Mardi 29 septembre 2026

PHP Group PHP

cleanup_xml_node() in the SOAP XML parser recurses once per XML nesting level with no depth limit. An unauthenticated attacker can post a SOAP request containing tens of thousands of nested elements to any SoapServer endpoint, exhaust the stack and crash the process. The same unbounded recursion exists in the SOAP value decoder and in the WSDL node search helper.

Eclipse Foundation eclipse-threadx/netxduo

Any host on the LAN can send two mDNS records and make the responder write past the end of its transmit packet. The string table stores each name in a slot rounded up to a multiple of four: ```c /* addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:11436, 11443, 11447 */ memory_len = ((memory_len & 0xFFFFFFFC) + 8) & 0xFFFFFFFF; ... len = *((USHORT*)(p - 2)); /* slot size, not string length */ if ((len == memory_len) && ... _nx_mdns_name_match(start, memory_ptr, memory_size) ...) ``` The lookup that decides whether an incoming name is already stored compares the rounded slot size, so names of 12, 13, 14 and 15 characters share one bucket. A second name in the bucket is answered with the pointer to the first, and the record then carries a string up to three bytes longer than the length the caller accounted for. `_nx_mdns_packet_rr_add` (nxd_mdns.c:8911) sizes its only bound check from that stale length, and `_nx_mdns_name_string_encode` writes the real string. Two PTR records are enough, both ordinary mDNS responses to a `_http._tcp` query, with owner names whose lengths fall in the same bucket: ``` ==87491==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow WRITE of size 1 at 0x611000000124 thread T5 #0 _nx_mdns_name_string_encode addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:13096 #1 _nx_mdns_packet_rr_add addons/mdns/nxd_mdns.c:8911 0x611000000124 is 0 bytes to the right of 228-byte region ``` The overflow is one to three bytes of attacker-influenced name data past `nx_packet_data_end`. In a normal pool that lands in the next packet in the same pool rather than in a redzone, so the visible effect is a corrupted neighbouring packet or a corrupted pool free list rather than a clean crash. Compare the slot size against the stored string length before declaring a match, or keep the string length in the slot header and return it to the caller so the encoder and the bound check agree.

AcademySoftwareFoundation OpenImageIO · Openimageio openimageio

OpenImageIO is a toolset for reading, writing, and manipulating image files of any image file format relevant to VFX / animation. Prior to 3.0.21.0, 3.1.16.0, and 3.2.0.3-beta1, A zbuffer-only tiled iff is exposed with a 16-bit public imagespec while the decoder retains a 32-bit internal pixel size. iffinput::read_native_tile() copies according to m_header.pixel_bytes() rather than imagespec::tile_bytes(true), and a failed read can leave m_buf nonempty so a later call copies partially initialized data into the undersized caller buffer, resulting in a heap out-of-bounds write and memory corruption. The affected implementation is identified by src/iff.imageio/iffinput.cpp, IffInput::read_native_tile(), ImageSpec::tile_bytes(true), m_header.pixel_bytes(), ZBUFFER, and m_buf, which define the relevant source path, functions, state, and trigger. This issue is fixed in versions 3.0.21.0, 3.1.16.0, and 3.2.0.3-beta1.

FreeRDP · Freerdp freerdp

FreeRDP before 3.29.0 contains a heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the TSMF FFmpeg decoder when parsing AVC1 MPEG2VIDEOINFO media types with insufficient ExtraData. Attackers can send malformed media format data from a server to trigger a crash by reading fixed offsets without validating source buffer length.