/0xa40 __ip_mc_join_group+0x334/0x3f0 do_ip_setsockopt+0x16fa/0x2010 ip_setsockopt+0x3f/0x90 do_sock_setsockopt+0x1ad/0x300 Freed by task 0: kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 kasan_save_free_info+0x40/0x50 __kasan_slab_free+0x3a/0x60 __rcu_free_sheaf_prepare+0xd4/0x220 rcu_free_sheaf+0x36/0x190 rcu_core+0x8d9/0x12f0 handle_softirqs+0x236/0x7f0

Linux · Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP · Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP · Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ipv4: bound TCP reordering sysctl writes and MTU probe sizes Reject invalid `net.ipv4.tcp_reordering` values before they reach TCP socket state. The sysctl is stored as an `int` but copied into the `u32` `tp->reordering` field for new sockets, so negative writes wrap to large values. With `tcp_mtu_probing=2`, the wrapped value can overflow the `tcp_mtu_probe()` size calculation and drive the MTU probing path into an out-of-bounds read. Route `tcp_reordering` writes through `proc_dointvec_minmax()` and require it to be at least 1. Also require `tcp_max_reordering` to be at least 1 so the configured maximum cannot become negative either. When registering the table for a non-init network namespace, relocate `extra2` pointers that refer into `init_net.ipv4` so the `tcp_reordering` upper bound follows that namespace's `tcp_max_reordering`. Harden `tcp_mtu_probe()` itself by computing `size_needed` as `u64`. This keeps the send queue and window checks from being bypassed through signed integer overflow.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: media: nxp: imx8-isi: Fix use-after-free on remove KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free in __media_entity_remove_link() during rmmod of imx8_isi: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in __media_entity_remove_link+0x608/0x650 Read of size 2 at addr ffff0000d47cb02a by task rmmod/724 Call trace: __media_entity_remove_link+0x608/0x650 __media_entity_remove_links+0x78/0x144 __media_device_unregister_entity+0x150/0x280 media_device_unregister_entity+0x48/0x68 v4l2_device_unregister_subdev+0x158/0x300 v4l2_async_unbind_subdev_one+0x22c/0x358 v4l2_async_nf_unbind_all_subdevs+0xfc/0x1c0 v4l2_async_nf_unregister+0x5c/0x14c mxc_isi_remove+0x124/0x2a0 [imx8_isi] Allocated by task 249: __kmalloc_noprof+0x27c/0x690 mxc_isi_crossbar_init+0x22c/0x560 [imx8_isi] Freed by task 724: kfree+0x1e4/0x5b0 mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup+0x34/0x80 [imx8_isi] mxc_isi_remove+0x11c/0x2a0 [imx8_isi] The problem is that mxc_isi_remove() calls mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup() before mxc_isi_v4l2_cleanup(). The crossbar cleanup frees the media entity pads, but the subsequent v4l2 cleanup still tries to remove media links that reference those pads. Fix this by calling mxc_isi_v4l2_cleanup() before mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup() to ensure all media entities are properly unregistered while the pads are still valid.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mfd: cros_ec: Delay dev_set_drvdata() until probe success If ec_device_probe() fails, cros_ec_class_release releases memory for the cros_ec_dev structure. However, because the drvdata was already set, sub-drivers like cros_ec_typec can still retrieve the stale pointer via the platform device. This leads to a use-after-free when cros_ec_typec attempts to access &typec->ec->ec->dev on a device that has already been released. Move dev_set_drvdata() to ensure that the pointer is only made available once all initialization steps have succeeded. sysfs: cannot create duplicate filename '/class/chromeos/cros_ec' Call trace: sysfs_do_create_link_sd+0x94/0xdc sysfs_create_link+0x30/0x44 device_add_class_symlinks+0x90/0x13c device_add+0xf0/0x50c ec_device_probe+0x150/0x4f0 platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0 ... BUG: KASAN: invalid-access in __memcpy+0x44/0x230 Write at addr f5ffff809e2d33ac by task kworker/u32:5/125 Pointer tag: [f5], memory tag: [fe] Tainted : [W]=WARN, [O]=OOT_MODULE Hardware name: Google Navi unprovisioned 0x7FFFFFFF/sku0 board/sku3 Workqueue: events_unbound deferred_probe_work_func Call trace: __memcpy+0x44/0x230 cros_ec_check_features+0x60/0xcc [cros_ec_proto] cros_typec_probe+0xe8/0x6e0 [cros_ec_typec] platform_probe+0xa0/0xe0

