Veille CVE

Vendredi 17 juillet 2026

4 CVE

Critique 2 Élevée 2 Moyenne 0 Faible 0 Non évaluée 0 Exploitées (KEV) Tri : plus récentes « Coder coder » ✕
  1. CVE-2026-44891 7.5 Élevée

    netty · Netty netty

    Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final, io.netty.handler.codec.stomp.StompSubframeDecoder fails to limit the total number of headers or their cumulative size per frame, and the maxLineLength parameter only restricts individual header lines. An attacker can send a large number of short headers that are accumulated in memory inside DefaultStompHeadersSubframe until the JVM throws an OutOfMemoryError, causing denial of service for servers exposing a STOMP endpoint based on StompSubframeDecoder. This issue is fixed in versions 4.1.136.Final and 4.2.16.Final.

  2. CVE-2026-15982 9.8 Critique

    CodeRevolution Aimogen Pro - All-in-One AI Content Writer, Editor, ChatBot & Automation Toolkit

    The Aimogen Pro - All-in-One AI Content Writer, Editor, ChatBot & Automation Toolkit plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 2.8.4. This is due to due to a missing capability check on the 'aiomatic_call_google_ai_function' function. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to leverage the 'aimogen_wp_god_mode' tool to clear function blacklists and execute arbitrary PHP functions, such as creating administrator accounts.

  3. CVE-2026-44436 7.5 Élevée

    h2o quicly

    Quicly is an IETF QUIC protocol implementation intended primarily for use within the H2O HTTP server. Prior to commit 8b178e6, Quicly is vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack through connection state corruption. In QUIC Invariants, the maximum length of a Connection ID is 255 bytes, while QUIC version 1 further restricts the maximum to 20 bytes. Quicly implements QUIC version 1 and therefore its CID buffers are limited to 20 bytes. However, to be able to respond to unknown versions of QUIC, its packet decoder accepts Connection IDs of up to 255 bytes. As its CID buffers are merely 20 bytes long, Quicly must reject QUIC version 1 packets with Connection IDs longer than that. The command line tool bundled with Quicly has had that check, however the library itself lacked such enforcement. As a consequence, when used by applications that lack their own enforcement, the connection state becoming inconsistent to buffer overrun. Fortunately, the overflow stops within the allocated chunk of memory, but nevertheless, the bug leads to assertion failures. This issue has been fixed by commit 8b178e6.

  4. CVE-2026-57075 9.1 Critique

    TODDR YAML::Syck

    YAML::Syck versions before 1.47 for Perl allow an out-of-bounds read via a signed-char lookup-table index in syck_base64dec. The base64 decoder in the bundled libsyck indexes the 256-entry static table b64_xtable with a signed char, so any !!binary byte >= 0x80 sign-extends to a negative index and reads before the table. The decoder receives the raw bytes of any !!binary node, a standard YAML type not gated by $LoadBlessed or $LoadCode, so it is reached on the default Load path. Any caller that runs Load or LoadFile on an untrusted document containing a !!binary scalar with a high-bit byte triggers the read, and the value read can surface in the decoded result.