Jeudi 27 août 2026

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: codecs: lpass-tx-macro: Fix enum kcontrol accesses The "DEC0 MODE" to "DEC7 MODE" controls are enumerated, but tx_macro_dec_mode_get() and tx_macro_dec_mode_put() access their value through ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] (a long) instead of ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] (an unsigned int). This same pattern was fixed in the sibling drivers by commit bcfe5f76cc40 ("ASoC: codecs: rx-macro: fix accessing array out of bounds for enum type") and commit 0ea5eff7c606 ("ASoC: codecs: va-macro: fix accessing array out of bounds for enum type"), but tx-macro was missed. On 64-bit kernels built with CONFIG_SND_CTL_DEBUG, the elem value sanity check catches the 4 bytes written past the enumerated item and every read of these controls fails with -EINVAL: snd-sm8250 sound: control 2:0:0:DEC0 MODE:0: access overflow

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: s390/vfio_ccw: Free all memory if cp_init() fails The routine cp_free() is called to unpin/free any memory once an I/O is completed successfully, or if cp_prefetch() fails. But if cp_init() fails, and cp->initialized is not enabled, the same routine cannot be used to free all the memory. An attempt to address this exists in ccwchain_handle_ccw(), where a single call to ccwchain_free() is made for the currently-processed CCW segment. But this will leak other segments (created as a result of a Transfer in Channel) that had been allocated as part of the same channel program. Address this by performing the cleanup outside of the recursive ccwchain_handle_ccw()/ccwchain_loop_tic() logic.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/shmem_helper: Check VMA boundaries for PMD mappings In the ->huge_fault handler do not install a PMD huge page mapping if the huge page exceeds the boundaries of the VMA. All other ->huge_fault handlers have similar checks and the resulting mapping will trigger a VM_BUG_ON_VMA() if it ever reaches copy_pmd_range().

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: cs40l50-vibra - validate custom data from user space cs40l50_add() copies the custom data of an FF_PERIODIC/FF_CUSTOM effect straight from the ff_effect the user passed to EVIOCSFF, without requiring it to hold anything: work_data.custom_data = memdup_array_user(periodic->custom_data, periodic->custom_len, sizeof(s16)); work_data.custom_len = periodic->custom_len; The driver then reads two words out of that buffer: custom_data[0] as the waveform bank in cs40l50_effect_bank_set(), and custom_data[1] as the index within the bank in cs40l50_effect_index_set(). Neither read is covered by a length check, and custom_len is fully user controlled: - custom_len == 0 makes memdup_array_user() call memdup_user() with a length of zero, which returns ZERO_SIZE_PTR rather than an error, so custom_data[0] dereferences it. - custom_len == 1 allocates two bytes. A bank of ROM or RAM keeps effect->type out of the OWT case, and custom_data[1] is then read one word past the allocation. The bank value itself is also mishandled. It is masked with CS40L50_CUSTOM_DATA_MASK (0xffff) but stored in an s16, so a custom_data[0] of 0x8000 or above wraps to a negative value that passes the "bank_type >= CS40L50_WVFRM_BANK_NUM" test. cs40l50_effect_index_set() indexes vib->dsp.banks[] with it before the switch statement's default case gets a chance to reject it: base_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].base_index; max_index = vib->dsp.banks[effect->type].max_index; Require the two words the driver reads to be present, and hold the masked bank in a u32 so the existing upper-bound test covers the whole range. The da7280 haptic driver already range checks custom_len this way.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - zero report size on F54 work error In rmi_f54_work(), if an error occurs during report request or command verification, the code jumped directly to the 'error' label, bypassing the 'abort' label where f54->report_size was normally zeroed out. This left f54->report_size containing its previous successful payload size. If a user then altered the V4L2 format to a smaller size, and a subsequent run failed, rmi_f54_buffer_queue() would copy the stale, larger payload size into the shrunken V4L2 buffer, causing a heap buffer overflow. Fix this by merging the 'abort' and 'error' labels into a single 'out' exit path, and ensuring that f54->report_size is always set to 0 on failure by checking for error and zeroing the local report_size first.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - bound the F54 report size to the allocated buffer rmi_f54_work() reads a diagnostics report from the device into f54->report_data, sizing the transfer with rmi_f54_get_report_size(): report_size = rmi_f54_get_report_size(f54); ... for (i = 0; i < report_size; i += F54_REPORT_DATA_SIZE) { int size = min(F54_REPORT_DATA_SIZE, report_size - i); ... rmi_read_block(.., f54->report_data + i, size); } report_data is allocated once at probe from F54's own electrode counts (array3_size(f54->num_tx_electrodes, f54->num_rx_electrodes, sizeof(u16))), but rmi_f54_get_report_size() computes the size from drv_data->num_*_electrodes when those are set, i.e. from the F55 function's electrode counts. Both counts come straight from device queries (F54 and F55 each report up to 255 electrodes) and nothing constrains the F55 counts to the F54 ones. A malicious or malfunctioning RMI4 device that reports larger F55 electrode counts than its F54 counts makes report_size exceed the allocation, so the read loop writes past report_data (and the V4L2 dequeue memcpy() then reads past it). On conforming hardware the F55 configured electrodes are a subset of the F54 physical electrodes, so report_size never exceeds the buffer and well-behaved devices are unaffected. Record the allocation size and reject a report that does not fit, mirroring the existing zero-size check.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: synaptics-rmi4 - block s_input when F54 queue is busy Changing the input (diagnostic report type) mid-stream changes the report size. Since V4L2 buffers are allocated based on the size at stream start, changing the input while streaming could lead to a heap buffer overflow if the new size is larger than the allocated buffers. Prevent this by blocking VIDIOC_S_INPUT with -EBUSY if the V4L2 queue is busy (streaming).

