Vendredi 12 juin 2026
2 CVE
-
CVE-2026-48059 7.5 Élevée
netty · Red Hat Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9 · Red Hat AMQ Broker 7.14.1 · Red Hat Build of Apache Camel 3.33 for Quarkus 3.33.2.SP1
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. Prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, the HAProxy PROXY protocol v2 codec in netty leaks native or heap memory on every connection when a client sends a syntactically valid header containing nested `PP2_TYPE_SSL` TLVs (type-length-value records) at depth two or greater. The leak occurs on the successful parse path — no exception is thrown, the message fires downstream, the decoder removes itself, and the application releases the `HAProxyMessage` normally. Yet the underlying cumulation buffer (a pooled, potentially direct `ByteBuf` allocated by the channel) remains permanently pinned. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.
-
CVE-2026-44893 7.5 Élevée
netty · Red Hat Cryostat 4 on RHEL 9 · Red Hat AMQ Broker 7.14.1 · Red Hat Build of Apache Camel 3.33 for Quarkus 3.33.2.SP1
Netty is a network application framework for development of protocol servers and clients. In netty-codec-haproxy prior to versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final, when decoding a PP2_TYPE_SSL TLV, HAProxyMessage.readNextTLV() first calls `header.retainedSlice(header.readerIndex(), length)` and only then reads the 1-byte client field and 4-byte verify field. If the attacker sets the TLV length below 5, the subsequent readByte/readInt throws IndexOutOfBoundsException. HAProxyMessageDecoder only catches HAProxyProtocolException around this call, so the IOOBE propagates and the retained slice on the pooled cumulation buffer is never released. Versions 4.1.135.Final and 4.2.15.Final patch the issue.