Mercredi 21 octobre 2026

Apache Software Foundation Apache bRPC

External control of file name or path and uncontrolled resource consumption in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers who can reach the builtin service port to create directories and truncate/overwrite files with the privileges of the server process, or to hold the process-wide CPU/contention profiler for an arbitrarily long time. Root Cause: 1. The builtin /flags service allows gflags carrying a validator to be modified at runtime via ?setvalue=. The bvar/mbvar dump path gflags (bvar_dump_file, bvar_dump_tabs, mbvar_dump_file) were registered with an accept-anything validator whose only purpose was to wake the dumping thread. A remote attacker could therefore repoint the dump path (e.g. GET /flags/bvar_dump_file?setvalue=/victim/dir/target followed by GET /flags/bvar_dump?setvalue=true, or the equivalent for mbvar_dump_file, which is used verbatim without a forced suffix), making the dumping thread recursively create directories and open/truncate files at attacker-chosen locations. Tab names in bvar_dump_tabs were appended to the path without sanitization, allowing '..' to escape the configured directory. 2. The /pprof builtin service did not clamp the ?seconds= parameter to FLAGS_max_profiling_seconds (a limit that /hotspots enforced). A single request such as ?seconds=2147483647 made the handler sleep for decades while holding the process-wide gperftools CPU profiler or bthread contention profiler, so /hotspots/cpu and /hotspots/contention returned 503 for everyone else during that time. Affected Scenarios: Any Apache bRPC server exposing the builtin services (enabled by default on the same port as normal RPC traffic) to untrusted networks. How to Fix: (Choose one of the following options) 1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue. 2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3523 Note: After the fix, bvar_dump_file, bvar_dump_tabs and mbvar_dump_file can no longer be modified at runtime through the /flags builtin service. They can still be changed programmatically via google::SetCommandLineOption(), taking effect on the next dump cycle. The profiling duration of /pprof is now capped by the -max_profiling_seconds gflag (default 300 seconds), which can be adjusted by the server owner.

Apache Software Foundation Apache bRPC

Interpretation conflict in the HTTP protocol implementation in Apache bRPC (version < 1.18.0) on all platforms allows remote attackers to bypass access control rules enforced by a front proxy. Root Cause: The method dispatch function FindMethodPropertyByURI() in bRPC's HTTP protocol splits the request path with a string splitter that skips empty fields, so paths containing empty path segments (consecutive slashes), such as //flags, /flags// and /flags//port, are dispatched to the same method as their collapsed form /flags. Per RFC 3986 these are distinct paths. A front proxy that enforces an ACL (e.g. blocking access to builtin services such as /flags) matches the collapsed form only, and therefore forwards the padded literal to the bRPC server, where it is dispatched as if it were the collapsed form. This differential allows //flags?setvalue= to reach a builtin service that /flags is not allowed to reach. Additionally, the HTTP/2 implementation never validated the :path pseudo-header, so requests without a :path, or with a :path that neither begins with '/' nor is the asterisk-form '*', contrary to RFC 9113 section 8.3.1, were not rejected. Affected Scenarios: Deployments of Apache bRPC behind a front proxy or gateway that performs access control (ACL) decisions on the literal request path, where the bRPC server accepts HTTP or HTTP/2 traffic from that proxy. In such deployments an attacker can send a path containing empty path segments to reach a resource that the front proxy intended to block. How to Fix: (Choose one of the following options) 1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue. 2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3512 Note: After applying the fix, HTTP and HTTP/2 request paths containing empty path segments (consecutive slashes) are rejected by default, and HTTP/2 :path values that are empty or neither begin with '/' nor equal '*' are rejected. Deployments that depend on the previous lenient behavior can restore it by turning on the gflag -http_allow_empty_path_segments, which is not recommended for servers exposed to untrusted traffic.

Apache Software Foundation Apache bRPC

The Redis server command parser in Apache bRPC accepts an empty RESP array as a command header. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach a bRPC server with Redis service enabled can send an empty array header followed by a bulk string, causing an out-of-bounds write in the parser and crashing the process. Root Cause: RedisCommandParser::ConsumeImpl rejected negative RESP array counts but accepted zero. It resized the command argument vector to zero elements and continued parsing. When a following bulk string was parsed, the only index guard was a CHECK. In configurations where fatal logs do not abort immediately, execution could continue and write to _args[0] even though the vector was empty. Affected Scenarios: Deployments that enable ServerOptions.redis_service and accept Redis protocol traffic from untrusted clients. The issue is reached during parsing before command handling or authentication. How to Fix: 1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue. 2. Apply this patch: https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3354 Note: The fix rejects empty RESP arrays as invalid Redis commands and replaces the internal index CHECK with an explicit parse error so malformed command streams cannot fall through to an indexed vector write.

Apache Software Foundation Apache bRPC

The RTMP AMF parser in Apache bRPC accepts AMF string lengths and array counts directly from untrusted input. A remote unauthenticated attacker who can reach a bRPC server with RTMP enabled can send a small AMF payload with an excessive declared long string length or array count, causing excessive memory allocation or resource consumption before the parser rejects the incomplete payload. Root Cause: The AMF long string parser resized the destination string to the declared 32-bit length before validating that the stream contained that many bytes. ECMA array and strict array parsers also accepted 32-bit element counts without a configurable upper bound. Affected Scenarios: Deployments that enable the bRPC RTMP server component and accept RTMP traffic from untrusted clients. Direct uses of the AMF parser on untrusted data are also affected. How to Fix: 1. Upgrade bRPC to version 1.18.0, which fixes this issue. 2. Apply this patch:  https://github.com/apache/brpc/pull/3353 Note: The fix introduces configurable AMF parsing limits. The default maximum string size is 64 MiB and the default maximum array element count is 1,048,576. Payloads above these limits are rejected. The limits can be adjusted with amf_max_string_size and amf_max_array_size.