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm: shrinker: fix shrinker_info teardown race with expansion expand_shrinker_info() iterates all visible memcgs under shrinker_mutex, including memcgs that have not finished ->css_online() yet. Once pn->shrinker_info has been published, teardown must stay serialized with expand_shrinker_info() until that memcg is either fully online or no longer visible to iteration. Today alloc_shrinker_info() breaks that rule by dropping shrinker_mutex before freeing a partially initialized shrinker_info array, which may cause the following race: CPU0 CPU1 ==== ==== css_create --> list_add_tail_rcu(&css->sibling, &parent_css->children); online_css --> mem_cgroup_css_online --> alloc_shrinker_info --> alloc node0 info rcu_assign_pointer(C->node0->shrinker_info, old0) alloc node1 info -> FAIL -> goto err mutex_unlock(shrinker_mutex) shrinker_alloc() --> shrinker_memcg_alloc --> mutex_lock(shrinker_mutex) expand_shrinker_info --> mem_cgroup_iter see the memcg expand_one_shrinker_info --> old0 = C->node0->shrinker_info memcpy(new->unit, old0->unit, ...); free_shrinker_info --> kvfree(old0); /* double free !! */ kvfree_rcu(old0, rcu); The same problem exists later in mem_cgroup_css_online(). If alloc_shrinker_info() succeeds but a subsequent objcg allocation fails, the free_objcg -> free_shrinker_info() unwind path tears down the already published pn->shrinker_info arrays without shrinker_mutex. The expand_one_shrinker_info() can race with that teardown in the same way, leading to use-after-free or double-free of the old shrinker_info. Fix this by serializing shrinker_info teardown with shrinker_mutex, and by keeping alloc_shrinker_info() error cleanup inside the locked section.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: handle unreadable frags sashiko reports: When an skb with unreadable fragments (such as from devmem TCP, where skb_frags_readable(skb) returns false) is processed by the u32 module, skb_copy_bits() will safely return a negative error code [..] xt_u32: bail out with hotdrop in this case. gather_frags: return -1, just as if we had no fragment header. nfnetlink_queue: restrict to the linear part. nfnetlink_log: restrict to the linear part. v2: - skb_zerocopy helpers don't copy readable flag, i.e. nfnetlink_queue is broken too xt_u32 shouldn't return true if hotdrop was set.

Linux · Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP · Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP · Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: zero chainstack array sashiko reports: looking at ebtables table translation, could a sparse cpu_possible_mask lead to an uninitialized pointer free? If cpu_possible_mask is sparse (for example, CPU 0 and CPU 2 are possible, but CPU 1 is not), the allocation loop skips CPU 1. If vmalloc_node() fails at CPU 2, the cleanup loop will blindly decrement and call vfree() on newinfo->chainstack[1]. Not a real-world bug, such allocation isn't expected to fail in the first place.

Linux · Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP · Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP · Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: module names must be null-terminated We need to explicitly check the length, else we may pass non-null terminated string to request_module().

Linux · Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP · Siemens SIMATIC S7-1500 CPU 1518F-4 PN/DP MFP · Siemens SIPLUS S7-1500 CPU 1518-4 PN/DP MFP