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: crypto: qce - fix error path in devm_qce_register_algs If ops->register_algs() fails, the error path repeatedly calls the same ops->unregister_algs() from the failed registration. Use the loop index to unregister the previously registered algorithms instead.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: openrisc: signal: do not restore privileged SR bits on sigreturn restore_sigcontext() copies the whole supervision register (SR) from the signal frame and only clears SPR_SR_SM before the value is reloaded into the hardware SR (through ESR and l.rfe) on the return to user space. All other SR bits are left under user control. An unprivileged task can thus return from a signal handler through a crafted sigframe that clears SPR_SR_DME. With the data MMU disabled the CPU performs no translation or protection on data accesses, so the task gains read and write access to arbitrary physical memory, a local privilege escalation. SPR_SR_IME, SPR_SR_SUMRA, SPR_SR_LEE, SPR_SR_EPH and the cache-enable bits are exposed the same way. The ptrace GPR regset already refuses any change to SR for exactly this reason. Restore only the arithmetic flag bits (F, CY, OV) from the signal frame and take every privileged control bit from the SR the kernel saved on signal entry. Verified with qemu-system-or1k -M or1k-sim: before this change an unprivileged PoC clears SPR_SR_DME in rt_sigreturn and writes a marker to physical address 0x03000000 (beyond the kernel's mem=32M); afterwards the same PoC receives SIGSEGV and physical memory is unchanged.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: sur40 - fix input device registration ordering In sur40_probe(), input_register_device() was previously called early before the V4L2 video device and vb2_queue components were fully initialized. If userspace opened the input device immediately upon registration, sur40_open() would trigger and start the sur40_poll() worker thread. This worker thread invokes sur40_process_video() and accesses the uninitialized vb2_queue structure, leading to a data race and potential system crash. Furthermore, if V4L2 or video registration failed after input_register_device() succeeded, the error path fell through to calling input_free_device() on a successfully registered device instead of input_unregister_device(), corrupting input core state. Move input_register_device() to the very end of sur40_probe(). This ensures the V4L2 and video queue structures are fully initialized before polling can start, and naturally resolves the error path bug since input_free_device() is now only called when input registration has not yet occurred. To maintain strict LIFO (Last-In, First-Out) teardown ordering, also move input_unregister_device() to the very beginning of sur40_disconnect(). This guarantees that the input polling worker thread is stopped before V4L2 video components or control handlers are unregistered.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mmc: atmel-mci: Fix use-after-free in atmci_remove due to race condition In atmci_probe, &host->bh_work is bound with atmci_work_func, and atmci_interrupt, atmci_timeout_timer and atmci_dma_complete can all queue this work on system_bh_wq. If we remove the module, atmci_remove makes cleanup and the memory allocated for host with devm_kzalloc() is released after the remove callback returns, while the work mentioned above may still be pending or running. The sequence of operations that may lead to a UAF bug is as follows: CPU0 CPU1 | atmci_interrupt | queue_work(system_bh_wq, | &host->bh_work) atmci_remove | atmci_cleanup_slot(...) | atmci_writel(host, ATMCI_IDR, ~0UL) | timer_delete_sync(&host->timer) | dma_release_channel(host->dma.chan) | free_irq(platform_get_irq(pdev, 0), host) | | atmci_work_func | // use host // devm resources released after | // remove returns, host is freed | | // use host (use-after-free) Fix it by canceling the work after all the sources that can schedule it (IRQ handler, timeout timer and DMA completion callback) have been stopped, and before proceeding with the remaining cleanup in atmci_remove.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: propagate errors from xfs_rtginode_load xfs_rtginode_ensure() treats every xfs_rtginode_load() error other than -ENOENT as success. This can leave the realtime group inode unset after an I/O, allocation, or corruption error. Growfs then continues as though the inode had been loaded. Only -ENOENT means that the inode needs to be created. Return all other errors to the growfs caller.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: fix off-by-one in rtrefcount btree root level validation xfs_rtrefcountbt_compute_maxlevels() sets mp->m_rtrefc_maxlevels = min(d_maxlevels, r_maxlevels) + 1; where the trailing "+ 1" already accounts for the inode-root level, so the deepest valid on-disk root level is m_rtrefc_maxlevels - 1 and a cursor must satisfy bc_nlevels <= bc_maxlevels (= m_rtrefc_maxlevels). The two on-disk validation paths, xfs_rtrefcountbt_verify() and xfs_iformat_rtrefcount(), check the root level with ">" instead of ">=", so a crafted rtreflink (metadir + realtime + reflink) image whose /rtgroups/N.refcount inode has bb_level == m_rtrefc_maxlevels is accepted on mount. xfs_rtrefcountbt_init_cursor() then sets bc_nlevels = bb_level + 1, exceeding bc_maxlevels by one. Since the xfs_rtrefcountbt_cur slab object is sized for exactly bc_maxlevels entries, the first btree op on such a cursor indexes bc_levels[m_rtrefc_maxlevels] past the end of the object. This is reached by the first rtrefcount cursor built after mount, via log/CoW recovery (xfs_reflink_recover_cow() during xfs_mountfs()) or an FS_IOC_GETFSMAP over the realtime device. Reject a root level equal to m_rtrefc_maxlevels, matching the ">=" form already used by the sibling data-device refcount/rmap verifiers and the in-memory rtrmap verifier. BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in xfs_btree_lookup (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:2101) Write of size 2 at addr ffff888018391658 by task exploit/144 xfs_btree_lookup (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:2101) xfs_btree_query_range (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_btree.c:5308) xfs_refcount_recover_cow_leftovers (fs/xfs/libxfs/xfs_refcount.c:2113) xfs_reflink_recover_cow (fs/xfs/xfs_reflink.c:1085) xlog_recover_finish (fs/xfs/xfs_log_recover.c:3551) xfs_mountfs (fs/xfs/xfs_mount.c:1158) xfs_fs_fill_super (fs/xfs/xfs_super.c:1940) get_tree_bdev_flags (fs/super.c:1634) vfs_get_tree (fs/super.c:1694) path_mount (fs/namespace.c:4161) __x64_sys_mount (fs/namespace.c:4367) entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) The buggy address belongs to the cache xfs_rtrefcountbt_cur of size 216 The buggy address is located 8 bytes to the right of allocated 216-byte region [ffff888018391578, ffff888018391650) Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: avoid UAF on sc->tempip in xrep_tempfile_create LOLLM noticed a potential UAF if the tempfile creation code fails after it set sc->tempip. Fix that.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ASoC: tas2562: Validate values for volume writes tas2562_volume_control_put() does not do any validation of the control value written by userspace, it uses it to look up a value in a fixed size array which can easily be overflowed and then writes whatever value it gets back to the device. Add validation that we are loading a value we have in the array.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: clk: spacemit: k3: set hdma clock as critical HDMA clock is responsible for the internal TCM access path of X100 RISC-V core, so set the clock flag as critical to prevent it from being shut off, otherwise the Linux system will hang, for example in the case of a vector instruction access generates a page fault.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ovpn: fix NULL dereference when killing missing key ovpn_crypto_kill_key assumes both crypto slots are populated and dereferences each slot before checking it. That is not guaranteed: a peer can have only one installed key, and the kill path may be asked to remove a key that is not present. Read each slot once while holding the crypto state lock, check for NULL before looking at key_id, and only replace the slot that actually matches.

