Mercredi 27 mai 2026

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv rxe_rcv() currently checks only that the incoming packet is at least header_size(pkt) bytes long before payload_size() is used. However, payload_size() subtracts both the attacker-controlled BTH pad field and RXE_ICRC_SIZE from pkt->paylen: payload_size = pkt->paylen - offset[RXE_PAYLOAD] - bth_pad(pkt) - RXE_ICRC_SIZE This means a short packet can still make payload_size() underflow even if it includes enough bytes for the fixed headers. Simply requiring header_size(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE is not sufficient either, because a packet with a forged non-zero BTH pad can still leave payload_size() negative and pass an underflowed value to later receive-path users. Fix this by validating pkt->paylen against the full minimum length required by payload_size(): header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxgk: Fix potential integer overflow in length check Fix potential integer overflow in rxgk_extract_token() when checking the length of the ticket. Rather than rounding up the value to be tested (which might overflow), round down the size of the available data.

Linux · Linux linux kernel

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: rxrpc: Fix re-decryption of RESPONSE packets If a RESPONSE packet gets a temporary failure during processing, it may end up in a partially decrypted state - and then get requeued for a retry. Fix this by just discarding the packet; we will send another CHALLENGE packet and thereby elicit a further response. Similarly, discard an incoming CHALLENGE packet if we get an error whilst generating a RESPONSE; the server will send another CHALLENGE.

Linux · Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 · Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 · Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: smb: client: fix potential UAF and double free in smb2_open_file() Zero out @err_iov and @err_buftype before retrying SMB2_open() to prevent an UAF bug if @data != NULL, otherwise a double free.

Linux · Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 · Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10.0 Extended Update Support · Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/iwcm: Fix workqueue list corruption by removing work_list The commit e1168f0 ("RDMA/iwcm: Simplify cm_event_handler()") changed the work submission logic to unconditionally call queue_work() with the expectation that queue_work() would have no effect if work was already pending. The problem is that a free list of struct iwcm_work is used (for which struct work_struct is embedded), so each call to queue_work() is basically unique and therefore does indeed queue the work. This causes a problem in the work handler which walks the work_list until it's empty to process entries. This means that a single run of the work handler could process item N+1 and release it back to the free list while the actual workqueue entry is still queued. It could then get reused (INIT_WORK...) and lead to list corruption in the workqueue logic. Fix this by just removing the work_list. The workqueue already does this for us. This fixes the following error that was observed when stress testing with ucmatose on an Intel E830 in iWARP mode: [ 151.465780] list_del corruption. next->prev should be ffff9f0915c69c08, but was ffff9f0a1116be08. (next=ffff9f0a15b11c08) [ 151.466639] ------------[ cut here ]------------ [ 151.466986] kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:67! [ 151.467349] Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI [ 151.467753] CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 2306 Comm: kworker/u64:18 Not tainted 6.19.0-rc4+ #1 PREEMPT(voluntary) [ 151.468466] Hardware name: QEMU Ubuntu 24.04 PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 [ 151.469192] Workqueue: 0x0 (iw_cm_wq) [ 151.469478] RIP: 0010:__list_del_entry_valid_or_report+0xf0/0x100 [ 151.469942] Code: c7 58 5f 4c b2 e8 10 50 aa ff 0f 0b 48 89 ef e8 36 57 cb ff 48 8b 55 08 48 89 e9 48 89 de 48 c7 c7 a8 5f 4c b2 e8 f0 4f aa ff <0f> 0b 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 90 90 90 90 90 90 [ 151.471323] RSP: 0000:ffffb15644e7bd68 EFLAGS: 00010046 [ 151.471712] RAX: 000000000000006d RBX: ffff9f0915c69c08 RCX: 0000000000000027 [ 151.472243] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffff9f0a37d9c600 [ 151.472768] RBP: ffff9f0a15b11c08 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: c0000000ffff7fff [ 151.473294] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffffb15644e7bba8 R12: ffff9f092339ee68 [ 151.473817] R13: ffff9f0900059c28 R14: ffff9f092339ee78 R15: 0000000000000000 [ 151.474344] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff9f0a847b5000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 [ 151.474934] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 151.475362] CR2: 0000559e233a9088 CR3: 000000020296b004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 [ 151.475895] PKRU: 55555554 [ 151.476118] Call Trace: [ 151.476331] <TASK> [ 151.476497] move_linked_works+0x49/0xa0 [ 151.476792] __pwq_activate_work.isra.46+0x2f/0xa0 [ 151.477151] pwq_dec_nr_in_flight+0x1e0/0x2f0 [ 151.477479] process_scheduled_works+0x1c8/0x410 [ 151.477823] worker_thread+0x125/0x260 [ 151.478108] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 [ 151.478430] kthread+0xfe/0x240 [ 151.478671] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 151.478955] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 151.479240] ret_from_fork+0x208/0x270 [ 151.479523] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 151.479806] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 151.480103] </TASK>

OALDERS HTTP::Daemon · Red Hat Enterprise Linux 10 · Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 · Red Hat Enterprise Linux 9

HTTP::Daemon versions before 6.17 for Perl allow OS command injection via send_file(). send_file() opens its string argument with Perl's 2-arg open(). The 2-arg form interprets magic prefixes: '| cmd' and 'cmd |' open a pipe to a subprocess, '> path' and '>> path' open the path for write or append. Untrusted input passed to send_file() can run OS commands at the daemon process UID. The read-pipe form ('cmd |') also leaks subprocess stdout into the HTTP response body. The write-mode forms can create or truncate files at attacker chosen paths.