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: ebtables: terminate table name before find_table_lock() update_counters() and compat_update_counters() forward a user-supplied 32-byte table name to find_table_lock() without NUL-terminating it. On a lookup miss, find_inlist_lock() calls try_then_request_module(..., "%s%s", "ebtable_", name), and vsnprintf() reads past the name field and the stack object until it hits a zero byte. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730) Read of size 1 at addr ffff8880119dfb20 by task exploit/147 Call Trace: ... string (lib/vsprintf.c:648 lib/vsprintf.c:730) vsnprintf (lib/vsprintf.c:2945) __request_module (kernel/module/kmod.c:150) do_update_counters.isra.0 (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:371 net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:380) update_counters (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:1440) do_ebt_set_ctl (net/bridge/netfilter/ebtables.c:2573) nf_setsockopt (net/netfilter/nf_sockopt.c:101) ip_setsockopt (net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:1424) raw_setsockopt (net/ipv4/raw.c:847) __sys_setsockopt (net/socket.c:2393) ... compat_do_replace() shares the same unterminated name via compat_copy_ebt_replace_from_user(); terminate it there too so all find_table_lock() callers behave alike. The other callers already terminate the name after the copy.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: bnep: pin L2CAP connection during netdev registration bnep_add_connection() reads the L2CAP connection without holding the channel lock, then passes its HCI device to register_netdev(). Controller teardown can clear and release that connection concurrently, leaving the network device registration path to dereference a freed parent device. Take a reference to the L2CAP connection while holding the channel lock. Retain it until register_netdev() has taken the parent device reference.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: btnxpuart: Fix out-of-bounds firmware read in nxp_recv_fw_req_v3() During the v3 firmware download the controller sends a v3_data_req with a 32 bit offset and a 16 bit len. nxp_recv_fw_req_v3() checks only the lower bound of the offset and then sends firmware from that offset. nxpdev->fw_dnld_v3_offset = offset - nxpdev->fw_v3_offset_correction; serdev_device_write_buf(nxpdev->serdev, nxpdev->fw->data + nxpdev->fw_dnld_v3_offset, len); Nothing checks that fw_dnld_v3_offset + len stays within nxpdev->fw->size, so a controller that asks for an offset or length past the firmware image makes the driver read past the end of nxpdev->fw->data and send that memory back over UART. nxp_recv_fw_req_v1() already bounds the same write. Add the equivalent check to the v3 path, reject the request when it falls outside the firmware image, and zero len on the error path so the fw_v3_prev_sent bookkeeping at free_skb stays consistent.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: fix UAF in bt_accept_dequeue() bt_accept_get() takes a temporary reference before dropping the accept queue lock. bt_accept_dequeue() currently drops that reference before bt_accept_unlink(), leaving only the queue reference. bt_accept_unlink() drops the queue reference. The subsequent sock_hold() therefore accesses freed memory if it was the final reference, as observed by KASAN during listening L2CAP socket cleanup. Retain the temporary queue-walk reference through unlink and hand it to the caller on success. Drop it explicitly on the closed and not-yet-connected paths.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: L2CAP: validate option length before reading conf opt value l2cap_get_conf_opt() derives the option length from the attacker-controlled opt->len field and immediately dereferences opt->val (as u8, get_unaligned_le16() or get_unaligned_le32(), or a raw pointer for the default case) before any caller has confirmed that opt->len bytes are present in the buffer. The callers (l2cap_parse_conf_req(), l2cap_parse_conf_rsp() and l2cap_conf_rfc_get()) only detect a malformed option afterwards, once the running length has gone negative, by which point the out-of-bounds read has already executed. An existing post-hoc length check keeps the garbage value from being consumed, so this is not a data leak in the current control flow. It is still a validate-after-use ordering bug: up to 4 bytes are read past the end of the buffer before it is known to contain them, and it is fragile to future changes in the callers. Fix it at the source. Pass the end of the buffer into l2cap_get_conf_opt() and refuse to touch opt->val unless the full option (header + value) fits. Each caller computes an end pointer once before the loop and checks the return value directly instead of inferring the error from a negative length.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: coresight: ultrasoc-smb: Fix OOB write in smb_sync_perf_buffer() When the SMB sink is used as a perf AUX sink, smb_update_buffer() calls smb_sync_perf_buffer() to copy hardware trace data into the perf AUX ring buffer pages. It derives pg_idx = head >> PAGE_SHIFT from @head, which is handle->head, and indexes dst_pages[pg_idx]. The pg_idx %= nr_pages normalization is only applied after the first loop iteration. This leaves the initial page index underived from the buffer size, which can result in an out-of-bounds write past dst_pages[] when head exceeds the AUX buffer size. Normalize head modulo the AUX buffer size before deriving the page index and offset, mirroring tmc_etr_sync_perf_buffer().

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: resolve SWN tcon from live registrations cifs_swn_notify() looks up a witness registration by id under cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drops the mutex, and then uses the registration's cached tcon pointer. That pointer is not a lifetime reference, and it is not a stable representative once cifs_get_swn_reg() lets multiple tcons for the same net/share name share one registration id. A same-share second mount can keep the cifs_swn_reg alive after the first tcon unregisters and is freed. The registration then still points at the freed first tcon, so taking tc_lock or incrementing tc_count through swnreg->tcon only moves the use-after-free earlier. Taking tc_lock while holding cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex also violates the documented CIFS lock order. Fix this by making the registration store only the stable witness identity: id, net name, share name, and notify flags. When a notify arrives, copy that identity under cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex, drop the mutex, then find and pin a live witness tcon that currently matches the net/share pair under the normal cifs_tcp_ses_lock -> tc_lock order. The notification path uses that pinned tcon directly and drops the reference when done. Registration and unregister messages now use the live tcon passed by the caller instead of a cached tcon in the registration. The final unregister send is folded into cifs_swn_unregister() while the registration is still protected by cifs_swnreg_idr_mutex. This removes the previous find/drop/reacquire raw-pointer window. The release path only removes the idr entry and frees the stable identity strings. This preserves the intended one-registration/many-tcon behavior: a registration id represents a net/share pair, and notify handling acts on a live representative selected at use time. It also preserves CLIENT_MOVE ordering for the representative tcon because the old-IP unregister is sent before cifs_swn_register() sends the new-IP register.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: prevent path traversal bypass by restricting caseless retry ksmbd_vfs_path_lookup() enforces LOOKUP_BENEATH to restrict path resolution within the share root. When a crafted path attempts to escape the share boundary using parent-directory components ('..'), vfs_path_parent_lookup() detects this and immediately fails, returning -EXDEV. However, a bug exists in __ksmbd_vfs_kern_path() under caseless mode. The function fails to intercept the -EXDEV error and erroneously falls through to the caseless retry logic, which is intended only for genuinely missing files. During this retry process, the path is reconstructed, leading to an unintended LOOKUP_BENEATH bypass that allows write-capable users to create zero-length files or directories outside the exported share. Fix this by ensuring that the execution only proceeds to the caseless lookup retry when the error is specifically -ENOENT. Any other errors, such as -EXDEV from a path traversal attempt, must be returned immediately.