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: veth: fix queue index used to wake the peer txq in veth_poll veth_poll() derives the index of the peer TX queue to wake from rq->xdp_rxq.queue_index. That field is only initialized by xdp_rxq_info_reg() in veth_enable_xdp_range(), which runs only when an XDP program is attached. On the plain GRO/NAPI path (veth_napi_enable_range()) xdp_rxq_info_reg() is never called, so queue_index stays 0 for every queue, as priv->rq is zero-allocated. So in a multi-queue setup with GRO enabled and no XDP program attached, every NAPI instance looks at the peer's TX queue 0. If veth_xmit() stops peer TX queue 1 because the ptr_ring is full (NETDEV_TX_BUSY), nothing ever wakes it again: the poller draining queue 1 wakes queue 0 instead. veth implements no ndo_tx_timeout, so the netdev watchdog does not kick in either, and the queue stays stopped indefinitely. Derive the index from the position of the rq within priv->rq instead, which is correct regardless of whether XDP was ever enabled. Scripts to reproduce the stall are available at https://github.com/netoptimizer/veth-backpressure-performance-testing

Linux

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ngbe: fix NULL pointer dereference in non-MSI-X interrupt enabling In non-MSI-X mode (such as legacy INTx or single MSI), wx->msix_entry is not allocated or initialized. Calling NGBE_INTR_MISC(wx) dereferences wx->msix_entry->entry, leading to a NULL pointer dereference crash. This issue was introduced by fixing the IRQ vector when the number of VFs is 7. Fix the issue by explicitly checking `pdev->msix_enabled` to determine the correct vector index. Additionally, as a side fix, set the interrupt mask to BIT(0) for the non-MSI-X fallback. In MSI/INTx mode, the MISC and queue interrupts share vector 0, and the WX_PX_MISC_IVAR register is only valid in the MSI-X case. Thus, BIT(0) is the correct mask for the miscellaneous cause when MSI-X is disabled.